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Summary
Economic researchers have not yet quantified the long-term benefits of price-level 
targeting. Consequently, central banks are unable to conduct a full cost-benefit 
analysis vis-a-vis inflation targeting. The primary contribution of this thesis is to 
quantify these benefits within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, 
thereby laying the foundations for a full cost-benefit analysis. The thesis focuses on 
three key areas: consumption volatility; social welfare; and inflation risk premia on 
long-term nominal contracts.
Conventional wisdom holds that the main benefit of price-level targeting is a 
reduction in long-term inflation risk. However, the current workhorse model for 
monetary analysis cannot be used to evaluate this benefit, because long-term inflation 
risk does not affect agents’ welfare. This thesis therefore builds and simulates 
overlapping generations models in which long-term inflation risk matters for social 
welfare. In these models, consumers save over a long horizon for old age using 
indexed and nominal government bonds that offer imperfect insurance against 
inflation risk. Importantly, the extent of nominal indexation is chosen endogenously 
in response to monetary policy in order to address the Lucas critique; and to allow for 
heterogeneities across countries and over time, three separate models are simulated in 
which consumers have access to different assets.
Key findings are as follows. First, price-level targeting reduces long-term inflation 
risk substantially compared to inflation targeting, leading to an increase in social 
welfare and a reduction in consumption volatility. Second, price-level targeting 
reduces by an order o f magnitude the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds. 
Finally, optimal indexation of government bonds is substantially lower under price- 
level targeting. Notably, there is considerable heterogeneity in results across model 
specifications. The estimated welfare gain from price-level targeting ranges from 0.01 
to 0.17 per cent o f aggregate consumption, and the estimated reduction in 
consumption risk ranges from 13 to 95 per cent.
1
Acknowledgements
I have many people to thank. First and foremost, I would like to thank my primary 
supervisor, Professor Patrick Minford, for his hard work and dedication, and for being 
willing to discuss my work at all points during the thesis. I have certainly enjoyed 
discussing my research with him, and feel I have leamt a great deal. I am also grateful 
to my second supervisor, Dr Panayiotis Pourpourides, for his useful and insightful 
comments on a topic that is far-removed from his own area of research. Dr 
Pourpourides read my work with care and diligence, and offered me continuous 
encouragement throughout the PhD.
Along the way, I have also received useful comments from many current and former 
PhD students at Cardiff, including Hao Hong, Tom Wilkinson, Dr David Meenagh, 
Dr Tom Nicholls, and Dr Eric Scheffel. Special thanks go to Dr Scheffel for helping 
to set-up my research website and for all of the useful advice he offered me 
throughout the PhD. I have also benefited greatly from presenting my research at 
seminars and workshops at Cardiff, and from publishing my research as Cardiff 
Economics Working Papers. The students at Cardiff are truly lucky to have such 
opportunities. I would personally like to express my thanks to Professor Max Gillman, 
coordinator of the PhD Economics Programme at Cardiff, for making this possible, 
and for ensuring that the PhD programme remained in tip-top condition during my 
time at Cardiff.
I would also like to thank Professor Laurence Copeland and Professor Gillman for 
comments they gave in a seminar at Cardiff in February 2010. These comments were 
invaluable and had a substantial impact on the final thesis. In addition, I am grateful 
to participants at the 3rd PhD Conference in Economics (Athens, May 2010) and the 
27 Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance (Bordeaux, June 2010) for their 
comments, and in particular to Jean Barthelemy, the discussant of my paper in 
Bordeaux, who offered many useful suggestions and insights. Matthias Paustian, an 
invited seminar speaker at Cardiff, also gave useful comments on my research. Last 
but not least, I would like to thank my long-suffering family for their unconditional 
support, and for their help and understanding during the final stages of the writing-up 
period.
The author would also like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) for funding this research.
2
Introduction
Inflation targeting (IT) is currently the most popular monetary policy framework with 
central banks, having been adopted in 26 countries worldwide (Roger, 2010).1 
However, recent research in the monetary policy literature has explored alternative 
policy options and their performance against IT in simulated models of the economy. 
This thesis contains five separate chapters that focus on one such alternative policy 
prescription: price-level targeting.
Price-level targeting (PLT), or stabilisation of the economy’s aggregate price index 
around a predetermined target price path, has been the subject of extensive theoretical 
research in recent years. It is also a timely topic from a policy perspective as the Bank 
of Canada is currently conducting a research programme to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of switching from IT to PLT (see Bank of Canada; 2006, 2009),2 and has left 
open the option to change its regime after 2011. The steady increase in literature on 
PLT has been driven in part by research at the Bank of Canada, but also reflects a 
renewed interest from academics due to the publication of articles on PLT in leading 
economic journals. Moreover, other central banks are now following suit by 
investigating PLT for themselves (Gaspar et al. 2007; Bank of Finland, 2008; Kahn, 
2009; Bundesbank, 2010).
The aim of this thesis is to quantify the long-term benefits of price-level targeting. 
This investigation is carried out in the context of a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) modelling framework. The models employed are therefore 
microfounded optimisation-based models of the macroeconomy of the kind developed 
to address the Lucas critique o f policy evaluation (Lucas, 1976). Such models have 
become popular tools for monetary policy analysis in recent years and have 
transformed the conduct of both theoretical and applied macroeconomic research. In 
order to provide context for the contributions that follow, the first chapter reviews the 
PLT literature, beginning with a simple explanation of PLT before proceeding to 
discuss its potential advantages, potential drawbacks, and practical issues. The first
1 Examples include the Bank o f  Canada, the Bank o f  England, the Swedish Riksbank and the Reserve 
Bank o f  N ew  Zealand.
2 The Bank o f  Canada began looking at PLT in the m id-1990s and the Review  was announced in Bank 
o f  Canada (2006).
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chapter is followed by chapters 2 to 4, which contain the main contributions of thesis, 
and whose content is discussed in greater detail below. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises 
key findings and policy implications, before putting in context the overall 
contributions of the thesis and discussing potential extensions for future research.
In a comprehensive review of PLT, Ambler (2009) identifies three main potential 
advantages of PLT over IT. Firstly, PLT can improve the economy’s short-term 
response to disturbances in models where economic agents are rational and forward- 
looking. Secondly, PLT can reduce the probability of the economy hitting or 
remaining at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates, potentially 
leading to improvements in social welfare. Thirdly, by eliminating ‘base-level drift’ in 
the price level, PLT can reduce inflation and price-level volatility over medium and 
long-term horizons, with consequent benefits for economic agents entered into 
contracts denominated in nominal terms or imperfectly indexed to prices. The first 
advantage has been explored extensively within the PLT literature (see Ambler, 
2009), such that recent research on PLT has turned away from this topic to more 
pressing issues (Bank of Canada, 2009). Considerable research effort has also been 
devoted to the second topic in recent years, following advances in computing power 
and numerical solution methods. The third advantage, however, has been neglected in 
recent research -  in part because the current workhorse model of monetary policy 
analysis is not well suited to a study o f the long-term welfare impact of PLT. This 
important but under-researched topic is taken as the focal point in this thesis.
Interestingly, the long-term impact o f PLT was originally considered to be its main 
potential advantage, and is responsible for the long-standing interest in PLT at the 
Bank of Canada (see Duguay, 1994). As Ambler (2009) points out, further study is 
desperately needed on this topic, in particular to assess the impact of PLT on long­
term contracting behaviour and social welfare. Such research would enable central 
banks to accurately assess the costs and benefits of PLT vis-a-vis IT. For this reason, 
the Bank of Canada has openly called for more research on the long-term impact of 
PLT whilst emphasising that such analyses should be conducted within DSGE models 
of the economy (see Bank of Canada; 2006, 2009). This primary aim of this thesis is 
to address this need for further research.
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The main analysis begins in Chapter 2 where a DSGE model of the economy is built 
in which the impact of PLT on long-term inflation volatility and social welfare can be 
quantified explicitly using consumer utility. The model put forth is an overlapping 
generations model o f life-cycle saving in which young generations save for old age 
using indexed and nominal government bonds whose payoffs are vulnerable to long­
term inflation risk. The model also includes money and capital as additional assets, 
and the degree of indexation -  that is, the share of indexed bonds in the total supply of 
government bonds -  is chosen optimally in response to monetary policy as part o f an 
optimal commitment Ramsey problem. In order to allow for heterogeneities across 
countries, three different versions of this general model are simulated in which 
consumers have access to different assets.
Chapter 2 first investigates social welfare when the model includes only nominal 
bonds and money, before extending the menu of assets available to include productive 
capital whose rate of return is driven by stochastic shocks to productivity. These 
special cases of the model are presented first because they highlight the workings of 
the underlying life-cycle model in a straightforward way, and are applicable for some 
developed economies. Chapter 3 then extends the model to include indexed 
government bonds, thus providing a robustness check on the results in Chapter 2 for 
countries in which indexation plays an important role. Chapter 3 is also important in 
its own right because the degree o f nominal indexation is endogenised with respect to 
monetary policy -  a key recommendation made by Ambler (2009). As a result, the 
welfare results obtained should not be vulnerable to the Lucas critique, making them 
more reliable from a policy perspective. Furthermore, in contrast to past literature 
focusing on optimal indexation o f bonds, the unrealistic assumption of perfect 
indexation is relaxed. Finally, in Chapter 4, the three models analysed in chapters 2 
and 3 are used to estimate the reduction in the long-term inflation risk premium on 
nominal bonds under PLT.
In order to model inflation risk over a long-term horizon, each period in the life-cycle 
model is interpreted as lasting 30 years and (long-term) money supply shocks are not 
assumed constant across monetary policy regimes, but are instead built-up from a 
yearly horizon. Crucially, this methodology means that the model captures the impact 
of IT and PLT on long-term inflation volatility -  that is, the model captures ‘base-
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level drift’ in the price level under IT and its absence under PLT. To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to formally model the long-term impact o f PLT 
and its welfare implications within a DSGE framework. In order to capture asset risk- 
premia in the model and obtain accurate welfare results, the model is solved using a 
second-order approximation method.
Several key results are found. First and foremost, the welfare gain of PLT over IT is 
estimated to be positive and economically non-trivial: the gain in social welfare under 
PLT is equivalent to a permanent increase in aggregate consumption of 0.01 to 0.17 
per cent. The intuition for PLT increasing social welfare is that, due to the elimination 
of base-level drift, PLT reduces long-term inflation risk substantially compared to IT, 
which in turn reduces real return risk on long-term bonds, making consumption less 
volatile for old generations. Since consumers are risk-averse, this reduction in 
consumption risk leads to an increase in social welfare.3
Secondly, PLT leads to a substantial reduction in aggregate consumption risk, though 
this reduction is driven entirely by a fall in consumption risk faced by the old, since 
only they benefit directly from the lower level of inflation risk under PLT. The 
reasoning is simply that inflation risk matters only when considering the payoffs of 
nominal assets over a long horizon -  payoffs which matter only to the ‘old’ who rely 
on savings (in real terms) to fund their consumption in retirement. There is 
considerable variation in the impact o f PLT on old generations’ consumption risk 
across the three models, with a volatility reduction of only 13 per cent in the full 
model with indexed bonds, capital and endogenous indexation, compared to 95 per 
cent in the model with only nominal bonds. Interestingly, the percentage reductions in 
volatility far exceed the potential welfare gains, because consumption risk has only a 
second-order impact on social welfare. As noted by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), 
such impacts are typically around 100 times smaller than those at first-order in DSGE 
models.
Thirdly, optimal indexation of government bonds is substantially lower under PLT. 
The intuition for this result is that PLT reduces the benefits to be had from indexed
J Given that consumption variability across old generations is lessened, PLT also has separate 
redistributive implications. These implications are not discussed in this thesis.
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bonds, because consumers have less need to protect themselves against inflation 
variations if the level o f long-term inflation risk is relatively low. On the other hand, 
indexation is relatively more costly under PLT, because the imperfections of 
indexation (as determined by institutional or political factors outside the model) are a 
relatively more important source of consumption variations if inflation risk is low. 
The result that optimal indexation is substantially lower under PLT has been echoed 
in recent work in the context of optimal indexation of wages (Minford and Peel, 2003; 
Amano et al. 2007), though the reasoning there is slightly different: indexing wages is 
‘costly’ even if indexation is perfect, because the burden of adjustment is pushed onto 
employment following real shocks, leading to an increase in output variability (Gray, 
1976).
Fourthly, due to the reduction in long-term inflation risk under PLT, the long-term 
inflation risk premium on nominal government debt is substantially lower than under 
IT -  typically by 90 per cent or more. An important implication of this result is that in 
order to finance government spending, higher taxes are necessary under IT. In turn, 
this means that society does not gain (or lose) from risk-premia in terms of average 
consumption: the gain in average consumption by the old from a higher risk-premium 
is offset by a reduction in average consumption by the young due to higher taxes. As a 
result, the optimal indexation share does not depend on risk-premia and is determined 
purely by a ‘consumption insurance’ motive. Similarly, social welfare does not 
depend on indirectly on inflation risk through bond risk-premia, but only on the direct 
impact of such risk on consumption volatility faced by old generations (i.e. 
pensioners).
Fifth, there is considerable heterogeneity in results across model specifications and to 
changes in key model parameters. For instance, introducing productive but risky 
capital into the model reduces the welfare benefit of PLT somewhat because the 
presence of real productivity risk makes consumption in old age somewhat more 
volatile, lessening the extent to which PLT can reduce overall consumption risk. 
Similarly, the potential welfare gain from PLT falls even further once indexed bonds 
are introduced, because consumers can then directly protect their savings against 
unanticipated inflation variations, making the stabilising impact of PLT on old 
generations’ consumption somewhat less than if only nominal government bonds are
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issued. In the case o f inflation risk premia, there is substantial variation in the 
magnitude of inflation risk premia, and also in the absolute reduction in the inflation 
risk premium that can be attained under PLT.
The main policy implications arising from these results are as follows. Firstly, the 
consumption volatility and welfare impacts of PLT are positive and non-trivial, and 
should therefore be taken into account in a full cost-benefit analysis by central banks. 
However, before any specific conclusions can be drawn, further research is needed to 
investigate this long-term impact within more comprehensive economic models of the 
kind used by central banks for quantitative policy analyses. Secondly, as optimal 
indexation of government bonds differs substantially between IT and PLT and this 
influences social welfare, it is important for future research to endogenise indexation 
in order to obtain accurate results when evaluating macroeconomic performance 
under IT and PLT using simulated models of the economy. Research that does not do 
so will clearly be vulnerable to the Lucas critique.
Thirdly, the long-term impact of PLT on social welfare and consumption risk is likely 
to vary considerably across countries. For example, in the case of the UK and US, 
private sector pensions play an important role; indexed government bonds account for 
a non-trivial share of government bonds; and public sector pensions are indexed once 
in payment. Therefore, the model with capital and indexed and nominal government 
bonds is likely to be most applicable, suggesting a relatively small welfare gain from 
switching to PLT of 0.01 per cent o f aggregate consumption. On the other hand, 
public sector pensions account for around 85 per cent of retirement income in 
Germany (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004) and the share of indexed bonds is 
extremely small (Garcia, 2008), suggesting that the model without any capital or 
indexed bonds should be used to estimate the welfare gain from PLT. Doing so 
implies a welfare gain around 10 times higher, or a 0.1 per cent increase in aggregate 
consumption. Moreover, an important finding from sensitivity analysis is that the 
long-term welfare gain from PLT varies substantially with the extent of risk aversion 
and the level of nominal volatility. In particular, countries in which risk aversion is 
relatively high and where IT and performs poorly will have more to gain from 
switching from IT to PLT.
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Fourthly, as the magnitude of inflation risk premia varies substantially with risk 
aversion, nominal volatility and model specifications, the importance of long-term 
inflation risk premia is likely to vary considerably across countries, being higher in 
countries in which risk aversion and nominal volatility are higher, and also in 
countries like Germany and Canada where nominal assets play an important role in 
retirement income prevision. However, it should be noted that the result that PLT 
leads to a large proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium compared to IT is 
strongly robust, and that this result holds potentially important public policy 
implications because it implies that, other things being equal, risk-averse consumers 
will be willing to save more in nominal pensions under PLT than IT.
Finally, the result that the inflation risk premium is an order of magnitude lower under 
PLT is likely to have separate welfare implications of its own. For instance, a lower 
inflation risk premium may boost investment -  potentially raising the sustainable rate 
of economic growth -  and will lower the average cost of issuing government debt, 
thereby enabling government spending to be increased for given taxes, or for taxes 
(and thus distortions) to be lowered for a given level of expenditure. Both of these 
factors are potentially important given that the sustainability of public sector pensions 
is now a major public policy issue in most developed economies. However, the 
models presented in this thesis would need to be extended to include a separate 
financial sector and/or endogenous growth in order to analyse these implications 
formally. These would be potentially fruitful extensions of the model for future 
research. Other potentially useful extensions are discussed at the end of Chapter 5.
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Chapter 1 
Price-level targeting: A literature review 
1.1 Understanding price-level targeting
Under a price-level targeting (PLT) regime, monetary policymakers attempt to 
stabilise the aggregate price level around a predetermined long run target price path. 
Consequently, the target price level in any period in unaffected by past economic 
shocks. Hence if the current price level is above the level implied by the target price 
path, below-average inflation is required next period in order to return the price level 
to target, and vice versa. In this respect, PLT is effectively ‘average inflation 
targeting', where the average is taken over a long horizon. Useful reviews of PLT are 
given by Ambler (2009), Coumede and Moccero (2009), Kahn (2009), and Parkin 
(2009).
The PLT approach to monetary policy stands in contrast to the inflation targeting (IT) 
mandates pursued by many central banks worldwide. In the case of IT, the rate o f  
change o f prices (over a short horizon) and not the level of prices is the target of 
policy. Hence if inflation rises above target, this deviation should not be offset in the 
future: ‘bygones and bygones’ and policymakers continue to aim at the same inflation 
target in all future periods. Consequently, there is ‘base-level drift’ in the price level 
under an IT regime, whilst this is ruled out by successful implementation of PLT. The 
response of policy to past deviations from target is the defining feature of PLT. 
Indeed, in the absence o f economic shocks that give rise to such deviations, PLT and 
IT will produce identical outcomes provided that the long run inflation target implied 
by the target price path is consistent with the short-term inflation target.4
In order to make distinction between IT and PLT clear, the next section draws on a 
simple comparison due to Minford (2004), in which the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy is suppressed for simplicity. The PLT case is dealt with first. The 
implications of PLT for the level and volatility of the price level and inflation are 
explained using diagrams, impulse responses and equations. These results are then 
contrasted with a simple representation of IT. Each period in these examples should
4 For example, a long run inflation target o f  60% over 30 years would be consistent (ignoring 
compounding) with an annual inflation target o f  2%.
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be interpreted as lasting either one quarter or one year; the former is more consistent 
with academic literature, whilst the latter is closer to empirical estimates of the 
‘monetary policy transmission lag’.5
1.1.1 Price-level targeting: A simple example
Suppose that in each period / a path for log prices po + n*t is targeted by the central 
bank, where po > 0 is the initial price level and n* > 0 is the inflation target that is 
consistent with the target price path. It is assumed that deviations from the target price 
path are offset in full and without error in the following period, and that the central 
bank has perfect credibility. Therefore, this example describes the impact of PLT 
under the assumption that it is implemented successfully in a world where economic 
agents have rational expectations.
Under the above assumptions, the actual level of prices in period / will deviate from 
its target only if there is a current price shock. Therefore, assuming that price shocks 
are temporary and uncorrelated, the time-/ price level will be given by
(1.1) P, = Po + X * t  + £,
where p t is the log of the aggregate price level, and e, is an IID shock to prices with 
mean zero and variance a2.6
Note that the time-/ price level depends on only a single (current) price shock, since 
any past deviations from the target price path have been offset. In order to make this 
feature of PLT clear, Figure 1.1 shows the response of the price level to a one-off 
positive price shock > 0 under the assumption that the long run inflation rate 
implied by the target price path is positive. The price shock in period 1 pushes the 
price level p\ above the target level (denoted with a star), but in period 2 the price 
level is returned to the target price path.
5 For a short review o f  this literature, see W alsh (2003, Ch. 1).
6 Henceforth I drop the ‘lo g ’ and ‘aggregate’ labels and just refer to the price level or prices.
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Figure 1.1 -  Response of the price level following a price shock (PLT)
We can also use this simple exam ple to look at the implied rate o f inflation. Taking 
the first-difference o f Equation (1.1) implies that inflation is given by
(1.2) K, =7T*+£t -e ,_ x
Equation (1.2) shows that inflation in period t is given by the inflation target implied 
by the target price path, plus the difference between the current shock to the price 
level and the shock in the previous period. Intuitively, the past shock to prices matters 
for current inflation because it is offset by the central bank in order to return the price 
level to its target path. For instance, in the face o f  an inflationary shock to the price 
level (inflation above target), inflation next period would need to undershoot its long 
run target in order to return the price level to target. Figure 1.2 shows this point 
explicitly by plotting the impulse response o f  inflation to a one standard deviation 
price shock. The standard deviation was set at a  = 0.01, since this implies an impulse 
response o f one per cent on impact.
12
V0.5
B
—c
- 0.5
.1—1 . , .____
2 4 6 8 10
Pericxl
Figure 1.2 -  Impulse response of inflation to a price shock (PLT)
1.1.2 Macroeconomic implications of price-level targeting
Firstly, note from Equation (1.2) that one-year-ahead inflation expectations are time- 
varying under PLT and given by
(1.3) E,_\7t, = 7 T * - £ , _ l
where E,.\ is the rational expectations operator conditional on information available in 
period /-l.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: past deviations from the inflation target 
are offset under PLT, and rational agents take this into account when forming their 
inflation expectations. Another way o f  thinking about this result is that the short-term 
inflation target becom es state-contingent. Specifically, the short-term inflation target 
is adjusted to ensure that, if  the target is met, the price level will be returned to its 
target path. Since the PLT regime is perfectly credible, inflation expectations simply 
follow this ‘state-contingent inflation target’. Consider next the impact o f PLT on 
price-level and inflation uncertainty.
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Using Equation (1.1), the /:-period-ahead price level is given by
( 1.4 ) Pt.k = Po +n * ( t  + k) + £ ,.k
Therefore, the uncertainty associated with the price level k periods hence is given by
Equation (1.5) states that future price-level uncertainty is independent of the forecast 
horizon. This result means that the long-term purchasing power of money is preserved 
over time under PLT. The reason is that any shocks to prices between periods t and 
t+k will be offset by policy in the intervening periods. That is, although the level of 
inflationary shocks cannot be forecast in advance, economic agents understand that 
they will be offset by a PLT central bank and therefore take this into account when 
forming their forecasts o f future price-level uncertainty. As a result, the only 
uncertainty in the future price level under PLT comes from the last period of forecast 
horizon -  the only period whose shock cannot be offset prior to the end of period t+k.
Now consider the implications of PLT for inflation measured over a ^-period horizon, 
that is, the percentage change in prices between period / and period t+k. This measure 
of inflation would be relevant for consumers or firms who enter into medium or long­
term nominal contracts like mortgages or long-term bonds.
Using equations (1.1) and (1.4), inflation over a ^-period horizon is given by
where the subscript t - » t + k  indicates that inflation is measured over a horizon from
7 Cochrane (2001) uses this notation to denote the holding period return on an asset held from period t 
to period t+k.
( 1.5) var,(p , .k )= + '
( 1 6 ) = P,.k ~P , = tz* k  + e,tt ~ e ,
period I to period t+k.
14
Consequently, the variance of ^ -period inflation is given by:
(1-7)
Equation (1.7) shows that horizon-/: inflation volatility is equal to /:-period-ahead 
price-level volatility. Depending on the horizon chosen, k will refer to a short-term, 
medium-term, or long-term horizon. In the context of PLT, medium and long-term 
horizons are considered to be important due to the result that inflation uncertainty 
does not increase with the forecast horizon.
Finally, there is one last result regarding inflation volatility that should be noted. 
Using Equation (1.2), the unconditional variance of short-term inflation is given by
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Since inflation depends on both a 
current shock and a past shock, unconditional inflation volatility is two times the price 
shock variance.8 It is important to note that unconditional variances are usually 
considered to be important in monetary policy analyses, because they allow 
alternative policies to be evaluated across all possible histories of shocks (see 
Damjanovic et al., 2008).
The example used in this section is o f course somewhat stylised, but deliberately so. 
Indeed, by abstracting from the monetary policy transmission mechanism, we have 
been able to clearly demonstrate main implications of PLT without the need to resort 
to a formal economic model. These implications are contrasted with the IT case in the 
next section.
1.13 Macroeconomic implications of inflation targeting
It is assumed that the central bank also has perfect credibility under IT, and that the 
short-term inflation target is consistent with the long-term one implied by the target 
price path under PLT (such that IT and PLT are directly comparable). Moreover, it is
8 The intuition for this result can been seen from the im pulse response in Figure 1.2.
( 1.8) var(/r,) = 2cr2
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assumed that the price level is subject to an identical set of shocks, but that the central 
bank permits base-level drift in the price-level -  as implied by the mandates of IT 
central banks.
Under this assumption the price level follows a random walk, with drift given by the 
short-term inflation target k*:
(1.9) p, = p, , + **+ £ '
Consequently, the dynamic evolution of the price level is somewhat different under 
IT. This point is demonstrated clearly in Figure 1.3, which shows the response of the 
price level following a one-off positive price shock E\ > 0 in period 1. This price level 
response can be contrasted directly with the PLT case in Figure 1.1. Starting from 
period 0, the central bank aims to meet its inflation target n * in year 1. However, the 
price shock frustrates its attempt to meet the inflation target: the actual price level is 
pu  and inflation in period 1 is above target. Under PLT, the price shock was offset to 
return the price level to the target path. However, there is no such response under IT: 
‘bygones are bygones’ and central bank ignores the past deviation from the inflation 
target, with the aim o f achieving the inflation target in every period henceforth. 
Hence, for instance, the inflation target is met in period 2 because the price level is p i 
which lies above p\ by exactly n*.
As shown by the upward shift in Figure 1.3, it is as though the IT central bank starts 
with a target path for prices in period 0 and subsequently revises this path 
permanently upwards by the shock in period 1. Furthermore, this point holds more 
generally: each price shock will have a permanent effect by causing the central bank 
to adjust its implied price path so that the inflation target can be met in each future 
period. The term ‘base-level drift’ is an appropriate description of the behaviour o f the 
price level, because price shocks lead to drift in the forecast path for prices, with each 
shock implying a new ‘target path’ with a different base (or starting point).
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Figure 1.3 -  Response of the price level following a price shock (IT)
Since past inflationary shocks are treated as bygones, inflation depends only on the 
current shock to prices. This point can be seen formally by subtracting the lagged 
price level on both sides o f  Equation (1.9) to get the following expression for short­
term inflation:
(1.10) 71, =  7 T * + £ ,
To provide a direct contrast with the PLT case dealt with above, Figure 1.4 shows the 
impulse response o f inflation to a one standard deviation inflation shock, again 
assuming that o  = 0.01. Clearly, the impact o f  the shock on inflation is temporary: 
inflation rises by one per cent on impact but is returned to steady-state (i.e. to target) 
in the following period. By contrast, PLT offset the positive shock in period 2 by 
setting inflation one per cent below target.
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Figure 1.4 - Impulse response of inflation to a price shock (IT)
Now consider inflation expectations under IT. Using Equation (1.10), expected 
inflation under IT is given by
Hence inflation expectations are constant at a level consistent with the inflation target. 
Intuitively, the central bank has perfect credibility and inflation depends only on the 
current shock to prices, whose expected value is zero. By contrast, expected inflation 
varies under PLT, because the central bank offsets past inflationary shocks in order to 
return the price level to its target path.
Finally, consider the implications of IT for price-level and inflation uncertainty. First, 
using Equation (1.9), the &-period-ahead price level is given by
Therefore, conditional on time-/ information, uncertainty surrounding the ^-horizon- 
ahead price level is given by
( 1 . 1 1 )
k - \
( 1. 12) P,.k = P „ k - 1  + x * + e , = P ,  + * * *  + £ £ , . * - ,
(1.13) var, (/>„,) = k<y2
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Equation (1.13) states that under IT uncertainty regarding the future price level is 
proportional the forecast horizon k. Hence base-level drift means that past shocks to 
prices have a permanent effect on the current level of prices. Intuitively, since future 
price shocks are not known in advance and are not offset, shocks during the forecast 
horizon accumulate, with each one adding to forecast uncertainty. An important result 
that follows from Equation (1.13) is that price-level uncertainty is unbounded as the 
forecast horizon increases, that is, as k—*q o . An equivalent expression of this result is 
that the unconditional variance of the period-/ price level is given by var(p,) = /er2, 
which is clearly not finite as / increases.
Now consider the implications of this result for inflation measured over a horizon of k 
periods. Using Equation (1.12), inflation over a A-pcriod horizon is given by
k\
(114) n, = p ,.k -  p, = n  +
/ =  o
where the subscript t —>t + k  again indicates that inflation is measured over a horizon 
from period / to period t+k.
Consequently, the variance of horizon-£ inflation, conditional on time-/ information, 
is equal to the A;-period-ahead price level variance:
(1.15) var,(/r,_,„4) = key1
Equation (1.15) demonstrates an important result: the variance of inflation is also 
unbounded as the forecast horizon increases. Inflation forecast uncertainty is likely to 
be important for economic agents who enter into medium or long-term nominal 
contracts, like long-dated bonds or mortgages. For instance, if these contracts are 
fixed in nominal terms for say k periods, then the value of nt-+t+k will determine the 
real value of these contracts in the period when they are paid-off or yield a return. 
Provided economic agents are risk-averse, they will also care about var,(7r,^,+* ), since 
this characterises the uncertainty associated with the real value of a nominal contract
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at time / when the contract is signed.9 In the PLT case, by contrast, both the future 
price level and inflation variances (k periods ahead) were finite. Moreover, the k- 
period-ahead variances were equal to tx2 -  the yearly price shock variance -  since all 
past price shocks are subsequently offset.
Finally, consider the unconditional variance of short-term inflation under IT. Using 
Equation (1.10), the unconditional variance o f inflation in any period is simply
(1.16) var(;r,) = <r2
Relative to the PLT case, this variance is halved. The intuition for this result is 
simple: under IT, inflation in any year or quarter will deviate from the inflation target 
only if there is a current shock, because past shocks to prices are treated as bygones. 
Hence the inflation variance is simply given by the price shock variance. By contrast, 
inflation under PLT depends on a current price shock and also on the shock from the 
previous period which is actively offset by policy. As such, yearly inflation is twice as 
volatile under PLT. The result that short-term inflation volatility is increased under 
PLT was emphasised in early literature, and the relatively low level of short-term 
inflation variability under IT provides an explanation for its popularity with central 
banks. A second reason behind the popularity of IT is that it encourages agents’ 
inflation expectations to converge on a constant inflation target, as highlighted by 
Equation (1.11).
It is notable, however, that recent literature has argued that short-term inflation 
volatility could actually be reduced under PLT. The reasoning is that, in forward- 
looking models with nominal rigidities, monetary policy can actually influence the 
volatility of ‘price-level shocks’: the size of such shocks will depend on the extent to 
which firms choose to ‘pass-on’ an increase (decrease) in costs through higher (lower) 
goods prices following cost-push shocks. In such models, prices are less sensitive 
under PLT than IT because firms expect the aggregate price level to be restored to the 
target price path in the near future, and therefore face a lower ‘loss’ from not
For instance, risk-averse econom ic agents w ill, ce teris  paribu s, be less w illing to enter into nominal 
contracts the higher the level o f  inflation uncertainty.
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adjusting prices in the face of cost-push shocks. The assumption made in the above 
example that price level shocks have the same volatility under IT and PLT is therefore 
not an innocuous one. In the context of the simple example above, we could allow for 
this difference by letting price-level shocks to have a lower variance under PLT. 
Short-term inflation volatility would then fall under PLT if price shock variance were 
less than one-half of the variance under IT.
Table 1.1 summarises the macroeconomic implications of IT and PLT explored in this 
section. Although the above comparison of IT and PLT is an extreme simplification of 
reality, it is powerful because of its transparency. In fact, somewhat remarkably, the 
simple comparison of this section provides the intuition for all the main results from 
the literature, and indeed all the key results in this thesis. If in doubt regarding the 
intuition behind any of the results that follow, the reader may therefore benefit from 
returning to this initial introductory section and the summary results in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 -  Summary of inflation and price-level targeting
IT PLT Notes
Inflation K, -  71* +£, * ii * + I
With PLT, inflation depends 
on a current shock to inflation 
and also the past one which is 
offset.
Inflation
expectations 7T *
Constant under IT, but not 
under PLT since rational 
agents expect the price level 
to be stabilised after a shock.
Medium and 
long-term 
price/inflation 
uncertainty
k a 2 c r
Increases one-for-one with 
the horizon k under IT due to 
base-level drift, but PLT 
eliminates base-level drift.
Short-term
inflation
volatility
c r l a 2
Doubled under PLT because 
past price shocks are offset. 
However, recent literature 
argues that volatility may in 
fact be reduced.
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1.2 Potential benefits of price-level targeting
The literature has identified three main potential benefits from PLT. In this section, 
each of these benefits is discussed in turn. The second benefit discussed in this section 
-  the impact of PLT on long-term inflation risk and the welfare of economic agents 
with long-term nominal contracts -  provides the foundation for the later chapters of 
the thesis that contain the main contributions to the economic literature. The reader 
should therefore pay particular attention to this section and the results described 
therein.
1.2.1 Short-term response to economic disturbances10
A first benefit of PLT identified by the literature is a reduction in short-term 
macroeconomic volatility that shifts inwards the economic trade-off between inflation 
and output gap volatility (see Taylor, 1979).11 In particular, PLT improves this trade­
off when the expectations of economic agents are forward-looking and the central 
bank acts in a discretionary manner, re-optimising its decisions independently every 
period. The basic intuition for this result can gleaned from one of the results in 
Section 1.1. In particular, it was shown that following an increase in inflation above 
target due to a price level shock, a credible PLT regime produces the expectation that 
inflation will be reduced below target in the following period. If current inflation 
depends positively on expected inflation -  as it does in forward-looking models in 
which agents have rational expectations -  then this expectation will reduce the extent 
to which inflation rises (falls) at times when inflationary pressure builds up 
(subsides), hence reducing deviations of inflation from target. These lower inflation 
deviations then feed through to lower output gap volatility via nominal rigidities.
A good starting point for understanding this result and the surrounding literature is the 
seminal paper by Svensson (1999). In this paper, Svensson reports a ‘free lunch’ to 
PLT: inflation volatility is reduced relative to IT for any given level of output gap 
volatility. This result means that PLT is desirable even if society has IT preferences, 
and this is the key point that Svensson emphasises. As in many papers in the monetary 
policy literature, Svensson assumes that social preferences take the form of a
10 This section draws heavily on the survey by Ambler (2009).
11 To be clear, ‘short-term’ should be taken to mean a quarterly or yearly horizon.
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quadratic ‘social loss function’ which states that inflation and output gap variations 
are costly for social welfare:12
d-17) l ,= £ , ! > k . +^ Ui=0
where 0 < ft < 1 is social discount factor, A is a constant indicating the relative 
importance of output gap fluctuations vis-a-vis inflation fluctuations, n, is inflation 
between period /-I and period /, and x, is the output gap at time /, defined as the 
proportional difference between actual output and the level of output in an economy 
with perfectly-flexible prices.13
Aggregate supply in the economy is given by a New Classical Phillips curve:
(1.18) n , = E ,An, +(p(x, - p x ,_,) + £?,
where the parameter 0 < p <  1 governs the extent of output gap persistence, <p > 0 is 
the Phillips curve slope parameter, and e, is an IID supply shock with a mean of zero 
and constant variance.
The aim of the central bank is to minimise its loss function subject to the Phillips 
curve in Equation (1.18). It is important to note that the loss function in Equation
(1.17) is assumed to be the correct representation o f social preferences. However, in 
the workhorse New Keynesian model discussed later on, this same equation can be 
derived as a second-order approximation to the expected welfare loss o f the 
representative household (see Woodford, 2001), thus giving a model-consistent 
representation of social preferences and laying the foundation for microfounded 
welfare analysis.
Svensson finds that in order to minimise the social loss function, it is better to 
delegate the central bank ‘PLT preferences’. In this context, PLT preferences can be
12 For simplicity, it is assumed that the target inflation rate and target output gap are zero.
,3 Each period in the loss function (1 .17) should be interpreted as lasting one quarter or one year.
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represented by a central bank loss function which specifies that price-level rather than 
inflation deviations are costly, or
d-19) c r u . .  -p* )2+ * "r*(2.,}
/=0
where p, is the log price level at time /, p * is the constant target price level and XPLT is 
the relative weight that the central bank places on output gap versus price-level 
deviations.14
Svensson shows that delegating Equation (1.19) to the central bank leads to a lower 
social loss than delegating the social loss itself, because inflation volatility is reduced 
for any given level of output gap volatility.15 This result arises because the central 
bank re-optimises its decisions every period in a discretionary manner, such that 
policy is subject to ‘discretionary bias’.16 Indeed, under IT the central bank is not able 
to manipulate private sector inflation expectations when it lacks commitment, which 
in turn prevents it from dampening the impact of supply shocks on inflation. This is 
somewhat problematic because, if output gap deviations are strongly persistent, 
inflation will deviate from its target for substantial periods of time following supply 
shocks.
However, this same problem does not arise under PLT. The reason is that PLT creates 
the expectation that inflationary shocks will be undone in the future, which then 
reduces actual inflation deviations through the expectations term in the Phillips curve, 
partly offsetting the destabilising impact o f a persistent output gap. Hence inflation 
variations can be reduced, whilst there is no impact on output gap variability itself 
since only ‘inflation surprises’ matter for output. In effect, this result shows that there 
is a critical value o f output gap persistence above which extra fluctuations caused by 
offsetting past inflationary shocks under PLT are dominated by reduced volatility
14 A constant target price level is assum ed because this is consistent with the assumed inflation target o f  
zero. The relative weight on output gap deviations can potentially differ from the IT case under PLT, 
but it is important to note that S ven sson ’s result holds for any given relative weight on output gap 
deviations.
15 Equivalently, output gap volatility is lower for any given level o f  inflation volatility.
16 By contrast, delegating the IT loss function w ill m inim ise IT social preferences under commitment.
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from stabilising inflation expectations. In fact, Svensson shows that an output gap 
persistence parameter of p > 1/2 is sufficient to deliver the free lunch result.
The free lunch result is viewed as important because it contradicts the conventional 
wisdom on PLT, and does so within a rational expectations setting. Moreover, it is 
important to note that this result is not limited to the case of endogenous output gap 
persistence, even if one considers a New Classical Phillips curve. For instance, Cover 
and Pecorino (2005) use the same model as Svensson but assume that the output gap 
is not persistent (i.e. p -  0) and that the central bank must choose its policy before 
knowing the current value o f the supply shock. This change in timing makes it is 
necessary to specify an IS curve for aggregate demand. Aggregate demand is assumed 
to depend negatively on the ex ante real interest rate, which in turn is negatively 
influenced by expected inflation through the Fisher equation. Consequently, an 
increase in expected inflation will reduce the ex ante real interest rate, stimulating 
aggregate demand and the output gap.
PLT performs well in this framework because, in contrast to IT, it automatically 
stabilises the output gap via impact o f variations in expected inflation on the real 
interest rate. For example, following a demand shock both the output gap and 
inflation will increase, and under PLT this impact will be mitigated by a reduction in 
expected inflation for the next period, which then pushes up the ex ante real interest 
rate and stabilises output via the IS curve. This automatic stabilisation mechanism has 
become known as the ‘expectations channel’ o f PLT.
Though these initial contributions are important for highlighting a key flaw in the 
conventional wisdom on PLT, they suffer from a major weakness: welfare analyses of 
monetary policy based on the New Classical Phillips curve are not microfounded, 
because the social loss function in Equation (1.17) cannot be derived as an 
approximation to the expected utility loss o f the representative household.17 
Furthermore, the New Classical Phillips curve has been widely criticised from an
17 Woodford (2003, Ch. 3) show s that a N ew  C lassical Philips curve (with no output persistence) can 
be derived when a fraction o f  m onopolistically com petitive firms must set their output prices one 
period in advance, whilst the remaining firms have fully flexible prices. However, the approximation o f  
the representative household’s expected welfare differs from Equation (1.17) and is not a sensible 
welfare criterion for monetary policy since only u n an tic ipa ted  fluctuations in inflation matter.
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empirical perspective because it implies that only unanticipated inflation influences 
output, in direct contradiction to evidence from the structural VAR literature (e.g. 
Christiano et a i , 2005). For these reasons, most recent studies comparing IT and PLT 
have used the microfounded New Keynesian model (see Clarida et al., 1999).
The New Keynesian model consists of households who maximise expected utility and 
profit-maximising firms. Firms are monopolistically competitive and produce their 
own individual differentiated output goods. Following Calvo (1983), a constant 
fraction of firms are unable to change the nominal price of their output in any given 
period, whilst the remaining fraction of firms are free to re-optimise their prices. 
Consequently, inflation in any given period comes solely from changes in output 
prices set by firms that are able to re-set their output prices. Profit maximisation by 
firms induces them to set their current output price as a function of marginal cost and 
the expected aggregate price level in the next period, with the latter entering firms’ 
first-order conditions due to the possibility that nominal rigidities will prevent them
from re-setting their output price next period. Moreover, under standard assumptions,
18all firms changing price in a given period will set the same output price, which 
simplifies greatly the task of aggregating across firms and gives rise to a simple 
Phillips curve describing economy-wide price setting behaviour.
Log-linearisation of this equation around zero trend inflation yields the so-called New 
Keynesian Phillips curve:
(1 .20 ) x, = PE , / r /+) + kx( +u,
where 0 < p  < 1 is the representative household’s discount factor, k  >  0 is a constant 
that depends on the structural parameters o f the model, and ut is an AR( 1) cost-push 
shock to inflation with a persistence parameter 0 < pu < 1 and a constant variance IID 
innovation. As before, it, and x, denote inflation and the output gap.
18 The assumptions are as follows: all firms face the sam e production technology and demand curves 
whose elasticity o f  substitution is com m on and constant over time (W alsh, 2003); the aggregate capital 
stock is fixed, but capital can be reallocated costlessly  and instantaneously across firms (Ambler,
2007); and finally, there is unfettered access to perfect financial markets, leading to price equalisation  
across firms (Rotem berg and W oodford, 1998).
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It is important to note that the cost-push shock does not arise from the pricing 
conditions of firms. It is instead appended to the New Keynesian Phillips curve to 
ensure that there is a trade-off between inflation volatility and output gap volatility 
(see King and Wolman, 1999). However, if monopolistic firms’ output demand 
elasticities are subject to exogenous fluctuations, then a microfounded justification for 
the addition of the cost-push shock then emerges from firms’ first-order conditions 
(Steinsson, 2003). The New Keynesian Phillips curve in Equation (1.20) has provided 
the foundation for most o f the recent literature comparing the performance IT and 
PLT. The key difference relative to the New Classical Phillips curve in Equation
(1.18) is that current inflation depends on expected future inflation, as opposed to the 
expectation of inflation in the current period. Consequently, monetary policy will be 
able to improve the trade-off between inflation and the output gap if it can favourably 
influence firms’ expectations regarding future inflation.
Vestin (2006) was the first to compare IT and PLT with a New Keynesian Phillips 
curve. Like Svensson (1999), Vestin focuses on the case where IT and PLT policies 
are discretionary, though he uses the optimal commitment policy as a benchmark 
against which to compare the results under discretion. Two key results are found in 
favour of PLT. Firstly, if  there is no persistence in the cost-push shock (i.e. pu = 0), 
PLT can exactly replicate the optimal commitment policy. Secondly, in the more 
general case when there is cost-push shock persistence, PLT dominates IT because it 
inflation volatility is lower for any given level o f output gap volatility. This result 
demonstrates that Svensson’s free lunch result is robust to a change in Phillips curve 
specification from Equation (1.18) to Equation (1.20).
The intuition for the first result can be seen from the first-order condition for the 
optimal commitment policy in the New Keynesian model:19
(1.21) /r,
K
where A is the relative weight on output gap stabilisation in the social loss function.
19 This condition will hold in the initial period only i f  W oodford’s ‘tim eless perspective’ is adopted 
(see Woodford, 2003; Ch. 7).
27
Equation (1.21) states that inflation should be traded-off against the change in the 
output gap and not its level. Therefore, if the output gap increases, inflation should be 
reduced and vice versa. In effect, then, the past output gap acts as a reference point 
that determines the course that optimal policy should take. This feature of optimal 
policy has become known as ‘history dependence’. History dependence is present 
under PLT because the actual price level depends on the deviation from the target 
price path in the previous period -  as price-setters hold the expectation that such 
deviations will be reversed in the future. It can also been shown that Equation (1.21) 
implies that the optimal price level is stationary (see Clarida et al., 1999), and hence 
that there is no base-level drift. Intuitively, since discretionary PLT implies both 
history dependence and a stationary price level, it is able to exactly replicate the 
optimal commitment policy if there is no cost-push shock persistence.
In the more general case when cost-push shocks are persistent, PLT is unable to 
replicate optimal commitment exactly because there is a ‘discretionary bias’ which 
has the effect o f increasing inflation volatility compared to the optimal commitment 
case. However, PLT still reduces inflation volatility relative to IT, because history 
dependence and price-level stationarity -  key features of the optimal commitment 
policy -  are present under PLT but entirely absent under IT. Intuitively, the former is 
absent under IT because ‘bygones are bygones’, and the latter because it permits base- 
level drift in the price level. To be clear, the key advantage of PLT is that it allows the 
central bank to dampen the impact o f a cost-push shock on current inflation by 
creating the expectation that the shock will be offset in next period, so that less of an 
inflationary shock is passed through to output prices by firms. Indeed, price-setters 
effectively face a trade-off under PLT: setting a high price in current period protects 
current profits, but will lead to a sharp reduction in future demand if there is no 
opportunity to re-optimise the output price in future periods. Under IT, by contrast, 
there is no such trade-off: firms find it optimal to pass inflationary shocks straight into 
output prices, because they do not expect the central bank to make any attempt to 
offset such shocks.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve in Equation (1.20) is attractive to researchers 
because of its strong theoretical foundations, but is not without its own flaws. For 
example, it cannot account for the structural inflation persistence observed in post-war
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inflation data (e.g. Fuhrer, 1997), because it does not include a term in lagged 
inflation. However, modifying the price-setting structure so that firms whose prices 
cannot be re-optimised are indexed to past inflation gives rise to a Phillips curve in 
which current inflation is, additionally, a function of the past inflation rate (Christiano 
et al., 2005). Whilst it is difficult to justify this assumption theoretically given that 
price-setters are assumed to be rational (Minford and Peel 2003; Le 2008), it does at 
least give rise to more plausible inflation dynamics.
The resulting equation for aggregate inflation has been dubbed the ‘hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips curve’ and takes the following form:
(1.22) n, - y n t , = /? (£ > ,., -  y7t,) + kx, + u ,
where 0 < y < 1 measures the extent o f indexation to past inflation.
Note that with this hybrid specification of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the 
quasi-difference of inflation n ,-  ynt.i replaces the inflation rate in the purely forward- 
looking version. One implication of this result is that approximate measure of social 
welfare is no longer given by Equation (1.17): instead, the inflation rate in the social 
loss function is replaced with the quasi-difference o f inflation (see Woodford, 2003). 
Gaspar et al. (2007) investigate the robustness o f Vestin’s free lunch result in a model 
in which the New Keynesian Phillips is given by Equation (1.22) and the social loss 
function is appropriately adjusted. They find that, in general, it is optimal for 
monetary policy to fully offset price level shocks (as under PLT). The only time when 
it is not optimal to do so is the special case when price-setters fully index their prices 
to the past inflation rate (i.e. y = 1). All in all, then, the result that PLT dominates IT 
is strongly robust to the modification that price-setters index their prices to past 
inflation when they are unable to re-optimise output prices.
Steinsson (2003) derives a similar hybrid specification of the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve based on ‘rule-of-thumb’ price-setting, but he reaches a different result. More 
specifically, Steinsson assumes that some fraction of price-setters follow a rule-of- 
thumb which dictates that price is set as function of the lagged output gap and
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previous prices adjusted for lagged inflation. In this case, the hybrid New Keynesian 
Phillips curve is given by
(1-23) n t = P0XE,7T,^ +<92/r,_, + ^ ,* f +y/2x,_x +u,
where the weight on future expected inflation (0\) falls relative to the weight on past 
inflation (#2) as the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is increased.
Furthermore, Steinsson derives the approximate social loss function in this case and 
uses it to investigate the form that optimal policy takes. He finds that the presence of 
rule-of-thumb price-setters means that it is no longer optimal to fully offset past 
shocks to the price level, and that the optimal level of price-level offset decreases as 
the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters increases. Consequently, the performance 
of PLT vis-a-vis IT deteriorates as the relative importance of rule-of-thumb price- 
setters increases, with the implication that Vestin’s result on the dominance of PLT no 
longer holds.20
This result stands in contrast to the conclusion reached by Gaspar et al. (2007) when 
firms’ prices were indexed to past inflation. The reason is that in the Steinsson model 
there is a subset o f firms -  viz. those that follow the rule-of-thumb -  whose price- 
setting behaviour is entirely backward-looking. This works against PLT because its 
benefits arise as a result o f price-setters being forward-looking when setting output 
prices. On the other hand, in the model o f Gaspar et al., firms index to past inflation 
only i f  they are unable to re-set their output price, optimally resetting prices in a 
forward-looking manner the rest of the time. Consequently, all firms in the economy 
enjoy periods when their prices can be reset optimally, akin to the canonical model 
dealt with by Vestin (2006). The main lesson from Steinsson’s analysis is that the 
assumption that one makes about firms’ behaviour during periods when prices are 
‘sticky’ is important for the IT-PLT welfare comparison. Furthermore, the theme that 
models with backward-looking expectations remove the benefits of targeting of the 
price level is returned to in Section 3 which discusses the potential costs of PLT.
20 One criticism that could be made o f  Steinsson’s m odel is that the implied social loss function does 
not have an intuitive interpretation. There are, for instance, additional terms in the lagged value o f  the 
output gap and the change in the inflation rate. It is d ifficult to reconcile these terms with the mandates 
delegated to central banks in practice.
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1.2.2. Long-term inflation risk and nominal contracts
As noted in Section 1.1, inflation shocks have a cumulative effect on the price level 
and its forecast variance under IT: as the forecast horizon increases, so does 
uncertainty regarding the future price level. By contrast, by preventing base-level 
drift, PLT ensures that past price shocks cannot accumulate over the forecast horizon. 
As a result, price-level uncertainty is bounded as the forecast horizon increases, and 
the long-term purchasing power of money is preserved. This is the traditional 
argument put forward in favour of PLT (e.g. Duguay, 1994). With greater 
predictability of purchasing power, the real value of payments on long-lasting 
contracts denominated in nominal terms, or imperfectly-indexed to the price level, is 
less uncertain than under IT. Consequently, PLT should provide welfare gains to 
economic agents entered into medium and long-term contracts -  examples include 
mortgages, long-dated bonds, pensions, and wage contracts -  and these should ideally 
be quantified so that they can be easily factored into a cost-benefit analysis of PLT.
increased nominal stability may also have non-trivial effects on the medium and long­
term contracting behaviour of economic agents -  for instance, nominal contracting 
might become more popular, whilst the incentive to index to prices (which is not
without its own costs) may be reduced. Since longer-term assets and liabilities
21account for a substantial share in household portfolios, these effects may well be an 
important consideration for social welfare. Studies that have investigated the 
redistributive impact o f an unanticipated increase in inflation have found that the 
impact is indeed sizeable (Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima 2010; Doepke and Schneider 
2006), suggesting that failure to contract optimally is costly for economic agents. In 
fact, Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010) study redistribution and welfare effects of 
unanticipated inflation under IT and PLT and find that an unexpected 1 per cent 
increase in the price level in Canada implies a household sector welfare loss of 0.40 
per cent of GDP under IT, compared to only 0.15 per cent under PLT. Given that 
these results suggest that PLT can have important implications for longer-term 
contracting decisions, such behaviour will need to be endogenised in economic 
models to obtain reliable welfare results to guide policy.
21 For instance, in Canada 70 per cent o f  assets and liabilities have a term-to-maturity o f  more than one 
year (Meh and Terajima, 2009), whilst in the UK around one-third o f  the government bond portfolio  
consists o f  nominal bonds with a term-to-maturity o f  15+ years.
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In the context o f the IT versus PLT debate, Ambler (2009, p. 998) emphasises the 
importance of endogenising contracting behaviour as follows:
Accounting for the effect of the monetary regime on contracting is 
difficult.. .However, comparing social welfare across monetary policy 
regimes that are vulnerable to the Lucas critique can potentially give 
seriously misleading results. Endogenising the degree of indexation and 
other features o f price and wage setting across monetary regimes is an 
important and promising avenue for future research.
There is, in fact, a small but growing literature that focuses on endogenising 
contracting behaviour in the context of IT and PLT. However, as the quote above 
from Ambler suggests, more research is desperately needed in this area to allow 
policymakers to conduct a reliable cost-benefit analysis. Chapters 2 and 3 undertake 
this task by building-up a DSGE framework in which the long-term impact of PLT on 
inflation volatility and social welfare can be quantified, and where contracting 
behaviour is endogenously determined. This section reviews current research in this 
area in order to motivate and provide context for the second and third chapters. 
Moreover, in Chapter 4, the models of chapters 2 and 3 are used to estimate the 
reduction in the inflation risk premium on long-term nominal contracts under PLT -  
an important issue which is also discussed in this section.
As the traditional argument in favour of targeting the price level, the topic of long­
term inflation risk received considerable attention in early literature on PLT. Duguay 
(1994) surveys this literature and concludes that the potential benefits from PLT are 
substantial, though this view is disputed by Fischer (1996), who argues that such 
benefits are likely to be small compared to the potential increase in short-term output 
volatility. More recently, Dittmar et al. (1999) use a US-calibrated version of the New 
Classical Phillips curve model o f Svensson (1999) to investigate medium- and long­
term inflation volatility under IT and PLT. They estimate that PLT would lead to a 
substantial reduction in long-term inflation volatility, with the benefits to PLT 
increasing strongly with the forecast horizon due to the presence of base-level drift 
under IT.
Along similar lines, Gavin et al. (2009) set-up a microfounded New Keynesian model 
in order to investigate inflation risk at horizons of up to 10 years. The model nests a
32
sticky-price model and a sticky-wage model as special cases, and includes exogenous 
disturbances to monetary policy, preferences and technology, plus investment 
adjustment costs. They find that the optimal (short-term) policy in both the sticky- 
price and sticky-wage cases generates a substantial amount of longer-term inflation 
volatility, but that a PLT monetary policy rule can eliminate much of this volatility. 
One issue highlighted by this result is that long-term inflation volatility has no role for 
social welfare in standard New Keynesian models, because it is only short-term 
fluctuations that matter for the utility of the representative agent. Therefore, as Gavin 
et al. (p. 73) note with regard to future research, “the effect of long-run inflation risk 
on social welfare needs to be explicitly model[l]ed.” Current literature on PLT has not 
yet addressed this issue within DSGE models, but Chapters 2 and 3 of thesis present a 
modelling framework that allows the impact of long-term inflation risk on social 
welfare to be quantified.
Stuber (2001) and Crawford et al. (2009) both argue that PLT would lead to non­
trivial reductions in long-term risk-premia on nominal debt contracts. Regarding this 
last argument, the empirical asset pricing literature provides evidence on the 
importance of inflation risk premia on nominal bonds at various horizons. For 
instance, Veronesi and Yared (2000) estimate that the inflation-risk premium on five- 
year nominal bonds in the US was significantly higher during the relatively volatile 
1968-90 period than post-1990, whilst estimates of the five-year inflation-risk 
premium in the literature tend to be positive and non-trivial at upwards of 30 basis 
points on average (Ang et al. 2008; Hordahl 2008). Moreover, estimates of inflation 
risk premia on longer maturity bonds tend to be higher (see Bekaert and Wang, 2010), 
consistent with idea that inflation risk premia will increase with the accumulation of 
inflation risk over the forecast horizon under IT.22 For instance, Buraschi and Jiltsov 
(2005) estimate the ten-year US inflation risk premium over the postwar period using 
a continuous-time flex-price general equilibrium model in which monetary policy and 
taxes are endogenous. Their results suggest that the ten-year premium has averaged 
70 basis points. Using a macro-finance approach, Campbell and Viceira (2001) find 
similar results. In particular, they conclude ten-year inflation risk premium in the US 
averaged 110 basis points over the postwar period.
22 It should be noted here that although the U S is not form ally an inflation targeter, the Federal Reserve 
is widely considered to have an im plicit target for inflation.
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In terms o f IT versus PLT, there is somewhat less literature. The single formal 
contribution is the paper by Meh et al. (2008a),23 who build a small open economy 
model in which firms can finance investment using short-term or long-term nominal 
debt contracts. Firms have the choice to default on both types of debt, so there is a 
risk premium in the cost o f capital. Although IT and PLT are not modelled explicitly, 
the former is assumed to be represented by a ‘high’ level of long-term price-level 
uncertainty, and the latter by a ‘low’ level of uncertainty. Reducing long-term price- 
level uncertainty has two effects. First, reducing the level of long-term price-level 
uncertainty lowers the risk premium on debt (since there is a lower probability of 
default), and with it the cost o f capital. Second, a reduction in long-term price-level 
uncertainty leads to an increase in the fraction of agents using long-term nominal 
debt, which in turn boosts investment and output. These results suggest that switching 
from IT to PLT could have a beneficial impact on investment and output by lowering 
the inflation risk premium, as argued informally by Lilico (2000).
In order to provide explicit evidence on the impact of PLT on inflation risk premia, 
Chapter 4 of this thesis estimates inflation risk premia on long-term nominal bonds 
under IT and PLT, using the models introduced and simulated in chapters 2 and 3. As 
emphasised by researchers at the Bank o f Canada (see Stuber 2001 and Crawford et 
al. 2009), it important to quantify the impact o f PLT on inflation risk premia in order 
to accurately estimate its long-term benefits. The results reported in Chapter 4 can be 
viewed as a first but important step in this direction.
The impact of PLT on nominal contracting behaviour more generally has been more 
widely researched, though primarily in the context o f medium-term wage contracts. 
The initial papers in this literature were due to Minford and various co-authors, who 
focus on the optimal degree o f indexation o f multi-period wage contracts (Minford 
and Peel 2003; Minford et al. 2003; Minford and Nowell 2003). Households have a 
strong incentive to insure against real wage fluctuations in these models, but are 
assumed to be unable to resort to financial markets for this purpose. The degree of 
wage indexation in the economy is chosen optimally to minimise such fluctuations, 
subject to monetary policy; hence the representative agent chooses optimal shares of
2JThis paper is cited by Crawford et al. (2009).
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indexed and nominal wage contracts in response to IT and PLT. On the basis of 
OECD data, the wage contract horizon is assumed to be one year, or four periods in 
the model. Minford and co-authors find several important results.
Firstly, optimal wage indexation is substantially lower under PLT than IT. This result 
is driven by the multi-period nature of wage contracts: PLT reduces nominal volatility 
relative to IT over the contract horizon, making nominal wage contracts relatively 
better real-wage stabilisers. Secondly, when indexation is endogenised, PLT increases 
social welfare because a reduction in indexation makes the real wage more flexible in 
response to productivity shocks and hence stabilises employment -  a point first made 
by Gray (1976). Finally, if indexation is held fixed as monetary policy shifts from IT 
to PLT, this gives the misleading conclusion that social welfare is reduced under PLT. 
This last point is crucial because it suggests that in order to obtain reliable welfare 
conclusions about PLT at a medium- or long-term horizon, it is crucial that the degree 
of nominal indexation is endogenised in response to monetary policy.
The robustness of these results was subsequently investigated by Amano et al. (2007), 
who develop an alternative model in which there are staggered cohorts of labour- 
differentiated wages setters whose contracts are subject to multi-period nominal 
rigidities.24 Moreover, in contrast to the model developed by Minford and co-authors, 
economic agents have unrestricted access to financial markets. Nevertheless, Amano 
et al. also find that optimal wage indexation is lower under PLT and that social 
welfare higher than in the IT case. Again, the welfare gains arise because reducing 
wage indexation increases employment stability in response to real shocks.
Meh et al. (2008b) extend the investigation of endogenous indexation to financial 
contracts that are imperfectly-indexed. More specifically, they develop a model with 
repeated moral hazard in which financial contracts are not fully indexed to inflation 
because nominal prices are observed with delay, as in Jovanovic and Ueda (1997). 
This assumption is motivation by the presence o f a time lag before aggregate price 
indices become public information -  for instance, due to the need to collect and 
process data prior to publication. Contracting in the model results from entrepreneurs
24 In this context, ‘labour-differentiated’ means that each worker p ossesses a particular type o f  skilled  
labour that differentiates them from other workers.
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entering into debt contracts with financial intermediaries so that they can finance 
investment. In concordance with the optimal wage indexation literature discussed 
above, Meh et al. find that the optimal degree of indexation falls with price-level 
uncertainty. One caveat, however, is that monetary policy does not enter the model 
explicitly, since the price level is exogenous. Nevertheless, these results do suggest 
that the optimal level of indexation of financial debt contracts would be lower under 
PLT than IT.
With regard to a long-term contracting horizon, the literature PLT is rather sparse. 
The reason, as noted by Dib et al. (2008, p.30), is that “model[l]ing long-term 
contracts in macroeconomics is a major challenge and requires separate 
consideration”. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) and Minford (2004) both argue that PLT 
would reduce real return volatility on long-term nominal bonds relative to IT but stop 
short of modelling this impact explicitly. Carlstrom and Fuerst explain the potential 
impact thus:
[T]he base-drift problem with IT leads to a great deal of uncertainty about 
what the price level 5,10, or 30 years in the future will be. The central 
bank may miss its inflation target by a very small percentage in each year, 
but if these misses are not offset, they will accumulate and become quite 
large after 30 years. Therefore, a price-level target will reduce the 
uncertainty associated with buying and selling long-term fixed bonds.
Mankze and Todtcr (2007) make a preliminary attempt at modelling the welfare 
impact of reduced long-term inflation risk under PLT by focusing on the real return 
on nominal bonds in an overlapping generations framework -  a neat potential solution 
to modelling long-term contracts in a tractable way.25 The model they use for this 
purpose is the canonical set-up in which government bonds are ‘net wealth’ because 
they act as a store of value (e.g. McCandless and Wallace, 1991). Given that each 
period is taken to last 30 years, this is also the horizon over which real return 
volatility on bonds matters for welfare. Monetary policy is not modelled explicitly 
because money is absent from the model; instead, inflation is assumed to be an
25 The author independently had the idea o f  assessing the long-term  welfare impact o f  PLT in an 
overlapping generations framework and did not becom e aware o f  Mankze and Todter’s paper until 
summer 2010. Interestingly, the main focus o f  their paper is not PLT, and the paper is not cited 
anywhere in the literature.
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exogenous stochastic process with a lower variance under PLT by factor of 30. 
Mankze and Todter’s results suggest that PLT would deliver a welfare gain of 0.066 
per cent o f long-term consumption over IT.
In order to understand these results, it is worth focusing briefly on the model. In real 
terms, the budget constraints of young and old consumers are given by
where c, y is consumption when young, b is fixed holdings of nominal bonds and Y > 
0 is the constant endowment income received by the young. Consumption in old age 
of the generation bom in period t is given by c,+ i.o; / > 0 is the constant yearly 
nominal interest rate after tax; n, is the exogenous stochastic process for inflation; and 
rt+1 is the ex post real return on a nominal bond held from youth to old age.
Given that all young consumers are homogenous and have the same bond holdings, 
their consumption levels are equalised. However, old generations will be 
heterogenous ex post because their consumption levels depend on the stochastic 
process for inflation, which in turn determines the real return on bonds. Therefore, in 
this simple model, inflation uncertainty imposes a welfare cost for old generations 
through the uncertain real return on nominal bonds. In particular, if welfare in old age 
is given by w(c/.o), the consumption risk premium is defined by the following 
equation:
where X is the risk-premium as a percentage of mean consumption in old age.
Mankze and Todter assume that consumers have constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility with a risk aversion parameter 6. A second-order Taylor expansion of
(1.24)
(1.25)
(1.26)
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Equation (1.26) around mean consumption thus yields the following expression for 
the consumption risk-premium:
where b is the constant level of bond holdings per generation.
This result makes clear that the consumption risk premium increases with the level 
long-term inflation risk (i.e. inflation risk over the 30-year saving horizon). 
Consequently, the estimated risk premium under IT was 0.068 per cent, compared to 
only 0.002 per cent under PLT, with the difference between the two giving the 
reported welfare gain under PLT of 0.066 per cent of consumption in old age.
The overlapping generations framework put forward by Mankze and Todter provides 
a simple and intuitive way by which to model the impact of PLT on social welfare via 
the long-term inflation risk channel, thus addressing in part the issues raised by Gavin 
et al. (2009) and Dib et al. (2008). However, there are a number of weaknesses with 
Mankze and Todter’s application of this framework, in addition to the fact that they 
do not model IT and PLT explicitly. First, the model is a ‘partial equilibrium’ model 
of the life-cycle since all generations receive an exogenous endowment income and 
no output is produced. Second, the nominal return on bonds is not endogenously 
determined by supply and demand for bonds, but is instead assumed to be constant. 
Third, there is assumed to be a positive (net) supply of bonds, yet there is no 
economic entity responsible for supplying bonds in the model. Fourth, the model 
abstracts from real assets such as capital or indexed bonds that offer protection 
against inflation. Last but not least, the model is unable to address the issue of 
optimal indexation, because consumers have access to nominal bonds but not indexed 
bonds.
To summarise, the overlapping model of life-cycle saving provides a useful 
framework for assessing the long-term welfare impact of PLT. Given the lack of 
research in this area so far, there are numerous extensions that can and should be
(1.27)
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made to investigate the robustness of Mankze and Todter’s results. Three important 
extensions would be to introduce alternative assets into the model; to extend the 
comparison to a DSGE framework; and to allow consumers to hold both indexed and
determined in response to monetary policy. In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, a 
modelling framework that fits this description is presented in which IT and PLT are 
modelled explicitly. This framework builds upon the basic model discussed above but 
permits the above extensions, plus many others, and is subsequently used to quantify 
the long-term impact o f PLT on social welfare.
1.23  Price-level targeting and the zero lower bound
The zero lower bound (ZLB) refers to the idea that central bank will be unable to 
reduce the target nominal interest rate below zero in an economy that is inhabited by 
rational agents. The reasoning is that since money is a perfect store of nominal wealth, 
no rational agent would willingly hold bonds that promised to pay a negative return in 
money terms. Mathematically, the ZLB can be represented as follows:
where /, is the nominal rate of interest.
Most research that has compared stabilisation of the economy under IT and PLT has 
ignored the ZLB by assuming that central bank is free to set negative nominal interest 
rates if required. Since there are good reasons for thinking that this assumption is 
false, it is instructive to compare IT and PLT when the ZLB is taken into account.
In order to see the importance of the ZLB in the context of the IT-PLT comparison, 
consider the microfounded consumption Euler equation for a bond that offers a 
riskless nominal return
nominal bonds, with the degree of nominal indexation being endogenously
(1.28) i > 0
(1.29)
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where UCJ is the marginal utility o f consumption at time /, and n,+\ is the rate of 
inflation between period / and period / +1.
If we assume for simplicity that there is no government spending or investment, that 
the economy is closed, and that utility is of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
form with risk aversion coefficient <) = 1/(7, then log-linearisation of Equation (1.29) 
gives an IS curve of the following form:
(1.30) x, = E ,x ,.x -  E r/rltl) + cr x rtn
where r" = a  '£ ,A v” , + r n and r n = -  log/? is the long run natural rate .
This equation can be solved forward for the current output gap as follows:
(•■3D = - o e , Z k ,  )-'■,:»}*-0
Equation (1.31) suggests that there are two routes by which monetary policy can 
potentially influence current output: the current and expected future path of the 
nominal interest rate; and the current and future path of inflation expectations. In the 
presence of the ZLB, however, the nominal interest rate will be constrained in a 
downward direction. As a result, the inflation expectations channel becomes more 
important for policy outcomes. It is this additional importance of the inflation 
expectations channel that makes the comparison of IT and PLT interesting within the 
context of the ZLB. The literature has focused on two main issues. The first is the 
likelihood that the lower bound will be reached in the first place; the second is the 
performance of policy in models once ZLB is reached, or when the ZLB is treated 
(realistically) as an occasionally-binding constraint.
The likelihood o f  hitting the zero lower bound
Early literature on the ZLB concentrated on the probability that it would be reached 
under optimal policy. For instance, using simulations of model economies, a number
26 Economists generally take the view  that monetary policy cannot influence the natural rate o f  interest.
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of studies estimated the risk of hitting the lower bound with an inflation target of 
around 2 per cent. As a ballpark figure, these studies suggest that the nominal rate 
would be reduced to zero between 1 and 5 per cent of the time (e.g. Cozier and Lavoie 
1994; Reifscneider and Williams 2000). However, it is important to note that the 
relationship between the probability o f hitting the ZLB and the inflation targeting is 
non-linear: as the inflation target is lowered towards zero, the estimated probability of 
hitting the lower bound increases sharply. More recent studies suggest that even with 
a positive inflation target, the probability of hitting the ZLB may be substantially 
higher than originally estimated at around 15 per cent (Lavoie and Pioro 2008; 
Amano and Ambler 2008).
In the context o f PLT and the ZLB, Smets and Gaspar (2000) compare IT and PLT in 
a New Keynesian model with a hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve and an IS curve 
with output gap persistence. The criterion they use to judge the probability of hitting 
the lower bound is nominal interest rate variability, the idea being that smaller 
deviations of the nominal rate should be associated with a lower probability of hitting 
the ZLB. The central bank in the model is assigned an IT loss function with an 
additional term in the squared deviation o f the price-level from its target value. If the 
weight on this additional term is zero, the loss function corresponds to the standard IT 
case, while if the weight is positive the central bank engages in ‘hybrid targeting’ of 
inflation and the price level. Smets and Gaspar find that as the weight on the PLT 
objective is increased, nominal interest rate volatility initially falls, remaining below 
the level under standard IT unless the weight on price-level deviations is quite high.
This result is driven by the forward-looking terms in the Phillips and IS curves; 
indeed, the main intuition for this result has been covered already in the discussion of 
Section 2.1. For instance, suppose the economy is hit with a positive cost-push shock. 
Under PLT, price-setters anticipate that the shock will be offset next period, so their 
expectation of future inflation is lower. This lower expectation causes the ex ante real 
interest rate to rise which then dampens the impact of the shock on the output gap 
through the IS curve. Similarly, in the face o f a demand shock, both the output gap 
and inflation will increase, but under PLT the impact will be mitigated by a reduction 
in expected inflation which pushes up the ex ante real interest rate and stabilises the 
output gap via the IS curve. Hence, the expectations channel under PLT is crucial
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when considering the ZLB, because it means that smaller movements in nominal rates 
are necessary in order to stabilise the economy. Given that Smets and Gaspar examine 
a New Keynesian model with lagged indexation and output gap persistence, these 
results would be strengthened in a purely forward-looking version where the 
importance o f the expectations channel would be even greater.
The robustness of these conclusions has been tested along a number of dimensions by 
other authors. Firstly, Amano and Ambler (2008) simulate a nonlinear version of the 
New Keynesian model and find similar results: the frequency with which nominal 
interest rates turn negative is somewhat lower under PLT than IT, and the economic 
intuition is unchanged. Secondly, a different but related approach is taken by Levine 
et al. (2008), who focus on discretionary IT policy using the Smets-Wouters model of 
the Euro Area. Given that policies which call for negative nominal interest rates are 
not operational, Levine et al. assume that the central bank must set a sufficiently high 
weight on interest rate volatility in their loss function to ensure that the probability of 
reaching the lower bound is close to zero. Under this modification, discretionary IT 
performs far worse by comparison to the optimal commitment policy, because a high 
relative weight on interest rate volatility is necessary to ensure that the interest rate 
does not reach the lower bound, and this causes policy to deviate substantially from 
the unconstrained optimal. Intuitively, discretionary IT performs poorly because there 
is no stabilisation through expectations, due to the absence of ‘history dependence’. 
Although a PLT policy is not explicitly evaluated by Levine et al., their results do 
suggest that IT does not perform well when constrained by ZLB considerations.
An important caveat regarding all the above studies is that they ignore, or side-step in 
some way, the existence of the ZLB. This approach could give misleading results 
because the expectations of economic agents will be influenced by the presence of the 
lower bound (Adam and Billi, 2006); that is, economic agents will form their 
expectations with the knowledge that the central bank faces a constraint on how much 
it can cut interest rates in the future. Indeed, since endogenous variables are typically 
influenced in important ways by future expectations, it is advisable to estimate the 
probability of hitting the ZLB using models in which the lower bound constraint is 
occasionally binding. Such models are also advantageous from the point of view of
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evaluating welfare, since it is only in such models that the behaviour of the central 
banks will be constrained by the ZLB in the same way as it would in practice.
The zero lower bound as an occasionally-binding constraint
More recent literature on the lower bound has drawn on advances in numerical 
simulation techniques to deal with its non-linear and asymmetric effects. Indeed, it 
should be emphasised that standard solutions techniques for DSGE models like log- 
linearisation and perturbation are unable to capture the impact of the ZLB (Ambler, 
2009). Surprisingly, however, it is possible to solve for an analytical solution in a 
simple model, and this is done in the seminal paper by Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003). This section first discusses the results o f Eggertsson and Woodford and then 
turns to the remainder of the literature that has employed numerical simulation 
techniques in more comprehensive models of the economy.
Eggertsson and Woodford make a number o f important contributions. First and 
foremost, they derive the optimal commitment policy when the ZLB is an 
occasionally-binding constraint, and show that it takes the form of a state-contingent 
PLT rule. Secondly, the performance o f this optimal policy at the lower bound is 
compared to simple PLT and IT rules. Finally, a number of arguments are put forward 
in anticipation of criticisms that PLT would be ineffective or infeasible in practice if 
the ZLB were reached. A discussion of this last point is postponed until Section 1.4.1, 
which discusses practical issues regarding PLT at the lower bound.
The model is deliberately simple, consisting o f a forward-looking IS curve, the 
microfounded New Keynesian Phillips curve, and the ZLB constraint:
The central bank is assumed to minimise the microfounded loss function, Equation
(1.17), which is repeated here for convenience:
(1.32)
d-33)
(1.34)
X, = £>,.1 - a ( i ,  -  £>,.1 - r " )
71, = /? £ ,* •„ , + K X , + U ,
i, > 0
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(1.35) I, =£,X/?"k,+Ar,U
/=0
To derive the optimal policy, first note that substituting the ZLB constraint into the IS 
curve yields the following inequality:
Using Equation (1.36), the optimal policy can be solved for by forming the following 
expected Lagrangian:
where the inequalities in (1.40) are the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
Note that since the Lagrange multiplier <pu is positive in some periods and zero in 
others, the nature o f the optimal commitment rule differs in periods when the ZLB has 
been reached and in periods when it has not.
In fact, Eggertsson and Woodford show that the optimal commitment policy takes the 
form of a state-contingent PLT policy:
(1.36)
(1.37) 3;
i 0
The first-order conditions are given by
(1-38) n , +<P2, - « V i  =P~'<XPu-i
(1.39) + <P\, -  P =>«Pl,
(1.40) <Pu ^  0, i, > 0, « v ,  = 0
(1.41)
A
P , + ~ x, = P,K
where p \ is a price-level target which is updated using
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(1.42) P'.i = P * + P ~ \8 , - S , ^ )  + fi-'/coS,
and S, = p t -  p, + — x t is the target shortfall in period t.
Ac-
Three main points should be noted regarding this optimal rule. Firstly, when the ZLB 
has not been reached, the price-level target defined by Equation (1.41) can always be 
met, since this is just the standard optimal commitment policy.27 Second, when the 
ZLB is reached, the price level target in Equation (1.41) becomes unattainable. For 
example, suppose the lower bound is reached in period T following a sharp fall in the 
natural rate. In this case, the target price level in period T will be given by Equation 
(1.42) with Sr > 0, because the central bank will be unable to cut rates to ensure that 
the price level does not fall below target in period T. The optimal response to this 
target shortfall is to raise the target price level in the next period T+\. In the following 
period, T+ 2, the target price level will be raised even further, provided there is still a 
target shortfall. This discussion brings us on to the third point: if the target shortfall 
grows (i.e. St-i > St), then the situation is worsening in the sense that the deviation 
from target is growing in response to deflationary pressures. Intuitively, the optimal 
rule overcomes such pressures in exactly the way suggested by Krugman (1998) -  by 
creating an expectation of future inflation by raising the target price level. This is the 
optimal policy because with the nominal rate stuck at zero, the only way to achieve 
lower real interest rates is through stimulating inflation expectations by raising the 
target price level.
It should be clear from this discussion that the state-contingent nature of the price- 
level target is crucial in achieving optimality. However, it is far from clear that such a 
rule would be feasible or credible in practice. Having anticipated these concerns, 
Eggertsson and Woodford point out a much simpler PLT rule that is ‘near-optimal’:
27 This can be seen by taking the first-difference o f  Kquation (1 .41) conditional on a target shortfall o f  
zero.
(1.43)
A
P < + - x < = P *
K
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where p  * is a fixed price-level target.
The reason this rule performs well is that agents hold the belief that the future price 
level will be returned to the level defined by the constant price-level target. This 
belief creates an expectation of future inflation and reduces the real interest rate, 
increasing the current output gap and inflation -  much like in the case of the optimal 
commitment policy. The key difference, however, is that the simple rule does not 
react to the severity o f the situation by raising the target price level. It will therefore 
take longer for the economy to emerge from a ZLB episode.
Now consider the performance of an IT rule at the ZLB. Eggertsson and Woodford 
interpret such a policy as a commitment to adjust the nominal interest rate to ensure 
that inflation is equal to target, insofar as this is possible given the presence of the 
lower bound. The interest rate rule necessary to achieve this objective is given by
(1.44) /, = r" + ft*
Note that the ZLB will prevent Equation (1.44) from holding if the natural rate of 
interest r" is lower than -7 r * ;  in this case, the central bank will set /', = 0 and the real 
interest rate will be bounded by the negative o f the inflation target. This constraint on 
real interest rates means that the IT rule performs substantially worse than the simple 
PLT rule or the optimal commitment policy, based on the loss function in Equation 
(1.35). There are two distinct but related problems with IT.
First, if the inflation target is relatively low, the real interest rate will be only slightly 
negative at the ZLB and is therefore unlikely to provide the stimulus to inflation 
expectations that is necessary to end a lower bound episode. Second, there is no 
response at all o f the real interest rate to the severity o f a ZLB episode, because 
inflation expectations are fixed on the inflation target. By contrast, both the optimal 
commitment policy and the simple PLT rule produce a real interest rate response, 
because they are history dependent: future expectations of inflation are stimulated 
whenever the price-level target is undershot at the ZLB. In concordance with 
Eggertsson and Woodford’s welfare results, Wolman (2005) finds that PLT rules can
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improve performance at the ZLB relative to IT, though in his model prices are set in 
staggered fashion and fixed for constant duration a la Taylor (1980).
Although Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) make the major contribution of deriving 
the optimal commitment policy when the ZLB constrains policy, it should be noted 
that their analysis of policies is only partial because it conditions on the occurrence of 
the lower bound by setting a large deterministic negative shock to the natural rate of 
interest in the initial simulation period. What is more interesting from the point of 
view of comparing alternative policies, however, is the performance of IT and PLT in 
simulations in which the ZLB is occasionally-binding and is hence free to bind or not 
as stochastic shocks dictate. Such simulations also permit the calculation of 
unconditional welfare, which gives an indication of the overall importance of the 
ZLB, and whether policies that perform well at lower bound are likely to be worth 
pursuing in practice. The task of calculating unconditional welfare was undertaken by 
Adam and Billi (2006, 2007), and independently by Nakov (2008). These papers are 
discussed in turn below.
The main contribution of Adam and Billi (2006) is to calculate unconditional welfare 
under optimal commitment when the ZLB is an occasionally-binding constraint. The 
model follows Eggertsson and Woodford but is calibrated to US data, with shocks 
identified using US experience from the early 1980s to early 2000s. In order to 
calculate unconditional welfare under optimal commitment these shocks are then used 
to simulate the model, which is solved numerically using collocation methods. 
Intuitively, the unconditional welfare implications of the ZLB are related to the 
frequency with which nominal rates reach zero under optimal commitment. Since zero 
nominal interest rates occur rather infrequently -  only about one quarter in every 17 
years (or a probability of 1.5 per cent) -  the additional unconditional welfare loss due 
to the ZLB is small at approximately one per cent o f the welfare loss generated by 
sticky prices.
The key to this result is that, since little time is spent at the lower bound, there are 
virtually no effects on the average levels of the output gap and inflation, and only 
relatively small effects on inflation and output gap volatility, which in turn have only
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a second-order impact on social welfare.28 These welfare results are robust to a 
significant increase in the variance of cost-push shocks and a markedly lower interest 
rate elasticity of output, but if the variance of natural rate innovations is tripled, the 
additional welfare losses due the ZLB increase from 1 per cent of the loss from sticky 
prices to 33 per cent. It should also be noted that, in concordance with the results of 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Adam and Billi find that welfare losses conditional 
on the ZLB being reached are non-trivial.
One interesting issue not addressed by Adam and Billi (2006) is the importance of the 
commitment assumption for the unconditional welfare implications of the ZLB. This 
issue was investigated in a companion paper, Adam and Billi (2007), which calculates 
unconditional welfare losses in the discretionary case. For ease of comparison, the 
discretionary results are compared directly with optimal commitment, with losses 
expressed in terms of their welfare equivalent permanent consumption reduction. The 
additional loss from discretionary policy compared to commitment increases by 
around two-thirds due to the presence of an occasionally-binding ZLB. Therefore, 
ignoring the ZLB constraint significantly understates the welfare benefits of 
commitment vis-a-vis discretion.
The welfare analyses conducted by Adam and Billi (2006, 2007) are extended in a 
number o f directions by Nakov (2008). His contribution is to compute unconditional 
welfare for a variety o f simple zero-truncated Taylor-type interest rate rules -  
including IT and PLT rules -  which he argues provide a more plausible representation 
of real-world monetary policy. Furthermore, the performance of these rules is 
compared against the optimal commitment policy; the constant PLT rule of 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003); and discretionary IT.
The IT rule allows for the possibility of ‘interest rate smoothing’ and is given by 
( 1.4 5 ) i, = tmx .{0 ,p , i ,  , + (1 - p \ r * + j t * + 0 , ( x ,  - j c * )  + 0xx,]}
28 One cannot sim ply use the loss function in Hquation (1 .35) for policy evaluation, because with an 
occasionally-binding ZLB the average levels o f  inflation and the output gap can potentially differ 
across policies.
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where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate and 0 < p, < 1 indicates the extent of 
interest rate smoothing.
The PLT rule is given by
(1 -46) /', = max {0, r * +6n (p t -  p*) + Oxx , }
where p  is the log price level and p* is a constant price level target.
With the exception of the constant price-level target policy suggested by Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003), all the policies perform poorly relative to optimal commitment. 
On some level this finding is not surprising: simple interest rules rarely perform well 
in individual models of the economy, but have the advantage of robustness across 
models (Taylor, 1999). This point is clearly demonstrated by the substantial 
difference between the performance o f the constant price-level target policy and the 
PLT Taylor rule. The constant price-level target delivers a loss in social welfare 
relative to commitment of only 56 per cent, whilst the corresponding loss for the PLT 
interest rate rule is 800 per cent.
As Nakov notes, it may be difficult to communicate even the constant price-level 
target policy in practice, and it is not clear that implementing a model-specific rule of 
this nature would be desirable in the real world. The social losses under truncated 
interest rate rules may therefore provide a better basis forjudging the performance of 
PLT at the ZLB than does the constant price-level target rule. Even on this measure, 
however, the PLT interest rate rule outperforms the IT one in terms of welfare loss, 
with lower inflation and output gap volatility regardless of whether or not interest rate 
smoothing is permitted. To summarise, Nakov’s results suggest that constraining the 
IT-PLT comparison to simple Taylor-type rules reduces but leaves intact the welfare 
benefits of PLT.
Finally, there is one other key strand of literature that has compared the performance 
of IT and PLT at the ZLB. These papers use more comprehensive models of the 
economy of the kind used by central banks for quantitative policy analyses. Such 
models have two potentially important advantages over those based on
49
microfoundations: first, a wide array of economic mechanisms are at work, and these 
may help identify benefits and costs of certain monetary policies; and, second, since 
such models provide better ‘fit’ to data, they may provide a better basis for policy 
evaluation. However, this extra rigour comes at an additional cost in the context of the 
ZLB, since it is only computationally feasible for policy outcomes to be examined 
once the model has been ‘deterministically guided’ to the ZLB. In other words, a 
deterministic shock to the economy is chosen so that the nominal interest rate is 
pinned at zero temporarily, during which time the performance of alternative policies 
is evaluated.29
The main papers in this literature result from a joint research project between 
researchers at the Bank of Japan (BoJ), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
Federal Reserve, whose results are summarised in Fujiwara et al. (2006a). This 
research project focuses on three different central bank models: the FRB/US model, 
the BoJ JEM model, and the ECB Area-Wide model. Amongst other policies, these 
papers consider zero-truncated IT and PLT Taylor-type rules. The ZLB is modelled in 
the same way in all three papers: the economy is hit with a set of demand shocks 
which are known by all agents and which ensure that the short-term nominal interest 
rate is pinned at zero for four or five consecutive years. Policies are then evaluated 
based on an intertemporal loss function in inflation and output gap deviations whose 
horizon depends on the length o f the ZLB episode. A robust conclusion that arises 
from these analyses is that PLT outperforms IT, though it should be noted that the 
relative benefits of PLT vary considerably depending on the model under 
consideration.
1.3 Potential costs of price-level targeting
A number of potential costs of PLT have been identified in the literature. These 
include the following: increased short-term volatility in inflation and output when 
agents do not have rational expectations; a costly transition period from IT to PLT; 
and potential time-inconsistency problems. In this section, which draws heavily on 
Ambler (2009), each of these topics is taken in turn.
29 That is, policies arc only evaluated conditional on the ZLB being reached.
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1.3.1 Inflation and output gap volatility
The traditional argument made against PLT was that it would increase short-term 
volatility in both inflation and the output gap (e.g. Fischer, 1996). The logic of this 
argument is sketched out clearly by Svensson (1999, p. 278):
In order to stabilize the price level under PLT, higher-than-average 
inflation must be succeeded by lower-than-average inflation. This should 
result in higher inflation variability than IT, since in the latter case, base 
level drift is accepted and higher-than-average inflation need only be 
succeeded by average inflation. Via nominal rigidities, the higher inflation 
variability should then result in higher output variability.
Early literature that investigated the performance of IT and PLT in simulated models 
of the economy tended to confirm this view (e.g. Lebow et al., 1992; Haldane and 
Salmon, 1995). The conclusions o f these studies differ from those in Svensson (1999) 
and found by later authors due to the assumption that agents have adaptive 
expectations. Adaptive expectations are purely backward-looking, with the result that 
the expectations channel by which PLT can stabilise inflation and the output gap is 
eliminated. As noted in Section 2.1, the short-term volatility benefits from PLT also 
arise under the assumption that the central bank cannot commit, a distinction which is 
irrelevant in purely backward-looking models. However, as noted in Section 2.1, 
increased volatility under PLT is not limited to models where all agents are backward- 
looking: Steinsson (2003) shows that if a fraction of firms are rule-of-thumb price- 
setters, PLT is no longer optimal, with its performance vis-a-vis IT deteriorating as 
the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is increased.
13.2 The transition from inflation targeting to price-level targeting
The studies discussed thus far all assume that the economy has settled in a long run 
PLT regime in which individuals understand perfectly the workings of policy and 
have rational expectations. However, since PLT has been implemented only once in 
history whilst IT is widespread, it seems reasonable to assume that there would be a 
transitional period of adjustment during which agents would leam about the new 
monetary policy regime and the PLT regime would, if implemented as promised, 
acquire credibility. A number of papers have therefore investigated the IT-to-PLT 
transition and, in particular, whether the long run benefits from moving to PLT 
outweigh the short run transitional costs.
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For instance, Gaspar et al. (2007) assume that the expectations of economic agents in 
the transition period are determined by recursive least squares learning (RLS). Under 
this assumption, the lagged data produced by the model are used to form forecasts of 
endogenous variables using least squares projection, with forecasts updated as new 
data becomes available. Gaspar et al. focus on the IT to PLT transition under the 
assumption that agents leam about the new PLT regime according to RLS, and the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve in the model takes the hybrid form that results from 
partial indexation to past inflation. Although Gaspar et al. find that the transition to 
PLT can be costly, the net gains from PLT remain positive unless learning is rather 
slow. For instance, with their benchmark calibration it takes seven years until the 
social loss under PLT is reduced to the level that prevails in the long run under IT. 
After this point, the social loss under PLT is lower than under IT and converges upon 
the level under the optimal commitment policy.30
However, Kryvtsov et al. (2008) reach a different result when imperfect credibility is 
modelled as an exogenous process that converges towards perfect credibility over 
time. An interesting insight from their model is that the beneficial expectations 
channel under PLT remains weak whilst the public still fears that monetary policy 
could revert back to the old IT regime. In the model, it takes two-and-a-half years for 
the PLT central bank to earn enough credibility to outperform IT, but this relatively 
short period is enough to ensure that, in net welfare terms, IT dominates PLT: the 
short run transition costs from PLT outweigh the long run welfare benefits. Cateau et 
al. (2009) extend the analysis of the transition from IT to PLT by using ToTEM 
(Terms-of-Trade Economic Model), the Bank o f Canada’s main policy analysis 
model. This model is a medium-scale open-economy DSGE model built around 
optimising behaviour by firms and households. The goal of the paper is to test 
whether the conclusions reached by Kryvtsov et al. (2008) are robust in a more 
comprehensive economic model that retains forward-looking behaviour. Cateau et al. 
find results that are more favourable to PLT: the long run welfare gains dominate the 
short run transition costs, provided that the initial spell o f imperfect credibility under 
PLT lasts less than 13 years. It is worth noting in this regard that the results of Carroll 
(2003) and Mankiw et al. (2003) based on expectations survey data suggest that US
M As discussed in Section 1.2.1, it is optimal to offset shocks to the price level unless there is full 
indexation to past inflation (i.e. y = 1). In their benchmark case, Gaspar et al. assume that y = Vi.
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households incorporate new macroeconomic information into their expectations in 
around one year.
13.3 Time inconsistency
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were the first to point out that monetary policy faces a 
time-inconsistency problem if agents have rational expectations. That is to say, a 
policy which is ex ante optimal can be suboptimal ex post, giving policymakers an 
incentive to deviate from socially-optimal policies to which they are not committed by 
some form of ‘commitment technology’. This is potentially problematic for PLT, 
because, as discussed in Section 1.2.1, it will only tend to reduce short-term volatility 
relative to IT if agents have rational expectations. Recall that the reasoning for this 
result was that PLT provides additional stabilisation through an ‘expectations 
channel’ -  in effect, firms move their prices less in response to shocks under PLT, 
because they expect shocks to be undone in future periods in order to return the price 
level to trend. However, if firms do hold such expectations and set prices accordingly, 
the central bank will then be faced with the temptation to deviate from the announced 
PLT policy ex post (Minford and Peel 2003; Ambler 2009). Intuitively, the central 
bank could ‘have its cake and eat it’ by benefiting from stabilised inflation by 
announcing a credible policy, only to renege on the announcement to avoid the cost of 
(say) reducing inflation below trend in following period. The central bank would in 
theory be faced with this temptation in every period, because reducing inflation below 
trend increases price dispersion across firms, which in its turn causes aggregate output 
to deviate from its efficient level.
As Ambler (2009) points out, the incentive to renege on the promised PLT policy 
would be intensified at the ZLB, since, once the nominal rate has moved away from 
zero, it would be far less costly to deviate and announce a new (lower) target price- 
level path than to achieve inflation above target for a substantial period of time in 
order to climb back to the initial target price path. This time-inconsistency problem is 
not formally captured by current models in the literature, but is an issue that is worthy 
of additional research.
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The reason that current models are unable to capture this temptation -  even in the 
discretionary case -  is that the central bank loss function depends on current and 
future price level deviations. The central bank would thus harm its own welfare if 
deviated from the announced policy in the current period, because it would then wish 
to undo the price deviation in the next period in order to return the price level to trend. 
In this sense, PLT rules out useless discretionary behaviour that is present under IT 
(Minford and Peel, 2003). However, what has essentially been argued above is that 
the central bank may be prepared to deviate from its loss function. There is an 
inconsistency in the current literature in the sense that the central bank is often 
assumed to be unable to commit to rules-based behaviour, yet able to commit to a 
particular loss function indefinitely.
1.4 Practical issues
A number of practical and implementation issues surrounding PLT are discussed in 
this section, including: credibility at the zero lower bound; the time horizon over 
which the price level should be returned to target; the idea of ‘hybrid targeting’ of 
inflation and the price level as a superior alternative to IT or PLT; open economy and 
financial market considerations; communication and credibility of PLT; and lack of 
practical experience.
1.4.1 Price-level targeting at the zero lower bound: practical issues
One major issue regarding PLT at the lower bound is credibility of the target price 
path. The credibility assumption is crucial since, as we have seen, the benefits of 
targeting the price level at the ZLB result from the automatic stabilisation implied by 
the link between inflation expectations and the real rate of interest. To be more 
precise, PLT creates an expectation o f future inflation, because a central bank that 
targets the price level promises to return the price level to its target path as soon as 
this is feasible. This then lowers the real rate o f interest and boosts current output and 
inflation, providing a potentially effective escape route from a ZLB episode. In short, 
for PLT to be beneficial at the lower bound, a high degree of credibility is a 
prerequisite.
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It is worthwhile, then, to consider whether central banks would in practice be able to 
commit to PLT rules and to establish a reputation for following such rules. Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) argue forcefully that there is little reason for concerns about the 
credibility o f PLT at ZLB. They put forward two reasons in support of this argument. 
First, the constant PLT rule they discuss is near-optimal and could be easily 
communicated to public, making it easy for the public to detect deviations from the 
announced rule. Second, they argue that the incentive to change policy at the ZLB and 
act in a time-inconsistent fashion is actually stronger under IT than under PLT, 
because social welfare is lower under the former.
On the first point, it is notable that Nakov (2008) argues that it may be difficult to 
communicate and implement even the ‘simple’ PLT rule analysed by Eggertsson and 
Woodford. He argues that simple interest rate rules are superior in this regard. 
Furthermore, monetary policies which are optimal or near-optimal in a specific model 
are usually not robust in terms of performance across models (Taylor, 1999). 
Regarding the second point, Eggertsson and Woodford are essentially arguing that 
PLT is well-suited to the demonstration o f commitment because it is equally optimal 
in both ordinary and extraordinary circumstances. In other words, by sticking to the 
PLT in the past -  prior to the occurrence o f a ZLB episode -  central banks could 
build-up a reputation for following through on promises and assuage any doubts 
agents may have about their commitment if the lower bound were reached. However, 
this point ignores an additional issue specific to the ZLB: observational equivalence. 
For instance, agents may doubt whether PLT is really being followed since returning 
the price level to its target path would require a zero nominal interest rate for a 
prolonged period, but so would any other reasonable policy. In summary, there 
remains the potential for time-inconsistency problems under PLT -  problems which 
are likely to be amplified at the ZLB and which would be understood by rational 
agents. It is also worth noting that the arguments made by Eggertsson and Woodford 
implicitly assume that agents have already learnt about the PLT regime, though this is 
not the situation that would be faced by real-world central banks considering whether 
to adopt PLT.
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1.4.2 The optimal horizon for returning the price level to target
In practice, IT central banks do not aim to instantly return inflation to target following 
a deviation. Instead, they aim to do so over the medium-term, which in this context 
means a period of 1 to 3 years. There are two reasons for this. First, changes in 
monetary policy affect inflation and output with a lag of 1-3 years (Christiano et al., 
2005; ECB, 2010). Secondly, responding with gradual changes in interest rates may 
prevent excessive volatility, as argued by Sack (2000). The optimal horizon for 
offsetting target deviations can be interpreted in terms of the relative weight on output 
gap stabilisation in the central bank loss function, with a higher weight implying a 
longer optimal targeting horizon.
With regards to PLT, the question arises as to whether the optimal horizon for 
offsetting deviations would change. This question has been investigated formally in a 
couple of papers. Smets (2003) investigates this issue in a New Keynesian model that 
is estimated on the Euro Area economy. The model consists of a hybrid New 
Keynesian Phillips curve and an IS curve with output gap persistence, as in Smets and 
Gaspar (2000). He finds that the optimal horizon for returning the price level to the 
target path is twice as long as the optimal horizon for returning inflation to target. The 
reasoning for this result is that the expectations channel under PLT is weakened 
compared to the purely forward-looking case, because the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve is partly backward-looking. Hence whilst PLT can still reduce inflation 
volatility relative to the IT case, the reduction is not that strong. Consequently, both 
nominal interest rate volatility and output gap volatility rise for a given targeting 
horizon, such that, in order to bring down interest rate and output volatility to levels 
similar to under IT, a longer targeting horizon is necessary. Similarly, Coletti et a l
(2008) compare IT and PLT in an open economy DSGE model and find that the 
optimal targeting horizon is higher under PLT, though it should be noted that both 
horizons are relatively short at less than one year. As noted by Coumede and Moccero
(2009), an issue related to the target horizon that has not yet been addressed in the 
literature is the width of the optimal band around the target price path.
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1.43 Hybrid targeting of inflation and the price level
Some papers have investigated the performance of PLT by focusing on hybrid 
targeting regimes in which the central bank places some weight on both inflation and 
price-level deviations from target (Gaspar and Smets, 2000; Batini and Yates, 2003; 
Cecchetti and Kim, 2005). In this literature, a positive weight on price-level 
deviations precludes base-level drift in the long run, and variations in the weight 
change the horizon over which the price level is returned to the target price path. For 
instance, Batini and Yates (2003) focus on an open economy model in which the 
exchange rate enters the Phillips curve. An interesting conclusion from their analysis 
is that pure PLT increases inflation volatility compared to pure IT. The reason for this 
result is that exchange rate volatility is raised under PLT via the uncovered interest 
parity condition (since the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve has a strong 
backward-looking component), and this requires substantial real interest rate volatility 
in order to return the price level to the target path. The optimal relative weight on the 
price-level objective is therefore rather low. A general conclusion from studies of 
hybrid targeting, however, is that an intermediate regime can be found that dominates 
strict IT or strict PLT if  there are both forward and backward-looking inflation terms 
in the Phillips curve (see Ambler, 2009).
Nessen and Vestin (2005) take a similar approach to these studies but investigate 
‘average inflation taregting’. Under this policy the central bank targets a moving 
average of current and past inflation rates. As the horizon of the moving average is 
extended, the amount o f price-level drift is reduced, converging to PLT in the limit. 
Hence the length of the moving average window defines a spectrum with IT at one 
end and PLT at the other. The question Nessen and Vestin set out to answer is 
whether an intermediate point on the spectrum would outperform pure IT and pure 
PLT, for the case where the central bank operates under pure discretion. The model is 
New Keynesian, with a moderate fraction of firms following backward-looking rule- 
of-thumb price-setting, and the remainder setting prices subject to nominal stickiness 
a la Calvo (1983). The supply side o f the economy is thus described by the hybrid 
New Keynesian Phillips curve in Steinsson (2003). Nessen and Vestin find that if the 
size of the moving average window is chosen optimally, average IT performs better 
than either strict IT or PLT and provides a good approximation to the optimal
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commitment policy. Intuitively, Vestin (2006) shows that PLT is optimal if the New 
Keynesian Phillips curve is purely forward-looking, whilst Steinsson (2003) notes that 
IT outperforms PLT if the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is high. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that a policy which is a hybrid of the two performs well when a 
moderate fraction of firms follow rule-of-thumb price-setting.
1.4.4 Open economy and financial market considerations
There has been a fair amount of work on the performance of PLT in an open 
economy, much of which has been carried out by, or in conjunction with, the Bank of 
Canada. Coletti et al. (2008) compare IT and PLT in the two-country IMF Global 
Economy Model (GEM), a medium-scale DSGE model designed to enable open- 
economy issues to be investigated within a rigorous representative-agent framework 
(see Laxton, 2008). The model is calibrated for Canada using the Bank of Canada’s 
ToTEM model, with the US as the second country in the model. The results focus on 
the implications of IT and PLT for macroeconomic stability in Canada. Coletti et al. 
find that a PLT Taylor-type rule slightly outperforms an IT one in terms of inflation 
and output gap volatility, primarily because shocks to the terms of trade strengthen the 
case for PLT due to its role as a nominal anchor.
Dib et al. (2008) investigate the impact of PLT within a medium-scale open economy 
model whose parameters are estimated using Canadian data. The model is New 
Keynesian but is augmented with credit frictions as in Bemanke et al. (1999), plus 
one-period nominal debt contracts which entrepreneurs enter into in order to finance 
investment. They find that PLT is better than IT at minimising the distortion in the 
economy due to nominal debt contracts, because the former leads to less revaluation 
of nominal contracts given that inflation expectations are stabilised through the 
‘expectations channel’. Real risk faced by entrepreneurs is therefore reduced, with the 
result that resources are allocated more efficiently under PLT. Moreover, this increase 
in efficiency means that nominal interest rates do not need to vary as much in order to 
minimise the distortion associated with nominal price stickiness, such that the real 
interest rate volatility is reduced, and the distortion from nominal debt is lessened. 
However, if the IT policymaker follows a Taylor rule with ‘interest rate smoothing’, 
much of this extra volatility is eliminated, because the IT policy is then history- 
dependent and therefore performs almost as well as PLT.
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Covas and Zhang (2010) focus solely on financial market imperfections. They 
compare IT and PLT in a closed-economy New Keynesian model that includes 
financial market imperfections in both debt and equity markets, and whose structural 
parameters are estimated for the Canadian economy. They find that PLT outperforms 
IT because the expectations channel means that inflation is better anchored under PLT 
than IT, which in turn enables a PLT central bank to deal with financial market 
distortions through policy whilst ensuring that inflation remains firmly anchored. It 
should be noted, however, that benefits of PLT are smaller than in absence of 
financial market imperfections and decrease as the extent of financial market frictions 
is strengthened. Therefore, whilst the research thus far suggests that PLT is robust in 
forward-looking models augmented with simple financial frictions, allowing fully for 
financial market imperfections could substantially reduce, or even eliminate, the 
short-term stabilisation benefits to be had from targeting the price level.
1.4.5 Communication and credibility of price-level targeting
Central banks that follow IT typically produce their own forecasts for inflation. Such 
forecasts have obvious importance for policy, but they are also used as a basis for 
transparently communicating policy decisions to the public. This is usually done via 
central bank ‘inflation reports’. This strategy seems to have been effective thus far in 
the sense that inflation expectations, as measured by survey-based and market-derived 
measures, appear to have been well anchored around the target rate of inflation 
(Gurkaynak et al. 2007; Demertzis and van der Cruijsen, 2007). In other words, it 
seems that IT central banks have been perceived as credible.
A key issue that has remained unresolved is the way in which PLT would be 
communicated to the general public. For instance, one option would be to continue to 
publish inflation forecasts. However, as the short-term inflation target is time-varying 
under PLT, inflation forecasts could be a source o f confusion, particularly in countries 
in which IT has been in place for a substantial period of time. A second option would 
be to publish price level forecasts instead, and perhaps ‘price level reports’ to go 
along with these forecasts. This approach would have the advantage that the forecasts 
could be directly compared to the predetermined target price path, which could of 
course be published well in advance. If PLT could successfully stabilise prices around
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the published target price path, it may be possible for PLT to attain credibility quite 
quickly. On the other hand, there is more uncertainty surrounding the outcome of this 
approach since, as noted by Ambler (2009), the public has been conditioned by IT to 
think in terms of inflation and not the general price level. The hybrid targeting results 
discussed above have practical importance because it would likely be easier to 
communicate a policy of ‘average IT’ given that the horizon of the inflation target and 
inflation forecasts could simply be altered (Ambler, op. cit.).
A second key issue with regard to PLT is how quickly it would be able to attain 
credibility. As noted in Section 1.3.2, credibility is likely to be a key factor in 
determining the transition costs o f switching to PLT. If credibility is established 
quickly, the transition costs are likely to be low because agents’ expectations will shift 
more swiftly from backward-looking learning mechanisms to (forward-looking) 
rational expectations. The extent of credibility initially attained will depend crucially 
on the ability of central banks to effectively communicate PLT to the general public.
Therefore, to the extent that public expectations are influenced by economic and 
financial forecasts, financial markets and the media may provide an important 
transmission mechanism by which PLT could gain credibility.31 Similarly, PLT is 
more likely to gain credibility quickly if central banks behave in a transparent manner, 
as this will enable economic agents to make their own assessment of whether the 
stated objectives of PLT are (i) achievable, and (ii) being pursued seriously by 
policymakers. In the long run, it seems unlikely that credibility would be an issue, 
since central banks would have sufficient time to demonstrate their commitment to 
PLT through policy actions.
1.4.6 Lack of practical experience: the Swedish experiment
An explicit PLT regime has only been adopted once in history, namely in Sweden in 
September 1931 after it left the Gold Standard. A detailed account of the Swedish 
experience with PLT is given by Berg and Jonung (1999) and Straumann and Woitek
(2009). The PLT regime was intended to stabilise prices against the backdrop of 
deflation that was widespread during the Great Depression. In particular, the price-
31 However, for this to be so, a prerequisite is that financial markets and the media perceive the regime 
as credible.
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level target related to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) -  the average level of consumer 
goods prices -  and was a constant target set at the September 1931 value, which for 
simplicity was normalised to 100. A floating exchange rate was initially adopted as 
part of the PLT regime, but in July 1933 the Riksbank decided peg the krona to the 
British pound. The Swedish experiment with PLT ended officially in April 1937 when 
the Riksbank chose to maintain the peg against the Pound -  a strategy that was seen as 
inconsistent with the price-level target given that CPI was consistently above target in 
the early part of 1937.
The main features of the Swedish PLT regime are summarised in Table 1.2, and for 
reference the evolution o f the CPI from 1928 to 1940 is shown in Figure 1.5. The CPI 
does seem to have stabilised during the PLT period, and it is notable that the deviation 
of the CPI from target was never greater than 3.8 per cent. Furthermore, it appears 
that the price level was successfully returned to target after falling more than 3 per 
cent in 1932 and 1933. Given the difficult economic backdrop, the performance of 
PLT in Sweden seems fairly strong. For instance, the US experienced almost 10 per 
cent deflation between September 1931 and April 1933 alone (Dittmar et al. 1999). 
Moreover, real indicators like industrial production and real income also fared well 
compared with most other countries (Berg and Jonung, 1999).
Table 1.2 -  The Swedish price-level targeting regime
Feature Description
Introduction As soon as the Gold Standard was 
suspended (September 27, 1931)
Operational target CPI at the date of introduction 
(normalised to 100), but other price 
indices were also monitored
Instrument Discount rate
Role of the exchange rate The krona was pegged to the Pound from 
July 1933 to the beginning of WWII
Role of money aggregates No role mentioned in the 
Monetary Programme
Goal independence No -  policy goals were set by the 
Riksdag (the Swedish parliament)
Instrument independence Yes
End date April 1937
Source: Adapted from Guender and Oh (2006)
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Figure 1.5 -  The Swedish experience with price-level targeting
Although PLT appears to have performed well, there are a number of reasons to be 
sceptical about whether PLT was responsible for the relatively strong performance of 
the Swedish economy. Firstly, countries that left the Gold Standard at an early point 
tended to perform better during the Great Depression and in its aftermath (Bemanke, 
1995). Hence, it could be that the decision to leave the Gold Standard was mainly 
responsible for Sweden’s good performance. Secondly, since the krona was pegged to 
the Pound from July 1933, it is far from clear that PLT was in fact being pursued 
during this time. Indeed, as Figure 1.5 makes clear, the deviations of the CPI from 
target were highest when the exchange rate was floating. Therefore, if only the 
September 1931 to July 1933 period was truly a PLT regime, the performance of PLT 
appears less favourable.
Straumann and Woitek (2009) go even further and argue that, after leaving the Gold 
Standard, the Riksbank was targeting the exchange rate with the Pound rather than the 
price level. They argue that “although being a major innovation in the history of 
Swedish economic thought, price-level targeting had no practical importance for the 
Riksbank in the 1930s” (p. 252). Their argument rests on both archival and 
econometric evidence. First, in terms of archival evidence, they present a series of
62
statements by the Riksbank governor at the time, Ivar Rooth, which suggest that in 
practice the policy implemented was not the PLT one that was announced publicly. 
They also show that some support for these statements can be found in private 
correspondence between the Riksbank and the Bank of England at the time. Second, 
Straumann and Woitek run a time-varying Bayesian VAR covering the period 1920- 
1939. The resulting impulse responses cast doubt on whether the price level was the 
target of policy, because the discount rate (the Riksbank’s instrument at the time) 
barely responds to a price shock, a result which is robust at different lag lengths and 
to various choices of the price index. Moreover, the impulse responses also suggest 
that there was no regime change after the 1930s. This observation provides further 
evidence against the hypothesis that PLT was adopted since, if the price level and not 
the exchange rate was the target of policy from September 1931, we would expect to 
see a structural break around July 1933 when it was officially announced that the 
krona would be pegged to the Pound.
Whilst neither the econometric or archival evidence that Straumann and Woitek 
present are entirely convincing, they is enough to cast doubt on whether the Riksbank 
really did adopt PLT. Furthermore, even if the Riksbank did target the price level, it 
must be remembered that this would provide only a single example in history during 
an extraordinary period. Consequently, the question of whether Sweden did or not 
adopt PLT has little relevance for the current debate on IT versus PLT. In fact, the 
most important contribution o f this episode may have been to highlight at an early 
stage the role that management of expectations can play in effective economic policy.
l.S Summary
This chapter has provided an exhaustive literature review of PLT, beginning with a 
simple comparison against IT before proceeding to discuss its potential advantages 
and drawbacks, as well as practical issues that have been identified in the literature. In 
terms of theoretical literature, the impact o f PLT on short-term volatility has been 
investigated in a wide range of models. The key finding from this literature is that 
PLT will tend to outperform IT in models in which agents are sufficiently forward- 
looking, because it favourably influences inflation volatility through the inflation 
expectations channel. The literature has also reached the robust conclusion than PLT
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will outperform IT in models in which the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates 
is a binding constraint on monetary policy, though more research is needed in this 
area to address the impact of imperfect credibility. One important area in which there 
is relatively little literature, however, is the impact of PLT on the welfare of economic 
agents that enter into long-term nominal contracts. Indeed, the theoretical literature 
suggests that such gains could be substantial, since if implemented successfully PLT 
would reduce long-term inflation risk by an order of magnitude compared to IT.
The aim of chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis is to quantify these gains. In order to do so, an 
overlapping generations model of life-cycle saving is built in which young 
generations save for old age using indexed and nominal government bonds whose 
payoffs are vulnerable to long-term inflation risk. This model has the desirable 
theoretical property that long-term inflation risk matters for social welfare, and is a 
DSGE model in the sense that all important variables are endogenised. Using this 
overlapping generations model, the key long-term benefits of PLT are quantified, 
including its impacts on consumption risk, social welfare, and inflation risk premia on 
long-term nominal contracts. Moreover, since the extent of indexation of government 
bonds is chosen optimally under IT and PLT, the model is able to addresses the issue 
of optimal contracting behaviour and should not be vulnerable to the Lucas critique. 
The model is also used to study the impact of heterogeneities across countries and 
over time, since the general model nests several special cases and is subjected to 
extensive sensitivity analysis.
From a practical perspective, there remain a number of unanswered questions 
regarding PLT that are not addressed in this thesis. The key ones are as follows: the 
impact of PLT on volatility immediately following its adoption when credibility 
would likely be imperfect; the importance of the perfect credibility assumption for the 
performance of PLT at the ZLB; and the way in which PLT would be communicated 
in practice. Although some of these issues can be investigated by academics, central 
banks themselves will be in the best position to address many of these issues. In fact, 
the Bank of Canada is already carrying out work in this direction as part of its review 
of PLT.
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Chapter 2 
Price-level targeting versus inflation targeting over the long-term: 
An overlapping generations approach
2. Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the potential long-term impacts of price-level targeting 
(PLT) have been under-researched in the literature. Indeed, as Ambler (2009) points 
out, evidence on these impacts is necessary to allow policymakers to conduct a full 
cost-benefit analysis against inflation targeting (IT). This chapter presents a general 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling framework that allows the 
impact of PLT on long-term inflation risk, consumption volatility and social welfare 
to be evaluated simultaneously. An overlapping generations (OLG) framework is 
chosen for this purpose since, as argued in the first chapter, the life cycle model due to 
Samuelson (1958) provides an ideal environment for an evaluation of PLT over a long 
horizon. In fact, this framework enables the impact of long-term inflation risk on 
social welfare to be modelled both explicitly and transparently, in contrast to the 
workhorse New Keynesian model.
The modelling framework presented in this chapter builds upon the standard OLG 
model of life-cycle saving in which government bonds are ‘net wealth’ (see Barro, 
1974). More specifically, the model extends preliminary work by Mankze and Todter 
(2007), discussed in the first chapter, that investigated the impact of PLT on social 
welfare in a model of overlapping generations in which consumers held nominal 
bonds. The partial equilibrium set-up they consider is improved upon in numerous 
ways here: IT and PLT are modelled explicitly as monetary policies, such that the 
price level is endogenised; aggregate output is produced via a production function as 
in Diamond (1965), rather than being given by an exogenous endowment process; the 
supplies of bonds and money balances are modelled explicitly, with government 
behaviour constrained by a budget constraint and a long run spending target; the 
returns on bonds (and other assets) are endogenously determined and include risk 
premia; and finally, consumers can hold both nominal and real assets in conjunction 
with government bonds.
This chapter puts forward the case for focusing on long-term government bonds 
before turning to the OLG model. The model presented is subsequently used to
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evaluate consumption volatility and social welfare under IT and PLT. In the current 
chapter, a basic version of the model is first presented and simulated in which 
consumers hold nominal bonds and money but no capital. Taken literally, this model 
is an extreme case since consumers can hold only nominal assets. However, this 
model provides a useful benchmark as it should provide an upper bound estimate of 
the gains from PLT and will also hold useful insights for countries in which nominal 
assets are the primary source of retirement income. Later in the chapter this simple 
model is extended so that consumers can also hold productive but risky capital, thus 
providing a check on robustness and providing results with more relevance for 
countries in which real assets play an important role. The results from both models are 
subjected to extensive sensitivity analysis.
Indexed bonds are then introduced into the model in Chapter 3, which presents and 
evaluates the ‘full model’ in which the extent of nominal indexation of government 
bonds is endogenised in response to monetary policy. As such, the results in Chapter 3 
are likely to be most applicable for countries where both real and indexed financial 
assets play an important role.
2.1 Motivation for focusing on ‘long-term government bonds9
Motivation for the analysis focusing on long-term bonds comes from a number of 
sources. One major motivation is that, as discussed in Chapter 1, there are no papers 
in literature that have investigated the economic impact of PLT within a DSGE 
framework in which long-term nominal contracts play an important role. Indeed, 
although the PLT literature has discussed the potential importance of such contracts, it 
has stopped short of explicitly modelling the impact, with the exception of the 
preliminary attempt by Mankze and Todter (2007). Yet, as argued in Chapter 1, the 
OLG life-cycle model of saving provides an ideal framework in which to investigate 
the impact of PLT through the long-term inflation risk channel, because in the 
canonical version of the model young generations maximise utility by saving for old 
age using long-term bonds.
Neither the PLT literature nor Mankze and Todter {op. cit.) provide a working 
definition of the types of contracts that should be covered by the term ‘long-term 
bonds’, but the need for a transparent definition in order to quantify the impact of PLT
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is clear, as well as being an important consideration for the way that such contracts 
are modelled theoretically. For the purpose of the analysis that follows, the term 
‘long-term bonds’ is taken to include (i) long-dated government bonds, and (ii) public 
sector pensions,32 both of which are long-term contracts that are used to smooth 
consumption in retirement (Whitehouse, 2009). The main justification for including 
both these contracts in the model is that public sector pensions are an important 
source of retirement income, so that focusing solely on long-dated government bonds 
would likely yield an inaccurate estimate of the long-term impact of PLT. Indeed, 
public sector pensions are a far more important source of household income than are 
government bonds (though the role of the latter is economically non-trivial33) and 
have become an important public policy issue in almost all developed economies 
(Disney, 2000; OECD, 2009a). In the case of the UK, for example -  where public 
sector pensions play an important role34 -  total pension wealth accounts for 50 per 
cent of personal wealth (Blake, 2004). There are, however, several other important 
reasons for focusing on both long-dated government bonds and public sector 
pensions.
First, long-dated government bonds and public sector pensions have numerous 
similarities. One similarity is that a typical holding period for a pension is 30-40 
years,35 a maturity at which long-dated government bonds are issued and at which 
holdings are non-trivial across OECD countries (OECD, 2007). A second is that long­
dated government bonds in issuance are predominantly nominal in developed 
countries (DMO, 2010a; Campbell et al. 2009; Kitamura, 2009), whilst public sector 
pensions are effectively nominal contracts because they are defined-benefit and are 
only indexed to prices once in payment.36 Lastly, both nominal government bonds and 
public sector pensions can be interpreted as having default risk of essentially zero in 
most developed economies. Due to these numerous similarities, it has been argued in 
the context of the UK that government pension liabilities should be discounted using
32 Doepke and Schneider (2006) also include public pensions in ‘bonds’.
33 For instance, UK households held gilts worth £10.3 billion  as o f  Q1 2010 (DM O, 2010b), or slightly 
less than 1 per cent o f  GDP.
34 For instance, independent estim ates o f  public sector pension liabilities range from 70 to 81 per cent 
o f  GDP in 2008, or between £39 ,000  and £45 ,000  per household (Pensions Commission, 2010).
35 Note that the typical retirement age in OECD econom ies is 65 for men and 60 for women (OECD, 
2009a).
36 That is, indexation to prices is applied to pensions only after retirement. It is also notable that public 
sector pensions have been subject to discretionary deviations from indexation at times o f  low inflation 
or deflation (W hitehouse, 2009).
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the yield on government bonds at a long maturity (see Pensions Commission, 2010). 
These similarities simplify the modelling of the long-term impact of PLT 
considerably because they mean that long-dated government bonds and public sector 
pensions can validly be treated as a single asset -  viz. ‘long-term bonds’ -  in the 
overlapping generations models presented below.
Second, from the point o f view of calibrating the overlapping generations model, the 
availability of data on government bonds and public sector pensions is a major 
advantage and means that heterogeneities across countries can be addressed by 
looking at different versions of the model and via sensitivity analysis. Third, the 
government bonds assumption also has practical appeal because it means that focus is 
directed to assets whose returns would most obviously be affected by a switch in 
monetary policy from IT to PLT. Indeed, as noted above, public sector pensions are 
typically ‘defined benefit’ pensions (see OECD 2009a),37 such that the nominal 
amount to be received in retirement is fixed. By contrast, private sector pension 
portfolios consist primarily o f equities and private bonds and therefore have highly- 
volatile returns even at relatively short horizons (D’Addio et al. 2009). Lastly, the 
assumption that the government issues all ‘long-term bonds’ is justified from a 
theoretical standpoint because government bonds are ‘net wealth’ in the standard 
OLG model of life-cycle saving, whilst private bonds are not (see Barro, 1974 and 
Minford and Peel, 2002).
In order to provide further background information for the reader, both long-dated 
government bonds and public sector pensions are discussed in more detail below, 
before introducing the overlapping generations model. The focus in these sections is 
on the G7 countries and the UK in particular, since the latter is used as a basis for 
calibrating the models that follow. Moreover, since the models in this chapter include 
nominal but not indexed government bonds, the discussion below concentrates on 
nominal government bonds. The importance of indexed government bonds is then 
discussed at the start of Chapter 3, prior to the introduction of the extended 
overlapping generations model with indexed bonds and endogenous nominal 
indexation.
37 In the UK, for exam ple, defined benefit pension plans accounted for 93.9 per cent o f  public sector 
pensions in 2008 (Pensions C om m ission, 2010).
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2.1.1 Long-dated nominal government bonds
Nominal government bonds are financial assets that provide a stream of known 
nominal payments over a specified horizon until the principal is returned upon 
maturity. For instance, Canadian, UK and US nominal bonds pay interest twice yearly 
over the holding period, plus the principal upon maturity. Nominal bonds account for 
the largest share of outstanding liabilities in government bond portfolios, though the 
share of indexed bonds has been growing steadily. In 2008, for example, nominal 
bonds accounted for around 70 per cent of British government stock (DMO, 2010a), 
90 per cent of the US Treasury’s marketable debt (Campbell et al., 2009), and 98 per 
cent of outstanding government bonds in Japan (Kitamura, 2009). Although the share 
of indexed bonds in total issuance has been increasing, the size of the market for 
nominal bonds has still grown substantially in absolute terms. In the UK, for example, 
the market for nominal gilts was £722.9 billion as of March 2010, compared to only 
£85.5 billion in 1981.38
As can be seen from Figure 2.1 (which plots the share in the UK bond portfolio of 
nominal gilts with maturities exceeding 15 years), long-dated government bonds have 
become increasingly important over recent years. For instance, in 2008 the average 
maturity of the UK gilt portfolio was 15 years, compared to only 10 years in 1998 
(DMO, 2010a).39 This increase has been driven largely by an increase in the 
proportion of gilts with a term-to-maturity exceeding 15 years. Similarly, the past 
decade has seen an increase in the relative importance of long-dated government 
bonds in many other OECD countries (see OECD, 2007). In Canada, for instance, 
there has been a marked shift towards maturities exceeding 20 years (Meh and 
Terajima, 2008), and increased issuance of longer-term debt is a stated objective of 
the Government.
38 This data was downloaded from the Debt M anagement O ffice (DM O ) website at 
http://www.dm o.gov.uk.
39 In the UK, issuance o f  nominal (i.e. conventional) gilts is concentrated around the 5-, 10-, 20- and 
30-year maturities.
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Source: DMO (2010a)
Figure 2.1 -  Long-dated nominal gilts and the UK bond portfolio 
2.1.2 Public sector pensions
Public sector pensions have been the subject of extensive discussion in recent years, 
not least because of concerns over their long-run sustainability if left unreformed 
(OECD, 2009a; Blake, 2000). In developed countries the share of the population of 
pension age lies between 10 and 20 per cent and has been rising consistently due to 
increases in life expectancy. For instance, across OECD countries, life expectancy at 
birth has risen from an average of 76.0 years in 1960 to 81.7 in 2006, with the 
population above retirement age currently at around one quarter of the population of 
working age (OECD, 2009a). Moreover, it is noteworthy that public sector pensions 
account for a substantial share of total pensions in many countries (OECD, 2009b), 
and that the public sector is an important source of output and employment in most 
developed economies.
This last point is demonstrated by Figure 2.2, which shows the share of public sector 
employment in the total labour force for the G7 countries in 2006. With the exception 
of Japan, public sector employment accounts for more than one-tenth of the total 
labour force. Public sector pensions are therefore held by a non-trivial fraction of the 
working population in these countries and seem set to play an important role going
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forward. Notably, the average share of public sector employment across OECD 
countries is around 15 per cent (Ponds et al. 2011).
250
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Source: O E C D  (2009c)
Figure 2.2 -  Public sector employment in the G7 countries
Public sector pensions are typically linked to salary during employment and then to 
inflation after retirement.40 However, indexation to inflation is imperfect due to 
publication lags, and aggregate price indices do not accurately capture some important 
price changes for pensioners as a group (Leicester et al. 2008)41 or quality 
improvements (Boskin Report, 1996).42 Hence, indexation is subject not just to time 
lags but also ‘indexation bias.’ Moreover, in some countries a non-trivial proportion 
of pension plans are not indexed at all, as in Canada where almost one-half of public 
sector pension plans are of the non-indexed variety (Meh and Terajima, 2008). 
Finally, as already noted above, discretionary deviations from indexation have 
frequently been observed in OECD countries, including those in the G7. In effect, 
then, public sector pensions are long-term nominal contracts that offer only partial
40 O f the 33 countries currently in the OECD, 17 currently index pensions to inflation after retirement 
(Whitehouse, 2009). In the UK, it was announced in the 2010 Budget that the State Pension and public 
sector pensions would be linked to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) from April 2011.
41 As a result, the inflation rate faced by pensioners can differ non-trivially from the rate faced by an 
average household, at least over the short-term (Leicester et al. 2008; Whitehouse, 2009).
42 Many statistics agencies are currently developing weight-linked price indices to address the ‘quality 
bias’ issue.
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protection against inflation (even after they are in payment). In the current chapter, 
the indexation element of pensions is ignored, because this point is addressed 
explicitly in following chapter that introduces long-term indexed bonds into the 
overlapping generations framework.
As public sector pensions are typically ‘defined benefit’ (OECD, 2009a), the nominal 
size of the pension received is guaranteed (i.e. the ‘rate of benefit’ as a stream of 
payments in retirement is known) and there is little or no uncertainty beyond inflation 
risk surrounding the real value of the pension. By contrast, a much higher proportion 
of private pensions are defined contribution plans,43 for which ‘investment risk’ is 
borne by pension-holders rather than the government. The fact that public sector 
pensions are primarily defined benefit fits in well with the standard overlapping 
generations life-cycle model since the government is the monopoly supplier of bonds. 
The next section provides a brief recap of this basic model as a means of introducing 
the more comprehensive modelling framework that follows.
2.2 The basic overlapping generations model: a brief reprise
Models of overlapping generations have been used to study issues relating to both 
pensions and government bonds (e.g. Boldrin and Montes, 2005; Barro, 1974). The 
next section o f this chapter introduces an overlapping generations model of life-cycle 
saving in which each period lasts 30 years and consumers hold long-term nominal 
government bonds and money balances. This simple model of life-cycle saving is 
similar to the canonical one in which government bonds are ‘net wealth’ but is 
extended in a number o f ways. In order to enable the reader to relate the model to 
previous literature, this section presents a brief recap of the standard life-cycle model.
In the standard overlapping generations model, government bonds are ‘net wealth’ 
because they perform a consumption-smoothing role via the real return they pay to 
consumers. The return on bonds is determined endogenously by demand for bonds by 
the young and the supply that is set by the government. A benevolent government will 
therefore set the bond supply so that the interest rate on bonds is such that each
43 However, in som e countries the share defined contribution plans in the private sector has remained 
low. For exam ple, in Canada as o f  2005, only 7 per cent o f  private sector pension plans were defined 
contribution ones (M eh and Terajima, 2008).
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generation smoothes consumption optimally between youth and old age. In order to 
briefly demonstrate this result, consider the following log-utility example from 
Minford and Peel (2002) in which there is no uncertainty and all generations have a 
population of one.
The lifetime utility function of generation / is given by ln(c,K) + ln(c,+i,o), where 
consumption in period t when young is denoted ct y and consumption in period /+1 
when old is denoted c,+ \ 0. Young agents receive a constant endowment Y -  e > 0, 
where 0 < c < Y/2 , which can be consumed or allocated to saving in riskless real 
bonds b, that have a gross real return of rt. The young’s budget constraint is therefore 
given by c , _ y  + b, = Y -  £. Old agents receive a constant endowment £ and consume all 
their savings, so their consumption in old age is given by c,+i o =  e + rtbt. The first- 
order condition for bond holdings gives the familiar Euler equation ct+\to -  rtCt,y. 
Substituting for consumption by old agents in the Euler equation and rearranging 
gives bond demand by young consumers, or bt = ( Y -  e)/2 -  el2rt.
Subject to this demand schedule, the real return on bonds is determined by the bond 
supply set by government. The government can maximise social welfare by choosing 
the bond supply so that the gross real return on bonds is equal to one -  that is, r( = 1 
for all t -  since this will maximise lifetime utility for all generations by ensuring 
perfect consumption-smoothing of q,o = c ,j= 1 /2 . Given that bond market equilibrium 
requires that the demand for bonds and the bond supply be equal, the bond supply 
required to implement this optimal policy is simply Y / 2 -  e.44 If government spending 
in real terms, gh is funded by issuing bonds, then in the initial period 1 there will be 
government spending of g\ -  Y 12 -  £ > 0. In subsequent periods, however, the debt 
can be rolled-over and government spending will be zero, because the government’s 
budget constraint is simply gt = (1 -  rt.\)bt. By this reasoning, the taxes required to pay 
off the initial government spending can be postponed indefinitely,45 such that 
government bonds are ‘net wealth’. Indeed, the above policy can be shown be 
welfare-maximising for all generations and a Pareto improvement over consuming 
endowments, a result first demonstrated formally by Barro (1974).46
44 The optimal bond supply can be derived by setting r, = 1 in the bond demand function.
45 It is assumed that the econom y and the governm ent are infinitely-lived.
46 It should be noted that Barro actually argues against governm ent bonds being net wealth because 
introducing a bequest m otive into the OLG m odel resurrects the Ricardian equivalence proposition.
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the bond market equilibrium that implements the optimal policy, 
and Figure 2.4 illustrates the corresponding gain in welfare for each generation 
relative to consuming endowments (as in the absence of a market in government 
bonds). The basic point is clear: the government can maximise social welfare by 
choosing the supply of long-term bonds optimally. The overlapping generations life­
cycle model depicted here is extended along a number of dimensions in the sections 
that follow in order to investigate long-term consumption volatility and social welfare 
under IT and PLT. Although the exact details of the model change considerably, there 
is a common central theme: the government supplies bonds because of their 
consumption-smoothing role for consumers, choosing the bond supply optimally so 
that consumption is smoothed between youth and old age. Thus the behaviour of the 
government in the model is not ad hoc but derives from its benevolent desire to 
maximise social welfare.
Bond supply Bond demandGross real 
return on 
bonds, rt
BondsY / 2 - s
Figure 2.3 -  Bond market equilibrium when the supply of bonds is optimised
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IC reached without bonds
Y
Slope = 1
Y / 2
IC attainable with 
optimal bond supply
Y
Y / 2
Figure 2.4 -  The welfare gain of each generation with government bonds 
2.3 The Model
The starting point for the analyses that follow is an overlapping generations (OLG) 
model of life-cycle saving in which consumers hold money balances and long-term 
nominal government bonds. Consumers live for two periods of 30 years: in the first 
they are ‘young’ and receive an exogenous endowment income; in the second they are 
the retired ‘old’ who receive the proceeds from their savings in youth. Consumers are 
assumed to receive no endowment income in old age because they are ‘retired’. Long­
term government bonds are therefore young consumers’ primary means of income 
provision for old age. Bonds have a maturity equal to the length of the holding period 
from youth to old age (i.e. 30 years), and following Lungu and Minford (2006), 
consumers are interpreted as holding bonds from ‘average youth’ to ‘average old age’. 
As discussed above, ‘long-term government bonds’ is used as an umbrella term that 
includes both long-dated nominal government bonds and public sector pensions. To
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ease the exposition, population growth is set equal to zero. Moreover, without loss of 
generality, each generation is assumed to have a constant size of one.47
Aggregate uncertainty is introduced into the model via nominal shocks that result 
from the inability of monetary policy to stabilise inflation perfectly. Although ‘fiat 
money’ is a popular way of justifying money holdings in OLG models (e.g. 
McCandless and Wallace, 1991), this approach is not theoretically convincing 
because fiat money must offer the same return as non-monetary assets to have value, 
implying deflation if other assets offer real returns. Money is instead introduced via a 
cash-in-advance constraint, an approach taken by a number of recent papers that 
investigate optimal monetary policy in OLG economies (e.g. Gahvari, 2007; Michel 
and Wigniolle, 2005). Monetary policy takes the form of either IT or PLT.
The government is risk-neutral and conducts monetary policy using the money supply 
as its policy instrument. It is also the monopoly supplier of long-term bonds and sets 
the bond supply to ensure optimal consumption smoothing (in expected terms) for 
each generation. In other words, the government sets the supply of bonds so that the 
ex ante real return on bonds is the optimal from the point of view of each young 
generation. The government also taxes young consumers in order to achieve a long 
run target level of government spending. The sections that follow focus on consumers, 
the government, monetary policy and social welfare -  thereby providing a detailed 
exposition of the economic environment. The model is solved using a second-order 
approximation in Dynare++ (Julliard, 2001) in order to capture asset ‘risk premia’.48 
This point is crucial since linear approximation can easily lead to an inaccurate 
ranking of policies in terms of social welfare, as it neglects the impact of uncertainty 
on the stochastic means of endogenous variables (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004; 
Kim and Kim, 2003).
47 There is no loss o f  generality because the focus throughout is on per-capita values. All model 
equations, and hence model dynamics, would be left unchanged i f  all generations had a constant size 
greater than one and were hom ogenously populated. Furthermore, constant population growth would 
introduce an additional parameter (the population growth rate) but would not change the dynamics o f  
the model.
48 Dynare+ *■ was used rather than Dynare because the advantage in terms o f  computation time meant 
that a significantly larger number o f  sim ulations were feasible. In general, perturbation methods are 
significantly faster than the alternatives (Caspar and Judd, 1997).
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2.3.1 The economic environment
Consumers live for two periods of 30 years and have constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) preferences over consumption:
( ^ *  ^ )  U t  ( C t . Y  ->C t  + \ , 0  )  =  U t , Y  i C t , Y  )  +  ^ / Wr + l , o ( C' /  + l , 0  )
where ui y(ct Y) = c 'J  /(I - 5 )  and ut^ 0 (ct+x0) = c);*0 / { \ - S ) .
Consumption in period t when young is denoted ct,y and consumption in period /+1 
when old is denoted cvu;. Hence u, y is utility in youth and w,+i,o is utility of the 
young generation bom at time t in period /+1 when they are old.49
In nominal terms, the budget constraint faced by young generations is given by
(2.2) Ptc, Y + B f'd + M f  = P M  1 -  t j )
where co is the constant real endowment income received by young consumers;50/5 is 
the aggregate price level; B" ‘'i s  demand for long-term nominal bonds; M  d is money 
demand; and r j is the constant rate o f income tax that can differ in the IT and PLT 
cases.
In real terms, the budget constraint faced by the young is given by
(2.3) C( y + K d + m f  = a t  1 -  r j )
where bn,d = BT d IP is real demand for nominal bonds and md = M d IP is the demand 
for real money balances.
49 Note that consumers do not discount consum ption in old age. This assumption can be justified on the 
basis that consumers view  their years o f  ‘old age’ as being just as important for utility as their years o f  
‘youth’. Exam ples from the literature that use this assum ption include Brazier et al. (2006), Minford 
and Peel (2002) and Champ and Freeman (1990).
50 A constant endowm ent is specified for sim plicity because the impact o f  real risk on the IT-PLT 
comparison is addressed later on by the introduction o f  productivity shocks which affect the real return 
on capital.
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Equation (2.3) states that consumers can save for old age by holding long-term 
nominal bonds or money balances. The income tax rate is set by the government to 
ensure that it meets a common long run government spending target under both IT 
and PLT (hence the need for the j  superscript).
Following Artus (1995), the demand for money arises from a cash-in-advance (CIA) 
constraint which states that real monetary savings are a fraction 0 < 6 < 1 of 
consumption when young:51
(2.4) m* > 6bir
This CIA constraint provides a role for money without explicitly requiring that money 
offer transactions services. The results that follow therefore do not depend in any way 
upon the impact of monetary policy on transactions costs or the ease of exchange, but 
on the link between monetary policy, long-term inflation risk and social welfare. 
Crettez et al. (1999) provide a useful discussion of the different CIA constraints that 
have been employed in OLG models with money.
As is demonstrated in Appendix A of this chapter, the CIA constraint will be strictly
c*y
binding so long as the money return on nominal bonds exceeds one. This result 
makes good sense intuitively since, with money being a perfect store of nominal 
value, an optimising consumer would not hold monetary savings in excess of the 
proportion 6 required by the CIA constraint if bonds pay a higher money return. In all 
numerical simulations discussed in this thesis, this condition was satisfied (based on 
ex post analysis of simulation results). It is therefore assumed henceforth that the CIA 
constraint is strictly binding.
With a strictly binding CIA constraint, Equation (2.4) becomes
(2 .5) mf = 6c,y
51 Cited by Crettez et al. (1999). This constraint is interpreted as a ‘cash-in-advance’ specification in 
the OLG literature.
52 Formally, the CIA constraint will be strictly binding if  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
CIA constraint is strictly positive for all t (Hodrick et al. 1991).
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In old age, consumers have no endowment income because they are ‘retired’. 
However, old agents receive a return on their holdings of nominal bonds and spend 
their money savings.
Thus consumption in nominal terms is given by
(2-6) PMc,.,0 = R,B:j + M f
where R, is the riskless gross money return paid on a nominal bond that is held from 
period / to period / +1.53
In real terms, consumption by old generations is given by
*7\ ^  n  L n . J  m  d
(2 -7) c „i.o = r,.A  +
where /•", = R, /(I + * ,.,)  and r", = 1/(1 + >rM ).
In Equation (2.7), r” is the gross real return on a nominal bond upon maturity (which 
is known at the time the bond is purchased but for inflation risk), and is the gross 
real return on money balances. nt = {Pt IPt-\ -1 ) the rate of inflation from period /-I to 
period t.
The initial old are endowed with mo units of real money balances and an initial stock 
of government debt of bo\ their corresponding level of consumption is c\to . Trivially, 
the utility of the initial old is given by
c '-*
o \  1 °(2.8) w, 0 —
1 - S
51 The return R, is endogenous determined so that in each period the demand for bonds is equal to the
available supply.
79
2.3.2 Long-term inflation risk and social welfare
Before investigating consumers’ first-order conditions and introducing the remainder 
of the model, it is worth briefly noting that the general OLG model set out above 
provides a microfounded welfare justification for focusing on long-term inflation risk 
-  a theoretical finding which provides support for informal arguments made in the 
PLT literature (as reviewed in Chapter 1).
In particular, a second-order Taylor expansion of the lifetime utility of a given 
generation / has the form of a loss function in long-term inflation volatility, where 
‘long-term’ refers to the holding horizon from youth to old age of 30 years. In order to 
obtain this result, the methodology used by Woodford (2003) is employed: the above 
equations are log-linearised around the deterministic steady-state and substituted into 
a second-order Taylor expansion of lifetime utility.54
Specifically, Appendix B of this chapter shows that the lifetime utility of generation t 
can be written as follows:
(2.9) Loss, a  -(1 / 2 )0 , var, (/r,+1)
where Losst is defined as the deviation of lifetime utility from its time-/ expected 
value, and the coefficient O, > 0 depends on the model’s steady-state parameters and 
anticipated consumption in old age.
Equation (2.9) shows clearly that the utility loss of each generation / is increasing in 
the (conditional) 30-year inflation variance. One interesting implication of this loss 
function expression is that the utility loss caused by long-term inflation risk can 
potentially differ across generations and thus over time (hence the / subscript on the O 
coefficient). The social welfare criterion that is subsequently used to evaluate IT and 
PLT is therefore based on average utility across all generations, rather than the
54 As shown formally by An and Schorfheide (2007), the resulting expression for utility is not in 
general second-order accurate because it neglects the impact o f  shocks on the means o f  endogenous 
variables when there are nonlinearities (i.e. it ignores terms due to Jensen’s inequality as a result o f  the 
‘certainty equivalence’ principle). However, this consideration does not affect materially the point that 
is being made.
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lifetime utility of any given generation. The social welfare function is discussed in 
further detail below.
2.3.3 Consumers’ first-order conditions
The maximisation problem faced by consumers can be represented by the following 
expected Lagrangian:
where A/.k OW o) is the Lagrange multiplier on young (old) consumers’ budget 
constraint and fx, is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.
First-order conditions are as follows:
Substituting out the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraints when young and 
old gives the following consumption Euler equations for nominal bonds and money 
balances:
(2 . 10)
(2 . 11 ) 
(2 . 12)
(2.13)
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
where fxt is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.
The Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint is given by
(2.17)
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Intuitively, Equation (2.17) states that, absent uncertainty, a sufficient condition for 
the CIA constraint to be strictly binding (i.e. n t > 0 for all /) is that money be rate of 
return dominated by nominal bonds.
Substituting for the Lagrange multiplier, the consumption Euler equation for nominal 
bonds can be written in the following form:
It can be seen from Equation (2.18) that the CIA constraint gives rise to an additional 
term 0(r” -  rm) on the right hand side of the consumption Euler equation. The intuition 
behind this additional term is that reducing consumption when young by one unit has 
a knock-on effect of reducing money holdings by 0  units via the CIA constraint, 
because money holdings are proportional to consumption. This reduction in money 
holdings makes available an extra 0 units of endowment income for bond purchases. 
Consequently, young consumers receive an additional return Or*1 from extra bond 
purchases whilst losing 0rm from the reduction in money balances.
2.3.4 Government
The government is risk-neutral and finances real spending g, by taxing young 
consumers, printing money and issuing nominal government bonds. The 
government’s budget constraint in real terms is therefore given by
where r jco is tax revenue, m is money supply in real terms, and bs is the real supply 
of nominal bonds issued by the government.
Real spending of g, per period is endogenously determined and is used up in projects 
that have no direct effect on the utility or consumption of agents. However, the 
income tax rate is set to ensure that, conditional on the money supply rule that is 
implemented, long run real government spending is equal to a target level of g*, or
(2.18)
(2.19)
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E(gt) = g*  55 Since the long run government spending target must be met, a higher 
cost of issuing government debt in one of the monetary policy regimes -  due, for 
instance, to differences in bond risk premia under IT and PLT -  must be covered by 
raising the constant income tax rate faced by young consumers.
As discussed above, the government sets the supply of bonds to ensure that the ex 
ante return is such that consumers enjoy perfect consumption smoothing in expected 
terms (making bonds a source of ‘net wealth’). This amounts to setting the bond 
supply so that the marginal utility of consumption in youth is equated to the (time-/) 
expected marginal utility of consumption in old age.56 The government bond supply 
will tend to vary with the money supply rule that is implemented and over time, 
because the optimal provision of bonds will depend upon the shocks that hit the 
economy and the response of monetary policy to such shocks.
Formally, the supply of nominal bonds is implicitly defined by the following 
equation:
(2-20) c ^ = E , { c ^ 0 )
2.4 Monetary Policy
As mentioned above, the government’s monetary policy instrument is the money 
supply. The major difference between IT and PLT is that the former implies ‘base- 
level drift’ in the price level, whilst the aim of the latter is to prevent it. This section 
discusses the money supply rules under IT and PLT. Importantly, the 30-year money 
supply rules which enter the model are derived from a yearly horizon. As a result, the 
money supply rules and equilibrium inflation over a 30-year horizon reflect the 
presence of base-level drift under IT and its absence under PLT. Since the 
government can commit to IT and PLT money supply rules, no time-inconsistency or 
credibility issues arise in relation to monetary policy. The exposition below
55 Under risk neutrality, policym akers care about mean values but not volatilities.
56 G iven that each period lasts 30 years, it is not unreasonable to think o f  the government choosing the 
bond supply to enable consumers to smooth their lifetim e consumption in this way. Note that in the 
deterministic steady-state there will be perfect consumption sm oothing with this policy, as in the 
example above from Minford and Peel (2002).
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concentrates on the nominal money supply (which is non-stationary), but the money 
supply is converted back into real terms in order to solve the model in Dynare++. 
Firstly, note that the CIA constraint implies that
(2 .21 )
where M f = P{\m^ is money demand in nominal terms.
Taking logs of Equation (2.21) implies that the (30-year) growth of money demand is 
given by
where n t * In Pt -  In Pt_x.
Given that there must be equilibrium in the money market, Equation (2.22) shows 
clearly how the rate of inflation in equilibrium will depend upon the money supply 
rule implemented by the government. However, reflecting the inability of monetary 
policy to perfectly stabilise inflation, money supply rules are subject to nominal 
shocks. These shocks are in turn passed through to equilibrium inflation, so the 
government is not able to perfectly control the rate of inflation using the money 
supply.
2.4.1 The IT money supply rule
The nominal money supply rule under IT takes the following form:
where e T is the aggregate money supply innovation over 30 years and n* is the 30- 
year inflation target.
(2 .22) In M f  -  In A/,J , = n t + In ctY -  In ct_lY
(2.23)
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In the absence of money supply shocks, Equation (2.23) would imply perfect 
stabilisation of inflation at the inflation target. Given that each period lasts 30 years 
and there is base level drift, the aggregate 30-year money supply innovation will be an 
accumulation of innovations to the money supply at a yearly horizon. This aggregate 
innovation is built-up from a yearly money supply rule. In order to do so, consider the 
goal of a achieving a constant yearly inflation target.
This goal implies a money supply rule of the following form at a yearly horizon i:
(2.24) In M ] jt = In M + n  + ei + In ciY -  In cM Y
where n is the yearly inflation target and e, is a yearly money supply innovation. The 
latter is assumed to be a serially-uncorrelated random variable drawn from an A(0, (f)  
distribution.
The aim is to derive the 30-year money supply rule in Equation (2.23) from this 
yearly specification. In order to do so, substitute repeatedly for the lagged money 
supply term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.24) until the following 30-year 
money supply rule is reached:
29
(2.25) In M*j t  = In A//:^ + 30 x  n  + ^  e i_j + In ci Y -  In c|._30ty
7=0
Equation (2.25) states that the 30-year growth rate of the nominal money supply has 
three separate components: a 30-year inflation target; the sum total of 30 separate 
yearly money supply innovations; and the 30-year growth rate of consumption when 
young. As such it is simply a version of Equation (2.23) expressed in terms of years 
rather than 30-year periods.
Hence, given that each period / lasts 30 years, Equation (2.25) implies that the money
57supply rule in any period t can be represented as follows:
57 To save on state variables (and hence computation time), the summation on the right hand side was 
modelled as an aggregate innovation.
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30
(2.26)
where, for ease of exposition, money supply innovations have been indexed from 
years 1 to 30 and the subscript indicates that all 30 innovations belong to period /.
The aggregate money supply innovation under IT is therefore given by £i ,+  £2 
£30./, while the 30-year inflation target is given by n* = 307T. A s the sum of 30 normal, 
zero-mean random variables, the aggregate money supply innovation is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance 3 0 ^ . Note that the aggregate money supply 
innovation under IT is simply the sum of the yearly money supply innovations that are 
allowed to accumulate over a 30 years as a result of base-level drift.
Money market equilibrium implies that inflation over a 30-year horizon under IT is 
given by
Therefore, expected inflation is equal to the inflation target and the 30-year inflation 
variance is thirty times the yearly money supply innovation variance:
Both of these results have been discussed in the literature on IT. First, expected 
inflation is equal to the inflation target because the government makes a credible 
commitment to an IT money supply rule. Second, the inflation variance is thirty times 
the yearly money supply innovation variance because of base-level drift; that is, 
money supply innovations cause inflation to deviate from target in each year, and over 
time these innovations accumulate, with each one adding to long-term inflation 
uncertainty.
30
(2.27)
(2.28)
(2.29)
Et 7r'tl\ = 3 0 x / r  
var(/r,/ r ) = 30a
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2.4.2 The PLT money supply rule
The nominal money supply rule under PLT takes the following form:
(2.30) In A// -  In M ; f T = In -  In + s?LT -  s ™  + In c, K -  hi c,_u
where £ is the money supply innovation and P, is the time-/ target price level.
In the absence of money supply innovations, Equation (2.30) would imply perfect 
stabilisation of the price level at target. However, the price level will deviate from its 
target level due to money supply innovations. The presence of a lagged money supply 
innovation in Equation (2.30) reflects the response of the PLT money supply rule to 
the past price level deviation, which is offset to ensure the price level is returned to its 
target path (as discussed in Chapter 1). Notice also that the money supply innovation 
is allowed to differ from the IT case in order capture the impact of PLT upon inflation 
over a 30-year horizon.
It assumed that target log price level under PLT follows a linear trend that increases at
CO
the target rate of inflation under IT:
(2.31) In P* = p 0 + 7t * x t
where p 0 is the initial target price level.
The 30-year money supply rule in Equation (2.30) can therefore be written as
(2.32) In Ai f LT -  In Ai stf T = x *  +e^LT -  e ™  + In c,>K -  In cM ,
Since PLT precludes base-level drift, the innovation in the 30-year money supply rule 
will differ from that in the IT case. However, in order to provide a fair comparison of 
IT and PLT, this innovation is also derived from a money supply rule that is subject to 
innovations at a yearly horizon.
58 This assumption is made to ensure direct comparability o f  IT and PLT. Under this assumption, IT 
and PLT are identical in the absence o f  m oney supply innovations.
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First, note that the goal of meeting a target yearly (log) price level of po + ni in each 
year i implies a yearly money supply rule of the following form:
(2.33) In M ‘-PLT = In M ‘: PLT + n  + e,. -  + In ci r -  In ciA y
where n  is the constant yearly inflation target that is consistent with the target price 
path and £, is a yearly money supply innovation that is drawn from an A(0, a2) 
distribution and is serially-uncorrelated (exactly as in the IT case).59
To derive the money supply rule in Equation (2.32) from this yearly specification, 
substitute repeatedly for the lagged money supply term on the right hand side of 
Equation (2.33) until the following 30-year money supply rule is reached:
(2.34) In M*'plt = In M -'P^ T + 30 x n  + e { -  + In ci Y -  In c,._30 Y
Equation (2.34) states that the 30-year growth rate of the money supply under PLT 
has three components: a 30-year inflation target 307r; two yearly money supply 
innovations; and the 30-year growth rate of consumption when young. As such, 
Equation (2.34) is simply a version of Equation (2.32) expressed in terms of years 
rather than 30-year periods.
Equation (2.32) can therefore be expressed as follows:
(2.35) w m ; plt / m ;:p lt) = 3 0 x x  + eMj -£-30,,_, +hi(c,r /c,_l r )
where the money supply innovations have been indexed to reflect the year in which 
they occur, and the t subscript indicates the period to which innovations belong.
As under IT, the 30-year inflation target is given by k * = 30k.
In contrast to the IT case, the money supply innovation in period / is given by a single 
yearly innovation, £307, such that the money supply rule contains only two yearly 
money supply innovations, £30,/ and £3o,m> which relate to year 30 in adjacent periods.
59 Hence it is assumed that PLT offsets shocks to the price level at a yearly horizon.
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The reasoning is as follows: innovations that occur in years 1-29 of a given period are 
offset in the following year in order to bring the price level back to its target path. For 
instance, a shock in year 29 will be offset in year 30, the last year of the current 
period. However, the innovation in year 30 of every period cannot be offset until year 
1 of the next period. Hence the innovations £30,/ and cjo.m enter the period-t money 
supply rule. The first is the innovation in year 30 of the current period (an 
unavoidable ‘trembling hand); the second is the innovation from year 30 of the 
previous period, which is actively offset by policy in year 1 of the current period.
From money market equilibrium, inflation under PLT is given by
Hence expected inflation varies over time and the 30-year inflation variance is two 
times the yearly innovation variance:
Both of these results have been discussed in the monetary policy literature (e.g. 
Svensson, 1999; Minford, 2004). Firstly, expected inflation varies because past 
deviations from the target price path are subsequently offset, and rational agents take 
this into account when forming their inflation expectations. Second, the 30-year 
inflation variance is 15 times lower under PLT because inflation depends on only 2 
yearly money supply innovations, compared to 30 under IT. The reasoning is simply 
that yearly deviations from the inflation target do not accumulate to increase long­
term inflation uncertainty, because PLT precludes base-level drift.
In order to make the main differences between IT and PLT concrete, Panels (a) and 
(b) of Figure 2.5 report impulse responses to a money supply innovation. As the 
yearly money supply innovation standard deviation has not yet been calibrated, its 
value was set so as to give a one per cent inflation shock in the IT case. The 
differences between IT and PLT are clear: the initial impact is somewhat smaller
(2.36)
(2.37)
(2.38) var{n?LT) = 2cr2
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under PLT due to the lower (30-year) money supply innovation variance; and the 
initial inflationary shock is reversed in the following period under PLT but is treated 
as a bygone under IT.
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Figure 2.5 -  Inflation impulse responses to a money supply innovation
This discussion completes the description of the model. For completeness, the 
deterministic steady state of the model and market-clearing conditions are reported in 
Appendix C, along with a full model listing in Appendix D.
2.5. Model calibration
2.5.1 Money supply rules
In order to make the money supply rules in the model operational, the yearly inflation 
target and yearly money supply innovation variance need to be calibrated. Given that 
inflation in the model is a function of the inflation target and a money supply 
innovation, UK inflation over the IT period was used to calibrate the money supply 
rules. The Retail Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) was 
chosen for this purpose, with the sample period running from 1997Q3 to 2010Q2.60 
Quarterly data were chosen because annual data would provide only 14 separate 
observations.61 The RPIX was chosen because it excludes mortgage interest 
payments, which are not faced by the majority of pensioners in the UK (Leicester et
60 The Bank o f  England was assigned an inflation target soon after ‘Black Wednesday’ in 1992, but 
was not given full operational independence until May 1997.
61 The index was downloaded from the ONS Time Series Database at 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbasc/tsdtimezone.asp.
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al. 2008), and because it includes both council tax and housing costs -  relatively more 
important costs for pensioners that are excluded from the Consumer Prices Index 
(CPI).
It is important to note that although the inflation target in the UK was changed from
2.5 per cent for the RPIX to a 2 per cent target for the CPI in December 2003, the 
adjustment was based on historical experience with the intention of ensuring that there 
was no material change in monetary policy strategy (King, 2004).62 As such, this 
event was not treated as a structural break in the sample. In concordance with this 
treatment, the Quandt-Andrews and Chow breakpoint tests were unable to reject the 
null hypothesis of no breakpoint. Quarterly inflation over the sample period is shown 
in Figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6 -  Quarterly RPIX inflation over the sample period
To calibrate the money supply rules, the following regression equation was estimated 
at a quarterly frequency q via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
(2.39) nq =c  + £q
where nq is the log first-difference of the quarterly RPIX.
62 The main argument cited in favour o f  the shift to the CPI was international comparability.
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The estimation results from this regression and relevant test statistics are reported 
below in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 -  RPIX regression results, 19971Q3-2010Q2
Parameter/Test Result
( 4 )
0.007
(0.001)
Quarterly standard deviation, sd (e  ) 0.0060
Yearly standard deviation 0.012
Dickey-Fuller unit-root test on \n(RPIX) 
(prob. value)
-1.706
(0.73)
Jarque-Bera test on e 
(prob. value)
1.837
(0.40)
The estimate for c is the mean quarterly inflation rate over the sample period. The 
value of 0.007 therefore implies mean annual inflation of 0.028 (or 2.8 per cent), 
which is close to the annual RPIX target of 2.5 per cent that was the focus of UK 
monetary policy from March 1997 until December 2003. As the difference between 
mean quarterly inflation and the quarterly rate implied by the annual target of 2.5 per 
cent was not statistically significant at the 5 per cent significance level, the yearly 
inflation target was set equal to n = 0.025. This yearly target implies a calibrated 30- 
year inflation target of n* = 30tc = 0.75, or a 75 per cent increase in prices over a 30- 
year horizon.
In order to estimate the variance of the yearly money supply innovation, the residuals 
from the above regression were used. The reasoning for doing so is that the IT the 
money supply rule gives the result that inflation is equal to the inflation target plus a 
money supply innovation, which implies that the inflation variance is simply the 
money supply innovation variance. The variance of the residuals from the above 
regression is of course a quarterly variance, but this was converted to a yearly 
variance using the unit root hypothesis and then used to calibrate the IT and PLT 
money supply rules. The assumption that there is a unit root in the quarterly RPIX is 
supported by the Dickey-Fuller unit root test (see Table 2 .1),63 and is an implication 
of the IT money supply rule since there is base-level drift. Notably both McCallum 
(1997) and Dittmar et a l (1999) used the unit-root hypothesis on quarterly US price
^3 An intercept and trend were included in the test regression.
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indices in order to calculate the implications of IT for longer-term inflation
64uncertainty.
The estimated quarterly standard deviation for inflation was 0.006, which by the unit- 
root hypothesis implies a yearly standard deviation of 0.012, or 1.2%. The implied 
yearly money supply innovation variance is therefore 0.00015; this was taken as the 
calibrated value in the model under both IT and PLT. It is notable that the null 
hypothesis that the inflation innovation is normally distributed could not be rejected at 
the 5 per cent significance level by the Jarque-Bera test statistic, as shown in the 
bottom row of Table 2.1.65
2.5.2 Model parameter calibration
The calibrated values for the model are summarised in Table 2.2. Young consumers’ 
endowment income is normalised to one for simplicity; this means that bond holdings, 
money balances and consumption levels can be interpreted as proportions of 
aggregate income or GDP. The coefficient 0, the proportion of consumption when 
young held as money, is calibrated to roughly match UK data. In particular, 
consumption accounts for just under 65 per cent of GDP (ONS, 2010a), and notes and 
coins in circulation for between 3 and 4 per cent of GDP over the past decade (ONS, 
2010b). Therefore, with aggregate steady-state consumption split equally between 
young and old agents by the government bond supply rule, holdings of notes and 
coins would need to be around one-tenth o f consumption by young agents to match 
the data. On this basis, 0 was set equal to 0.10.
64 Both these papers also assumed that the inflation innovation is serially uncorrelated.
65 By the unit-root hypothesis, the yearly m oney supply innovation is the sum o f  the innovations from 
the four quarters in that year. Since a sum o f  normal random variables is itse lf normally-distributed, it 
is sufficient to test for normality o f  the quarterly regression residual.
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Table 2.2 -  Model calibration
Model
parameter
Role in the model Calibrated
value
e Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances
0.10
s Coefficient o f relative risk aversion 3
(O Endowment income of young consumers 
(and GDP)
1
g * Long run target for government spending 0.20
n * Inflation target over 30 years 0.75
vai<£,,) Yearly money supply 
innovation variance
1.45x10^
The coefficient of relative risk aversion was set equal to 3. This value lies in the mid­
range o f calibrated values in the literature: it is higher than a standard real business 
cycle (RBC) calibration of unity, but somewhat lower than the values typically used 
in the open-economy literature that attempts to match exchange rate volatility and 
persistence in the data (e.g. Kocherlakota and Pistaferri, 2007; Chari et al. 2002), or in 
the finance literature that attempts to resolve asset-pricing ‘puzzles’ by appealing to 
risk aversion coefficients of 5 or higher (e.g. Bansal and Yaron, 2004). Moreover, the 
value o f 3 is close the estimated value of 3.5 reached by Todter (2008) using US stock 
return data from 1926 to 2002.
The long run target level of government spending is set equal to 0.2, or 20 per cent of 
GDP. This long run target is similar to the recent level of UK government spending as 
a percentage of GDP (ONS, 2010a) and is broadly similar to the level of government 
expenditure as percentage of GDP in other developed economies.66 The last two rows 
in Table 2.2 were calibrated using the RPDC regression results discussed above. The 
implied steady-state values of key variables in the model are shown in Table 2.3.
66 For exam ple, in their model o f  the US econom y, Rudebsuch and Swanson (2008) specify that 
government spending is an exogenous stochastic process with an unconditional mean o f  17 per cent o f  
GDP.
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Table 2.3 -  Key variables at steady state
Model variable Steady-state value
C t.Y 0.40
c t ,o 0.40
b f ( = b ; ) 0.39
m 1  ( = 6 ° ,  J  = m ", ) 0.04
0.75
Steady-state consumption accounts for 80 per cent of GDP and is split equally 
between young and old generations by the government bond supply rule. Since there 
is no investment in the model, the remaining 20 per cent of GDP is accounted for by 
government spending. Steady-state bond holdings are just under 40 per cent of GDP, 
and approximately ten times money holdings.67 Finally, steady-state inflation over 30 
years is equal to the 30-year inflation target of 75 per cent. These implied steady-state 
values provide a reasonable fit to UK data and developed economies in general.
2.6 Simulation methodology
The model is solved using a second-order approximation in Dynare++ (Julliard, 
2001). It is important to use non-linear approximation methods to obtain the model 
solution for two reasons. Firstly, the demand for bonds depends on consumption 
covariance risk. Log-linearising the model would eliminate covariance risk, with the 
result that the model would miss a potentially important ‘risk premia’ channel through 
which PLT could potentially have an impact on social welfare vis-a-vis IT. 
Furthermore, the study of bond risk-premia is of interest in its own right since the 
literature on PLT predicts a substantial reduction in the inflation risk premium on 
nominal contracts. For this reason, inflation risk-premia under IT and PLT are 
investigated formally in Chapter 4.
Secondly, when comparing social welfare across different monetary policy regimes, 
linear approximation can easily lead to an inaccurate ranking of policies because it 
neglects the impact of second-order terms on the stochastic means of endogenous 
variables. For instance, Kim and Kim (2003) present a simple two-agent economy in
67 At steady-state, nominal bonds account for 93.7 per cent o f  old generations’ retirement income. By 
comparison, public sector pensions account for around 85 per cent o f  retirement income in Germany 
(Berkel and BOrsch-Supan, 2004; Bdrsch-Supan, 2000).
which log-linearisation leads to the spurious conclusion that autarky delivers higher 
social welfare than full risk-sharing. In the context of the current model, mean returns 
on both bonds and money balances are influenced by second-order terms due to 
Jensen’s inequality. Consequently, linearisation could give spurious social welfare 
results, since the model solution would fail to take these second-order terms into 
account when evaluating mean consumption by old generations.
The results presented below are based on 1,000 simulations of the model with the 
simulation length set equal to 5,000 periods, and with the simulation seed chosen 
randomly in each simulation. The next section discusses the social welfare criterion 
that was used as a basis for the IT-PLT welfare comparison. Simulation results are 
then presented in the section that follows.
2.7 Evaluating the impact of PLT on social welfare
The appropriate criterion for evaluating social welfare in OLG models is far from 
obvious, since the lifetime utilities of individual generations will generally vary 
response to the shocks that hit the economy. Therefore, in order to evaluate IT and 
PLT, it was assumed that the government seeks to maximise the unconditional 
expectation of social welfare -  a criterion first proposed by Taylor (1979). This 
approach to policy evaluation has been used in numerous papers in the monetary 
policy literature, including Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), Clarida, Gali and Gertler 
(1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).68 The unconditional expectation of 
social welfare is the average across all possible histories of shocks and is therefore a 
robust criterion by which to evaluate alternative policies using a long run perspective.
Given the lifetime utility function in Equation (2.1) and the utility of the initial old -  
see Equation (2.8) and the surrounding discussion -  average welfare over T periods is
, 69given by
68 Examples o f  stochastic OLG m odels in which monetary policy is evaluated using an unconditional 
social welfare criterion include Kryvtsov et al. (2011) and Brazier et al. (2006).
69 Note that the young o f  period T only receive utility from their youth, because the ‘world’ is assumed 
to end after the period T horizon over which welfare is evaluated.
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1=i
(2.40)
1 = 1
Y  U * y  ( C r.Y )  u \ ,0  ( c i, 0  )  ^  E , U l+\ o  {C ,+ \ '0  )
j r r-i
Social welfare is then defined as the unconditional expectation of this expression, or
Social welfare from this criterion is expressed in ‘utils’ and is therefore meaningless 
from a policy perspective. The analysis that follows therefore focuses on the 
consumption equivalent welfare gain from switching from IT to PLT over the long 
run. Formally, the consumption equivalent welfare gain X is defined as the fractional 
increase (or decrease) in consumption by young and old generations under IT that is 
necessary to equate social welfare under the two policies, i.e.
where U ,T „ is social welfare under IT and U PLL  is social welfare under PLT.society society
A positive value for X indicates that social welfare is higher under PLT than IT, and 
that the gain in welfare is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption for all 
young and old generations of 10(U per cent. On the other hand, if social welfare is 
higher under IT, X will be negative. Note that since aggregate consumption is 80 per 
cent of steady-state GDP under the baseline calibration, the consumption equivalent 
welfare gain can be expressed as a gain or loss in per cent of GDP by multiplication 
of A by 80.
2.8 Simulation results
As mentioned above, simulation results were obtained from 1,000 stochastic 
simulations of 5,000 periods each, giving a total of 5 million simulated observations 
from which to evaluate the impact of PLT vis-a-vis IT. The results in this section
(2.41)
(2.42) society
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compare IT and PLT across three areas: impulse responses, consumption volatility 
and social welfare.
2.8.1 Impulse responses
Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses o f  inflation to a one standard deviation money 
supply innovation in the IT and PLT cases. The initial impact is somewhat smaller 
under PLT because o f  the lower 30-year money supply innovation variance. Although 
the shock to inflation is subsequently offset under PLT, it is clear that overall inflation 
variability is substantially higher under IT.70
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Figure 2.7 -  Inflation response to a money supply innovation
Figure 2.8 shows the response o f  bond holdings and consumption when young to a 
money supply innovation. In the IT case there is no response: a money innovation 
increases inflation but not expected future inflation, leaving expected returns on bonds 
and money balances unchanged. As a result, there is no incentive for young 
consumers to substitute between bonds and money balances. Under PLT, however, a 
positive money supply innovation reduces future expected inflation because agents 
anticipate that the positive impact o f  the innovation on the price level will be offset in 
the next period. Since nominal bonds com pensate bondholders for anticipated changes 
in inflation whilst money balances do not, a reduction in future expected inflation has 
no impact on the expected real return on bonds but raises the expected real return on 
money balances. In response, consumers substitute away from bonds and towards
70 In this context, ‘variability’ can be measured by the area under the impulse response function (that is, 
the area above and below the zero line).
;
PLT
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money balances, with the result that consumption in youth rises.71 One interesting 
im plication o f this finding is that there is zero consumption variability across young 
generations under IT, but some under PLT.
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Figure 2.8 -  Impulse responses to a money supply innovation
Impulse responses o f  the real return on nominal bonds and consumption by old 
generations are shown in Figure 2.9. Since a positive monetary supply innovation 
corresponds to an unexpected increase in inflation, real bond returns fall under both 
IT and PLT. However, the deviation under IT is considerably larger due to the greater 
level o f  inflation risk. As a result o f  the falls in bond returns with unanticipated 
inflation, consumption by old generations also falls below steady-state, with a 
correspondingly sm aller fall under PLT. It is notable that since nominal bonds 
com pensate consumers for anticipated fluctuations in inflation, there is no lagged 
response o f the real return on bonds to the initial inflation shock under IT or PLT. 
However, since money balances provide no protection against anticipated inflation, 
there is a small lagged response o f  consum ption by old generations when the initial 
innovation is offset under PLT.
71 Recall that consumption when young and money balances are proportional via the CIA constraint.
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Figure 2.9 -  Impulse responses to a money supply innovation 
2.8.2 Consumption volatility and social welfare
In order to  provide some intuition for the social welfare results, average consumption 
levels and volatilities are reported. The im portance o f these values for social welfare 
follows directly from the use o f  second-order approximation and the nature o f the 
social w elfare function. Social welfare is evaluated using Equation (2.41), but that 
expression is analytically intractable.
Hence consider the following equation:
( 2 .4 3 )  W * *  =  e (u ( c , j  )  +  t / ( c , 0 >)
This expression arises exactly if  the utility o f  the initial old is excluded from social 
welfare, o r  equivalently if  the limit o f  Equation (2.41) is taken as the number o f 
generations T  tends to infinity. The reason is that all generations, except the initial 
old, are ex  ante homogenous (in the long run sense) and hence have the same long run 
average level o f  utility. M oreover, given that the model is solved using a second-order 
perturbation method, we can work with a second-order Taylor expansion o f the above 
equation around mean consumption levels.
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Given the specification of lifetime utility, a second-order expansion results in the 
following social welfare criterion:
r {Ec' . v t d + {Ec' , o t d(2.44) U :
1 - S -3<
u society vai(c,1,) + j  j  societycoco var(ci.o))
Therefore, social welfare can be expressed in a mean-variance form in which welfare 
is positively related to mean consumption levels by young and old generations, but 
negatively related to consumption risk. The above expression also makes clear that 
whilst mean consumption levels have a first-order impact on social welfare, 
consumption risk terms have only a second-order impact. Intuitively, consumption 
volatility is costly for society because it leads to dispersion in consumption levels 
across generations, hindering intergenerational consumption-smoothing.
The simulation results from the model are summarised in Table 2.4, which reports the 
consumption equivalent welfare gain X in per cent, plus consumption means and 
variances under IT and PLT.
Table 2.4 -  Social welfare and consumption
Simulated value IT PLT
E c t.Y 0.3994 0.4000
E c ,.o 0.4005 0.4000
var( c l Y ) x  1000 0 2.3e-5
var(c, 0 ) x 1000 0.228 0.008
k  (in % terms) 0.103%
The positive value of A indicates that social welfare is higher under PLT. In 
particular, an increase in consumption in youth and old age of 0.103 per cent is 
needed for all generations under IT in order to match the higher level of social welfare 
under PLT. Notably, the estimated welfare gain from PLT is considerably higher than 
the preliminary estimate reached by Mankze and Todter (2007) of 0.066 per cent for 
old generations only. Using aggregate consumption expenditure by UK households in 
2009 gives an aggregate monetary gain of £899.1 million, which is equal to a lifetime 
consumption increase of £31.03 per working member of the population aged 16 years
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and over, or £107.04 per pensioner.72 It is important to note that this consumption 
gain would apply, in principle, to all current and future generations and would be 
permanent. Moreover, the level of consumption on which these gains are calculated 
should grow over time. Since steady-state aggregate consumption is 80 per cent of 
GDP in the model, the implied welfare gain is approximately 0.08 per cent of GDP.73
Consumption by old generations is higher on average under IT due an increase in the 
inflation risk premium on nominal bonds.74 However, as this premium corresponds to 
a higher average cost of issuing government debt, the government has to raise the 
income tax rate faced by young consumers in order to meet its long run government 
spending target.75 As a result, mean consumption by young generations is lower under 
IT, offsetting the increase in average consumption across old generations. The 
intuition for this result can be seen formally by a first-order Taylor expansion of the 
first term on the right hand side of Equation (2.44) around the deterministic steady- 
state.76 Using this approximation results in the following social welfare criterion:
(2.45) IT"*** * c'0 s E c ' , y + E c , .o  +
2 S x c ( 
1 - 8
r t society
C y C y var (c,r ) + U
society
var(c i.o ))
where Ecl Y + Ecl 0 is the average level of aggregate consumption.
The goods market-clearing condition ct Y + ct,o + gt = co can be used to show that the 
average level of aggregate consumption Ectj  + Ectio is approximately invariant to a 
change in monetary policy from IT to PLT. In particular, taking the unconditional 
expectations operator through the market-clearing condition gives Ectj  + E^t,o = co -  
g*. The key to the invariance result is that the government must meet its long run 
government spending target of Egt -  g* regardless o f whether it targets inflation or 
the price level. The key implication of this invariance result is that the gain in social 
welfare under PLT arises primarily from its impact on young and old generations’
72 These figures are based primarily on 2009 data in O NS (2010a), but the pensioner population figure 
is based on 2007/8 data in DW P (2009).
73 In developed econom ies aggregate consumption accounts for around 70 per cent o f  GDP, implying a 
welfare gain closer to 0.07 per cent o f  GDP. In the UK, aggregate consumption is less than 65 per cent 
o f  GDP.
74 See Chapter 4. The average real return on m oney balances is also higher under IT by Jensen’s 
inequality.
75 In particular, the tax rates necessary to meet the governm ent spending target were z/r = 0.1692 and 
f LT= 0 .1676.
76 This approximation is em ployed only to provide intuition.
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consumption volatility. More specifically, PLT leads to an increase in social welfare 
because there is a substantial reduction in consumption volatility across old 
generations, but only a small increase in volatility across young generations (see rows 
3 and 4 of Table 2.4).
The result that PLT increases consumption volatility across young generations was 
predicted based on the impulses responses reported earlier. In particular, there is no 
consumption volatility at all across young generations under IT because inflation 
expectations are constant and equal to the inflation target, so that there is no incentive 
for successive generations to substitute between money and bonds. Under PLT, 
however, this is not the case: inflation expectations are time-varying, because agents 
expect above average inflation to be followed by below average inflation, and vice 
versa. For instance, if inflation is currently above target, young generations will 
anticipate inflation below target next period, which increases the expected real return 
on money balances whilst leaving the expected real return on nominal bonds 
unchanged. Consequently, young generations will substitute from bonds to money 
following periods in which inflation is unexpectedly high, and from money to bonds 
following periods when inflation is unexpectedly low. These substitution effects mean 
that consumption by young agents varies over time, lessening intergenerational 
consumption-smoothing and reducing social welfare ceteris paribus. However, what 
is clear from Table 2.4 is that this volatility ‘cost’ of PLT is rather small.
By contrast, the ‘benefit’ from PLT for old generations is rather large: consumption 
volatility across old generations is reduced by more than 95 per cent! The reasoning 
for this substantial reduction in volatility is that consumption by old generations is 
derived solely from nominal assets -  viz. bonds and money balances -  whose real 
returns are substantially less volatile under PLT due to the considerable reduction in 
inflation risk. To demonstrate this difference graphically, Figure 2.10 plots the 
distributions of real bond returns and consumption by old generations under IT and 
PLT based on the first 200 simulations of the model (that is, 1 million observations in 
total). The dramatic reduction in volatility under PLT due to the lower level of 
inflation risk is clearly evident. Notably, the welfare gain from PLT is far lower than 
suggested by the massive proportional reduction in consumption volatility, since a 
reduction in volatility has only a second-order impact on social welfare. Indeed, as
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noted by Rudebsuch and Swanson (2008), second-order terms in DSGE models are 
typically around 100 times smaller than first-order terms, because the shocks in such 
models are small under standard calibrations.
Real return on nominal bonds Consumption in old age
Figure 2.10 -  Bond returns and consumption of old generations
The marked reduction in volatility under PLT is partly the result o f the model 
abstracting entirely from real assets. Such assets would provide a hedge against 
inflation risk, such that PLT would have less overall impact on consumption volatility 
via the bond return channel. Similarly, the presence o f indexed bonds in the model 
would enable consumers to directly protect their wealth against fluctuations in 
inflation.
However, what the results from the simple model above do highlight clearly is the 
potential for reduced long-term inflation risk under PLT to have non-trivial volatility 
and welfare benefits for society -  and in particular for old generations (i.e. 
pensioners). It should also be noted that the results from this model should provide a 
good estimate o f  the gain from PLT for countries in which state provision o f 
retirement income is dom inant and prim arily in the form o f nominal assets. Germany 
is an exam ple o f  one such country: more than 80 per cent o f  retirement income is in 
the form o f  public sector pensions (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004; Borsch-Supan, 
2000) and the market for indexed governm ent bonds is trivial (Garcia, 2008).
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In Section 2.11, the OLG model is extended so that consumers can also hold risky real 
assets -  namely, private sector pensions which are modelled as holdings of productive 
capital. The object of this extension is to examine the robustness of the estimated 
welfare and volatility gains from PLT in a more realistic model in which not all risk is 
nominal and where aggregate output is endogenised. First, however, the sensitivity of 
the quantitative results reported above is investigated.
2.9 Sensitivity analysis
Given that there is uncertainty surrounding the correct calibration of model 
parameters, this section investigates the robustness of the quantitative results reported 
above to alternative calibrations. Given that the impacts on consumption volatility are 
strongly robust, focus is restricted in this section to the sensitivity of the consumption 
equivalent welfare gain k. In order to allow for calibration uncertainty and 
heterogeneities across countries, robustness is investigated for three key model 
parameters: the coefficient of relative risk aversion S; the CIA constraint coefficient 9; 
and the money supply innovation variance (which determines inflation variability 
under IT and PLT in equilibrium).77
2.9.1 Model parameter calibration
The coefficient 9 represents the proportion of consumption by young agents held as 
real money balances. The baseline value of 0.10 was calibrated to roughly match UK 
data. In this section, sensitivity is tested to ‘high’ and ‘low’ values of 9, namely 0.25 
and 0.01. Regarding the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the baseline calibration 
of 3 is close to the mid-range o f values considered plausible in the literature. In 
particular, coefficients in a range from 1 to 5 seem most relevant from an empirical 
perspective. On this basis, sensitivity was tested using alternative values of 3/2 and 
5.78 Table 2.5 reports the results from this sensitivity analysis. The baseline estimate is 
shown in bold in the centre of the table.
77 In each simulation, the tax on young consumers was altered so that the long run government 
spending target o f  20 per cent was met.
7 Tddter (2008) estimated a 95 per cent confidence interval o f  (1.4, 7.1) for the coefficient o f  relative 
risk aversion using US stock return data from 1926 to 2002.
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Table 2.5 -  Sensitivity of X  to risk aversion and money holdings
Risk aversion 
coefficient 6
Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances 0 
0 = 0.01 0 = 0.10 0 = 0.25
6 = 3/2 
6 = 3 
6 = 5
0.052% 0.052% 0.052%
0.103% 0.103% 0.103%
0.173% 0.173% 0.173%
The welfare gain from PLT is robust to changes in 0. Indeed, as the parameter is 
varied between 0.01 and 0.25, the welfare gain remains unchanged to three decimal 
places. On the other hand, there is considerable sensitivity of the welfare gain to the 
extent of risk aversion. For instance, with the baseline calibration for 0, reducing the 
risk aversion coefficient to 3/2 almost halves the welfare gain to 0.052 per cent, whilst 
an increase to 5 increases the baseline welfare gain by almost three-quarters to 0.173 
per cent. Intuitively, increasing risk aversion raises the welfare gain because PLT has 
a positive impact on social welfare by reducing consumption risk across old 
generations. Indeed, the importance of the risk aversion coefficient for consumption 
risk terms in the social welfare function can be seen clearly from Equation (2.44) in 
which the second-order risk terms are weighted by 6. In effect, an increase in S 
increases the curvature of the utility function (see e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson, 
2008), making second-order uncertainty terms of more importance for social welfare.
A policy implication that follows from these results is that heterogeneity across 
countries in terms o f risk aversion will have consequences for the potential long-term 
welfare gain from PLT. Ceteris paribus, those countries with greater aversion to risk 
will have more to gain, in the long run, from switching from IT to PLT. Additionally, 
since the extent of risk aversion is itself uncertain, the welfare gain from switching to 
PLT in any given country will necessarily be uncertain as well. It is notable, however, 
that the welfare gain from PLT is economically non-trivial even if risk aversion is 
relatively low.
2.9.2 Nominal volatility
In the baseline calibration of the model, the money supply innovation variance was 
based on UK inflation data for the RPIX over the IT period. The RPIX was chosen 
because it excludes mortgage interest payments but includes council tax and housing 
costs, both of which are relatively important costs for pensioners that are excluded
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from the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). However, since the RPIX is an index that is 
supposed to be representative of an average household in the UK, it still may not 
capture the inflation experience of pensioners well. This issue has been investigated 
by Leceister et al. (2008). They note that though similar on average, pensioner RPI 
inflation indices constructed by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) can differ 
substantially in the short-term from the RPI and RPIX. Therefore, the pensioner RPI 
for one-pensioner households was used to estimate the money supply innovation 
variance.79 The results are shown in Table El in Appendix E. The implied yearly 
money supply innovation standard deviation was 0.015, compared to 0.012 based on 
the RPIX. The model was simulated under this alternative calibration as a robustness 
check.
It has also been argued that the CPI -  on which the current UK inflation target is 
based -  is a better measure o f inflation than the RPI or RPIX because it captures 
substitution away from relatively more expensive goods to cheaper goods. This 
substitution effect may be particularly important for pensioners given that their 
incomes are lower than the general population (OECD, 2009a; DWP, 2009). Using 
the CPI in estimation instead implies a lower yearly money supply innovation
QA
standard deviation of 0.011, as shown by the results in Table E2 of Appendix E. The 
model was therefore also simulated with a lower money supply innovation variance. 
However, in order to make the sensitivity analysis exactly symmetric relative to the 
baseline case, a standard deviation o f 0.009 was specified.
Table 2.6 shows the sensitivity o f results to the money supply innovation variances 
implied by these ‘high’ and ‘low’ standard deviation calibrations. In the low variance 
case, the welfare gain from PLT falls by around four-tenths from 0.103 per cent to 
0.062 per cent. Intuitively, reducing the innovation variance reduces the welfare gain 
from PLT since, with nominal volatility reduced, long-term inflation risk (a second- 
order impact) becomes relatively less important for social welfare. By the same 
argument, increasing the money supply innovation variance increases the relative 
importance of long-term inflation risk for social welfare, and with it the welfare gain
79 The O NS also publish an RPI index for two-pensioner households. The one-pensioner measure was 
used because there are more single pensioners in the UK (DW P, 2009). The index was downloaded  
from the O NS Tim e Series Database at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtim ezone.asp.
80 Again, the index was downloaded from the O NS Tim e Series Database.
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from PLT. In the high volatility case, the consumption equivalent welfare gain from 
PLT is increased by approximately one half to 0.153%. All in all, then, the welfare 
benefit from PLT is rather sensitive to the calibrated money supply innovation 
variance, though slightly less so than to the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Table 2.6 -  Sensitivity of k to nominal volatility
Money supply innovation variance
Low
var(£,,) = 0 .87x10^
k  =  0.062%
Baseline
v a r ^ , )  = 1.45 xlO -4
k  =  0 .1 0 3 %
High
var(^./) = 2.19x10^ 
k  =  0. 154%
Two policy implications are suggested by these volatility sensitivity results. First, to 
the extent that long-term inflation risk under IT is uncertain due to lack of historical 
experience, the welfare gain from PLT is necessarily also uncertain. The benchmark 
calibration of the model implicitly assumes that current and past experience with 
nominal volatility under IT will be a good guide to future. However, this may not be 
case because macroeconomic shocks may have been usually small during the Great 
Moderation (the ‘Good Luck’ hypothesis), and the performance of IT may change as 
policymakers acquire more experience. Secondly, the potential welfare gain from PLT 
is likely to vary across countries according to the success of the monetary policy 
regime currently in place (IT in many cases). In particular, the welfare gain from PLT 
will be higher in countries in which nominal variability is greater, because long-term 
inflation risk will be a more important factor for social welfare in these countries.
2.10 Summary of results and policy implications
In preliminary analysis, Mankze and Todter (2007) estimated that the welfare gain 
from PLT was equal to 0.066 per cent o f average consumption for old generations 
only. The numerous limitations with their analysis have been addressed in the more 
comprehensive analysis presented thus far. In the baseline case, the estimated welfare 
gain from PLT was 0.103 per cent for both young and old generations, which 
amounts to 0.103 per cent of aggregate consumption, or 0.08 per cent of GDP. This 
estimate is more than three times as high as that reached by Mankze and Todter 
(2007), suggesting that their analysis substantially understates the potential long-term 
welfare gain from PLT. Intuitively, the welfare gain from PLT arises from a sharp
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reduction in consumption volatility for old generations (i.e. pensioners) that exceeds 
by far a small increase in consumption volatility across young generations. However, 
since the model assumes that consumers hold no real assets into old age, the baseline 
welfare gain from PLT is best treated as an upper bound for most developed 
economies, and is likely to be applicable only in special cases where nominal assets 
dominate in the provision o f retirement income (e.g. Germany).
It is important to note that the estimated welfare gain from PLT is rather sensitive to 
the extent of risk aversion and the calibrated money supply innovation variance. The 
welfare gain for a society which is more risk-averse is considerably larger because 
PLT benefits consumers by reducing the extent of long-term consumption risk they 
face. For empirically relevant risk aversion coefficients, the welfare gain ranges from 
0.052 to 0.173 per cent of aggregate consumption, and is almost as sensitive to the 
calibrated money supply innovation variance, with a higher money supply innovation 
variance implying greater long-term inflation risk and a higher welfare gain from 
PLT. A policy implication that follows from this second result is that countries with 
more volatile inflation would have more to gain in the long run by switching from IT 
to PLT.
Based on the analysis above, the long-term welfare gain from PLT is estimated to be 
small but economically non-trivial. Importantly, the model analysed here did not 
include real assets that can hedge against inflation risk, or inflation-indexed bonds. As 
a result, the potential welfare gain from PLT is likely to be overstated for most 
countries. In order to address this point, the next section investigates the extent to 
which the estimated welfare gain from PLT is altered when consumers can also hold 
capital -  a risky real asset -  in their savings portfolios.
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2.11 Introducing productive capital into the model
The model analysed above clearly demonstrates the intuition for PLT increasing 
social welfare vis-a-vis IT. However, as the model makes the implausible assumption 
that consumers hold only nominal assets, the results presented above should be treated 
with caution. Other things being equal, we should expect the introduction of real 
assets into the model to reduce the welfare gain from PLT. The reasoning is that with 
consumers’ portfolios diversified between real and nominal assets, consumption 
volatility in old age should be less sensitive to a reduction in long-term inflation risk.
This second half of the chapter investigates this issue by allowing consumers to hold 
productive but risky capital as well as nominal bonds and money balances. Given the 
30-year holding horizon in the model, an investment in risky capital can be thought of 
as an investment in a private sector pension.81 Indeed, it is notable that one-half or 
more o f private pension fund assets are invested in equities in 4 of the G7 countries -  
namely, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US (see OECD, 2009a) -  and that such funds 
have highly volatile real returns (see D’Addio et al. 2009), in contrast to government 
bonds. Private sector pensions play an important role in many developed economies, 
including three of the G7 countries: the UK, US and Canada (OECD, 2009b). 
Moreover, theoretical motivation for modelling risky capital in an OLG model is 
provided by Lungu and Minford (2006), who show that taking a long-term view of 
stock returns can help resolve the ‘equity premium puzzle’ without the need to resort 
to habit-forming preferences.
Economic theorists have long held the view that the return on capital is independent 
of the rate of inflation, in which case equities are a ‘hedge’ against inflation. The 
approach taken here is consistent with this view. Although empirical evidence 
regarding this issue is mixed (Luintel and Paudyal, 2006; Ely and Robinson, 1997; 
Bodie, 1976), it is not sufficient to reject the hypothesis from a Popperian perspective. 
It is also worth noting that empirical studies tend to find that equities are a better 
hedge o f inflation over long horizons (e.g. Bekaert and Wang, 2010; Shen, 2005). An 
important implication of the introducing capital into the model is that aggregate
81 An investment in productive capital could also be thought o f  as including long-term investments in 
the stock market by individuals, but such investm ents are a minor source o f  income for most pensioners 
(DWP, 2009; OECD, 2009a).
1 1 0
income becomes endogenously determined, hence extending the model from partial to 
general equilibrium along the lines o f Diamond (1965).
2.11.1 The OLG model with capital
The model of the previous section is extended so that young consumers can 
additionally allocate savings to risky capital which is used to produce output in old 
age, a la Lungu and Minford (2006). Capital is thus a claim to an uncertain amount of 
real output in old age. Moreover, following Lungu and Minford {op. cit.), capital lasts 
for only one period, that is, the assumed depreciation rate is 100 per cent.82
The production function for output is given by:
(2.46) y ,= A ,k ^  0 < a  < 1
where k t is capital holdings and A, is a productivity shock.
The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process in logs:
(2.47) In A, = { \ - p ) \ n A mean+ p \n A l_l +et 0 < p < \
where et is an I ID normal random variable with mean zero and variance a ] .
With the additional option to save via capital, the budget constraint of young 
generations is now given by
(2.48) c, y + bnt 'd + m dt + kt = m{ 1 -  t j )
82 Given that each period lasts 30 years, the assumption o f  full depreciation is empirically plausible.
See, for exam ple, Nadiri and Prucha (1996) and studies cited therein.
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And consumption by old generations is given by
(2.49)
where At+Xk° is output produced for consumption in old age using capital.
The lifetime utility function o f young consumers is unchanged, as is the demand for 
money. However, aggregate output in the economy (and hence goods market 
equilibrium) does change, and is now given by the following expression:
In order to gain some formal intuition for the social welfare impact of adding capital 
into the model, the model was log-linearised around the deterministic steady-state and 
then substituted into a second-order Taylor expansion of lifetime utility.
Appendix F shows that lifetime utility can be written in the following form:
where Loss, is the deviation o f lifetime utility from its time-/ expected value, 4*, > 0 is 
a coefficient that depends on the model’s steady-state parameters and expected 
consumption in old age, and q > 0 is a coefficient that represents the relative 
importance of capital in consumers’ savings portfolios.
Equation (2.51) shows that welfare loss for generation t depends on the conditional 
variances of inflation and productivity over a 30-year horizon. Intuitively these 
variances determine the extent of long-term return risk on bonds and capital 
respectively, and also, therefore, consumption risk faced by old generations. Since 
exogenous productivity determines the extent of return risk on capital, the relative 
welfare gain from PLT should be diluted somewhat: monetary policy will able to 
affect only a fraction of the uncertainty faced by consumers, in contrast to the case 
just studied where consumers held only nominal assets. Equation (2.51) indicates that
(2.50) co+A,k?_, - c r y + cl Q + g, +k,
(2.51) Loss, * -(1 / 2)4*, [var, (;r,+1) + q var, (A ,+l)]
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the extent to which the welfare gain of PLT will be reduced will depend on the 
importance of capital in consumers’ portfolios, and on the relative importance of the 
inflation and productivity variances. This intuition is confirmed by the quantitative 
simulation results reported below.
2.11.2 Consumers9 first-order conditions
First-order conditions are unchanged, except that there will be an additional first-order 
condition relating to capital holdings. Consequently, there will be two Euler equations 
that define optimal savings: one for nominal bond holdings; and one for capital. To 
derive the additional first-order optimality condition for capital, consider the 
following Lagrangian:
where n t is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.
The first-order conditions are as follows:
(2.53)
(2.54)
(2.55)
(2.56)
(2.57)
Substituting out the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraints when young and 
old gives an additional consumption Euler equation relating to capital holdings:
The Lagrange multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint is therefore given by
Intuitively, the first equality states that, absent uncertainty, the CIA constraint will be 
strictly binding if money is rate of return dominated by nominal bonds, whilst the 
second equality indicates that the same relationship holds for capital versus money, 
because capital and bonds are priced to give equivalent expected utility (at the 
margin) by no-arbitrage.
Substituting out for the Lagrange multiplier, the consumption Euler equation for 
capital can be written in the following form:
2.11.3 Government and monetary policy
The government’s budget constraint is not affected by the inclusion of capital in the 
model, and it is assumed that the government continues to set the bond supply so as to 
equate the marginal utility of consumption in youth with the expected marginal utility 
of consumption in old age. The money supply rules to which the government commits 
under IT and PLT are also unchanged.
For completeness, the deterministic steady-state and market-clearing conditions for 
the model are given in Appendix G, along with a listing of the model’s equations in 
Appendix H.
2.12 Calibrating stochastic productivity
When calibrating the stochastic process for productivity, it is necessary to take into 
account the 30-year horizon of the OLG model. The approach taken here is to extend 
a typical quarterly calibration from the real business cycle (RBC) literature over a 30- 
year horizon.
(2.60)
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Consider an AR(1) process for log productivity at a quarterly horizon q :
(2.61) In/I, = ( l - p , ) l n ^ , „ „ „  + ^ l n ^ ,  + e, 0 < p ,  <1
where e, is an IID-Normal productivity innovation with mean zero and variance a 1.
By substituting repeatedly for lagged productivity terms, productivity over a 30-year 
(i.e. 120-quarter) horizon can be obtained as follows:
(2.62) In A, = (1 -  p ';" ) In A ^ rm + p™  In A,_m  + £ P & -J
7=0
On this basis, productivity in the OLG model can be represented as follows:
(2.63) In A, = (1 -  p ) In Amem + p in  A,_, + e,
where In Amr{_ = (1 - p ™) In Aqme(m/(I -  p ) , p  = p™  and e, = ^ p ‘lleq_j .
7=0
Equation (2.63) was used to calibrate the stochastic productivity process in the OLG 
model. Many papers in the RBC literature (e.g. King and Rebelo, 2000) use quarterly 
calibrations of productivity in which the autoregressive parameter is slightly below 
one and the innovation standard deviation is less than 0.008. For instance, Gavin, 
Keen and Pakko (2009) set the quarterly first-order autocorrelation at 0.95 and the 
innovation standard deviation at 0.005, consistent with the lower volatility of output 
in the ‘Great Moderation’ period. The calibration used here is based on the same 
standard deviation as in their paper but a higher autocorrelation coefficient of 0.996, 
which is more consistent with the bulk o f the RBC literature. Consequently, the 
calibrated 30-year productivity process has a first-order correlation of 0.996120 and an 
innovation standard deviation of oe = 0.04398. 83 Steady-state productivity Amean was 
set equal to 0.75. Given the other calibrated values in the model, this value ensured
“  In particular, <r, =  ^ ( ! - 0 . 9 9 6 240) ( 1 - 0 . 9 9 6 2) 1 x  0 .0 0 5 .  
Note that this expression makes uses o f  the fact that
var(e,) = 0  + P,2 +P,4 + - + p f V , 2 = 0
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plausible holdings of bonds relative to capital. For reference, calibrated values in the 
stochastic productivity process are summarised in Table 2.7.
Tab le 2.7 -  Calibration of stochastic productivity
Model
parameter
Role in the model Calibrated value
P Persistence in productivity at a 
30-year horizon
0.618
Productivity innovation standard 
deviation (at a 30-year horizon)
0.04398
A
mean Steady-state level of productivity 0.75
2.13 Model calibration
The only additional model parameter that has not yet been calibrated is a, the 
elasticity of output produced (in old age) with respect to capital. The baseline 
calibration for this parameter was set at 0.375, a value that lies in the mid-range of 
calibrated values in the RBC literature84 and which is close to the calibration in Lungu 
and Minford (2006). Other calibrated values are the same as in the model with 
nominal bonds, with the exception of the endowment income of young consumers. 
Due to the inclusion of capital in the model, aggregate output (i.e. GDP) is no longer 
given by the endowment income of the young. Normalising the endowment to one as 
before would therefore not enable variables to be interpreted as percentages of GDP. 
Therefore, to ease exposition, the constant endowment of young consumers was 
chosen so that steady-state GDP was equal to 2. Moreover, the long run government 
spending target was doubled in line with this to ensure that it remained at 20 per cent 
of GDP as previously. The calibration of the model, including that of the money 
supply process, is summarised in Table 2.8.
84 Papers in this literature typically include both capital and labour in the production function, so that a 
is the share o f  labour incom e in output. Many papers in the literature set a =  1/3, but there are some 
notable exceptions that use higher calibrations (e.g. Perli and Sakelleris 1998 and King et al. 1988 set a  
= 0.42). With this calibration, the production function in the OLG model w ill exhibit plausible 
diminishing returns to capital.
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Table 2.8 -  Calibration of the model with capital
Model
parameter
Role in the model Calibrated value
e Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances
0.10
s Coefficient of relative risk aversion 3
6) Endowment income of young consumers 1.641
g* Long run government spending target 0.40
n * Inflation target over 30 years 0.75
vaiff,,) Yearly money supply 
innovation variance
1.45x10^
a Elasticity of output in old age to capital 0.375
Table 2.9 shows the steady-state values for key model variables under this calibration.
Table 2.9 -  Key variables at steady state
Model variable Steady-state value
Ct,Y 0.730
c t,o 0.730
bf (= b;) 0.343
m d( = f c tY = m t) 0.073
k , 0.140
0.75
Note: Steady-state GDP is equal to 2
Aggregate consumption accounts for 73 per cent of steady-state GDP (which 
approximately matches developed economies in general) and is split equally between 
consumption by young and old generations by the government bond supply rule. 
Money holdings are 3.7 per cent of GDP (i.e. 0.073/2), which is similar to the UK 
share of notes and coins in GDP over the past decade (ONS, 2009b). As previously, 
steady-state inflation is equal to the 30-year inflation target, or a 75 per cent increase 
in prices over a 30-year horizon. Since there is full depreciation of capital, investment 
is given by the level of capital holdings. Steady-state investment is thus 7 per cent of 
GDP, with the remaining 20 per cent of GDP consisting of government spending. 
Steady-state capital holdings are 41 per cent of bond holdings, which is equal to the 
ratio of private pension spending to public pension spending in the UK in 2006 
(OECD, 2009b), and is similar to the average ratio of investment to government 
bonds in the UK over the past decade (ONS, 2010a). All in all, the implied steady- 
state values provide a reasonably good fit to aggregate data for the UK and other
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d ev e lo p e d  e c o n o m ie s . A s  m en tion ed  ab ove, private sector p en sion s p lay an im portant 
role in three G 7 cou n tries: C anada, the U K  and the U S .
2 .1 4  S im u la t io n  r e su lts
S im u lation  resu lts w er e  again  ob ta in ed  from  1 ,000  stoch astic  sim ulations o f  5 ,000  
periods u sin g  a seco n d -o rd er  ap proxim ation  in  D ynare+ + . T he results again focu s on  
im p u lse  resp on ses, co n su m p tio n  v o la tility  and so c ia l w elfare.
2 .14 .1  Im p u lse  r e sp o n se s
S in ce  the ca libration  o f  the m o n e y  su p p ly  in n ovation  variance is unchanged, the 
im p u lses resp on ses for in fla tion  are id en tica l to  th ose in the m odel w ithout capital. 
H ow ever, as co n su m ers find  it op tim al to  h old  capital in their p ortfolios, bond  
h o ld in gs are a ltered  com p ared  to the m od el w ithou t capital, and not all im pulse  
resp on ses are left u n ch an ged . F igu re 2.11 h ig h lig h ts  this point clearly  the by sh ow in g  
the im p u lse resp o n ses o f  the real return on  b ond s and con su m p tion  in o ld  age to a 
m o n ey  su p p ly  in n ovation . T h e real return im pact is the sam e as in the m odel w ithout  
cap ital, but the im p act on  co n su m p tio n  in old  age is sm aller b ecau se con su m er  
p ortfo lio s are n o w  d iv ers ified  b etw een  b ond s and capital (see  T able 2 .9 ). 
C on seq u en tly , the ‘b on d  return’ ch an n el has le ss  im pact upon consum ption  b y  old  
gen erations than in the m o d e l w ith ou t ca p ita l.
R eal return on bonds
0 005
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w  -0 .01
c  -0.015 o
& -0.02
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------ IT
------ PLT
-2
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F ig u r e  2 .1 1  - Im p u lse  r e sp o n se s  to  a m o n e y  su p p ly  in n o v a tio n
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As is shown in Figure 2.12, the result that expected inflation falls in response to a 
money supply innovation under PLT means that consumers substitute towards money, 
whose expected return has risen, and away from capital and nominal bonds, whose 
expected real returns are unchanged.85 Since the CIA constraint states that 
consum ption by the young is proportional to money holdings, consumption by young 
generations also rises. Under IT, however, expected inflation is constant, so there is 
no response o f asset holdings to a m oney supply innovation and consumption by the 
young is left unchanged. As a result, consumption variability across young 
generations is higher under PLT than IT, as in the model without capital.
A sse t holdingsx 10
IT (no re sp o n se ) 
B onds, PLT 
Capital, PLT 
Money, PLT
4 6
Periods
10
x ^Q-4 Consumption in youth
2.5
IT (no response) 
PLT<o
e 15-O
co
TO
>CDo
0.5
Periods
Figure 2.12 -  Impulse responses to a money supply innovation
The next sets o f  impulse responses focus on the impact o f productivity innovations on 
consum ption by old and young generations -  impacts which are the same under IT 
and PLT since m onetary policy does not respond to productivity fluctuations. Firstly, 
Figure 2.13 shows that, because productivity is persistent, an innovation raises 
productivity and consum ption in old age above their steady-state values for a number 
o f  periods after the initial impulse, with both returning to steady-state after around 15 
periods. M oreover, it is notable that the im pact o f  a productivity innovation on 
consum ption in old age is som ew hat larger than that o f  a money supply innovation,
85 Tobin (1965) discusses how a change in inflation is accompanied by portfolio substitution between 
money and capital.
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because capital is a ‘riskier’ asset than are nominal bonds under the baseline 
calibration.
Log productivity
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Figure 2.13 -  Impulse responses to a productivity innovation
Given that productivity is persistent, a productivity innovation raises, for any given 
level o f capital, the expected return on capital. As a result, young consumers 
substitute towards capital and aw ay from nom inal bonds, as can been seen from the 
first panel o f  Figure 2.14. Bond holdings fall more sharply than capital holdings 
increase, with the net result that consum ption by young generations increases (see the 
second panel).
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2.14.2 Consumption volatility and social welfare
Table 2.10 reports the consumption equivalent welfare gain X and consumption means 
and variances across young and old generations in the model with capital.
Table 2.10 -  Social welfare and consumption
Simulated value IT PLT
E c.j 0.7297 0.7300
E c,.o 0.7310 0.7307
var(c, Y) x 1000 0.0385 0.0387
var(c, 0 ) x 1000 0.4859 0.2960
X (in % terms) 0.026%
The baseline welfare gain from PLT falls by approximately three quarters to 0.026 per 
cent. PLT increases social welfare because, as previously, it leads to a significant 
proportional reduction in consumption variability across old generations, yet only a
QZ
trivial increase in variability across young generations. The welfare gain is 
somewhat lower in the model with capital because there is only around a 40 per cent 
reduction in consumption volatility across old generations, compared to 95 per cent in 
the model with only nominal bonds. Figure 2.14 shows this result clearly by plotting
on
the distribution of real bonds returns and consumption by old generations. Indeed, 
real return variability on nominal bonds is reduced just as drastically as in the model 
without capital, but consumption variability much less so. This result arises because 
savers’ portfolios are diversified between nominal bonds and risky capital, such that 
the relative importance of inflation variations in overall consumption volatility is 
lessened. Intuitively, since PLT has no direct impact on real risk from holding capital, 
it reduces risk only on the fraction of consumers’ portfolios that relates to nominal 
assets. Hence the presence of capital dilutes the impact of PLT on consumption 
volatility and social welfare, because it introduces an independent source of 
consumption fluctuations which monetary policy cannot influence.
86 As in the model with only nominal bonds, the need to meet the long run government spending target 
means that aggregate consumption is essentially the same under IT and PLT. Capital does not affect 
this result because it is a pure real asset whose return is not directly influenced by monetary policy.
87 These distributions are based on the first 200 simulations o f  the model.
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Figure 2.15 -  Bond returns and consumption of old generations
To summarise, introducing capital into the OLG model reduces substantially the 
w elfare gain from PLT, though it remains econom ically non-trivial. Moreover, the 
reduction in consum ption volatility across old generations attained under PLT is 
substantial at around 40 per cent, though much lower than in the model with only 
nominal bonds.
2.15 Sensitivity analysis
This section investigates the robustness o f  the welfare gain from PLT with respect to 
key model parameters and innovation variances.
2.15.1 Model param eters
In concordance with the model w ithout capital, the welfare gain o f PLT is not 
sensitive to the CIA constraint param eter 6. Robustness o f the welfare gain o f PLT is 
therefore tested with respect to only two key model parameters: the coefficient o f 
relative risk aversion S , and the extent o f  persistence in the stochastic process for 
productivity p. The results from this sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 2.11. The 
baseline welfare gain is highlighted in bold.
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Table 2.11 -  Sensitivity of X  to risk aversion and productivity persistence
Coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, 3
Persistence in productivity, p 
p  =0.486 p  =0.618 p  =0.750
3 = 3/2 0.0130% 0.0122% 0.0120%
3 = 3 0.0260% 0.0258% 0.0255%
3 = 5 0.0441% 0.0438% 0.0435%
The extent of risk aversion is again a crucial parameter for the welfare gain from PLT. 
With a risk aversion coefficient o f 5, the welfare gain from PLT is increased by 
around two-thirds, whilst halving the risk aversion coefficient from 3 to 3/2 roughly 
halves the welfare gain. In this latter case, the welfare gain from PLT is only just 
above one-hundredth of one percent, and ten times smaller than the baseline welfare 
gain in the model without capital. On the other hand, relatively high risk aversion 
increases the welfare gain from PLT to just over four-tenths of the baseline gain in the 
model without capital. There is thus considerable overall sensitivity to risk aversion, 
though the extent of sensitivity in absolute terms is reduced somewhat.
Changing the extent of productivity persistence has a measurable quantitative impact 
on the welfare gain from PLT, but the impact is rather small. For instance, Table 2.11 
shows that altering the persistence parameter by 0.132 either way -  a 20 per cent 
deviation from the baseline value -  changes the welfare gain from PLT by less than 
0.001 per cent. The welfare gain from PLT falls as persistence in productivity is 
increased, since an increase in persistence raises unconditional productivity volatility 
because innovations take longer to ‘die out’. In turn, this increase in volatility reduces
oo
the relative importance of inflation risk for old generations’ consumption. Similarly, 
a reduction in productivity persistence reduces unconditional productivity volatility 
and increases the welfare gain from PLT.
2.15.2 Innovation variances
In order to test sensitivity to the money supply innovation variance, the same range of 
values was considered as in the model without capital. Therefore, alternative money 
supply innovation standard deviations of 0.009 and 0.015 were investigated. The 
variance of the innovation to productivity is also likely to be important for the welfare 
gain from PLT, since it determines the relative importance of real versus nominal 
fluctuations in overall consumption risk. Sensitivity was therefore also tested with
88 The unconditional variance o f log productivity is given by var(e,)/(l -  p 2).
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respect to the productivity innovation variance. The baseline productivity innovation 
standard deviation was set at 0.044. Sensitivity was tested to a ‘high’ standard 
deviation of 0.055 and a ‘low’ standard deviation of 0.033, deviations of around one- 
quarter from the baseline and similar to the range considered for the money supply 
innovation. The alternative money supply and productivity innovation variance 
calibrations considered in this section are summarised in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12 -  Volatility sensitivity calibrations
Money supply innovation variance
Low
var(£lV) = 0.87 x 1 0 4
Baseline
var(£<f) = 1.45x10^
High
var(£,,) = 2.19x10^
Productivity innovation variance
Low
vai(e,) = 0.001089
Baseline
var(e,) = 0.001934
High 
var(e,) = 0.003025
Table 2.13 -  Sensitivity of X to innovation volatilities
Productivity 
innovation variance
Money supply innovation variance
Low Baseline High
Low 0.0151% 0.0261% 0.0390%
Baseline 0.0153% 0.0258% 0.0388%
High 0.0159% 0.0255% 0.0389%
Table 2.13 reports the sensitivity results corresponding to these alternative 
calibrations. The impact of changing the money supply innovation variance is clear- 
cut: increases in nominal volatility in raise the welfare gain from PLT regardless of 
the calibration of the productivity innovation variance. For instance, when the 
productivity innovation variance is at its baseline value, the welfare gain from PLT 
rises by more than half to 0.0388 per cent. The reasoning behind this result is that the 
innovation variance determines the extent o f inflation risk in equilibrium, and hence 
the magnitude of the reduction in consumption variability under PLT. Hence, for 
example, increasing the money supply innovation variance raises the relative 
importance of inflation risk for consumption volatility, so that the proportional 
reduction in consumption volatility under PLT is somewhat larger than in the baseline 
case (49 per cent versus 39 per cent).
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Similarly, reducing the money supply innovation variance reduces the relative 
importance of nominal volatility, and consequently the magnitude of the welfare gain 
from PLT. For example, when the money supply variance is low, the welfare gain 
from PLT is almost halved to 0.0153 per cent. As was the case with model 
parameters, the welfare gain from PLT is less sensitive in absolute terms than in the 
model without capital, because the welfare gain itself is almost an order of magnitude 
lower. The model at hand is therefore likely to provide not only a better estimate of 
the welfare gain from PLT for many developed countries, but also a less uncertain 
one.
There is a surprisingly small impact from varying the productivity innovation 
variance: the welfare gain changes by only 0.001 to 0.008 per cent across the different 
specifications. With the baseline money supply innovation variance, the welfare 
benefit from PLT falls as the productivity innovation variance is increased. The 
reason is that the relative importance of productivity fluctuations is increased, so that 
the inflation risk channel through which PLT has its impact becomes a relatively less 
important factor for overall consumption volatility. This point is shown clearly by 
comparing the reductions in consumption volatility across old generations to the 
baseline reduction of approximately 40 per cent: there is only a 30 per cent reduction 
in the high productivity volatility case, but a 53 per cent reduction when the 
productivity innovation variance is low.
Interestingly, the impact of changing the productivity innovation variance is 
ambiguous for the ‘low’ and ‘high’ money supply innovation variance calibrations. 
For instance, when the money supply innovation variance is low, reducing the 
productivity innovation variance reduces the PLT welfare gain from 0.0153 per cent 
to 0.0151 per cent, whilst raising the productivity innovation variance increases the 
welfare gain to 0.0159 per cent. The reason for these seemingly odd results is that 
increasing the productivity innovation variance has a small first-order impact on the 
welfare gain through a relative increase in the equity premium under PLT. If this 
effect outweighs the impact on welfare through the second-order volatility channel, 
then the welfare gain from PLT can rise when the productivity innovation variance
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increases, and vice versa*9 In other words, increasing the productivity innovation 
variance can, for some calibrations, raise average consumption by old generations 
sufficiently to offset the reduced proportional impact of PLT on old generations’ 
consumption risk. This trade-off between first- and second-order effects helps to 
explain why the overall impact of altering the productivity innovation variance is 
relatively small in all cases.
2.16 Summary of results and policy implications
Introducing capital into the OLG model reduces the baseline welfare gain from PLT 
to 0.026 per cent, as compared to 0.103 per cent in the model without capital. This 
lower baseline increase in aggregate consumption amounts to an increase in GDP of 
around 0.02 per cent. Based on UK data, this figure implies an aggregate gain of £227 
million, £4.59 per employed member of the population, or £27.02 per pensioner. 90 
The reasoning for the substantial reduction in the welfare gain from PLT is that with 
consumers’ portfolios split between real and nominal assets, the relative importance 
of inflation risk (and hence PLT) for overall consumption volatility is reduced 
somewhat.
The estimated welfare gain is sensitive to the extent of risk aversion, but is more 
robust than in the model without capital. As the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
varied between 3/2 and 5, the estimated welfare gains remains in a range from 0.012 
to 0.044 per cent. Similarly, the welfare gain from PLT is less sensitive in absolute 
terms to the extent of nominal volatility, though this too remains an important factor 
for the welfare gain. Interestingly, there was little sensitivity to the extent of 
productivity volatility or persistence. Based on these findings, the model with capital 
should provide not only a more plausible estimate of the welfare gain from PLT for 
most countries, but also a less uncertain one. Countries in which risk aversion is high 
and those with a high degree o f nominal volatility have more to gain from PLT in the 
long run. The potential welfare gain from PLT may also vary over time with changes 
in risk aversion, or as performance under IT improves or deteriorates.
89 The equity premium appears to increase more under PLT because capital holdings fluctuate more as 
a result o f  variations in expected inflation. B y Jensen’s inequality, such variations will increase the 
expected return on capital, since the latter is s convex function for the calibrated value o f  a.
90 Again, these figures are based primarily on 2009 data in O NS (2010a), with the pensioner population 
figure based on 2007/8 data in DWP (2009).
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To summarise, allowing consumers to invest in productive capital reduces but by no 
means eliminates the benefits from PLT, with old generations experiencing a 
reduction in consumption risk of almost 40 per cent. The results from the model with 
capital are likely to be most applicable for countries like Canada in which both real 
and nominal assets play an important role in retirement income (Meh and Terajima, 
2008), but where a large proportion of public sector pensions are not indexed to prices 
and indexed government bonds are not widespread.91
The next chapter extends the OLG model even further by allowing consumers to hold 
government bonds that are indexed to inflation. This modification to the model is 
intended to increase its realism given that long-term assets are indexed to prices in 
many economies. The primary aim of Chapter 3 is to investigate the effect of this 
modification on the welfare and volatility impacts of PLT. Importantly, the degree of 
indexation of government bonds in this model is chosen in response to monetary 
policy as part of optimal commitment Ramsey policy in order to avoid the Lucas 
critique.
91 The share o f  indexed bonds in Canada was around 16 per cent in 2008 (Canada Department o f  
Finance, 2008). Meh and Terajima (2008) document that as o f  2005, 48.8 per cent o f  public sector 
pension plans were non-indexed defined benefit ones. They also note that middle-age and older 
households have substantial holdings o f  nominal bonds.
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Appendix A -  Proof that the CIA constraint is strictly binding when R t >  l 92
It is shown in this appendix that the CIA constraint binds with strict equality if the 
gross money return on a nominal bond exceeds one.
Proposition: The CIA constraint binds with strict equality when J?,>1 
Proof.
From equations (2.15) and (2.16) and in the main text, the first-order conditions for 
nominal bonds and money holdings are as follows:
(AD = E ,{ c ^ oC t )+ 0M,
(A2) c,* = E,(c-*w C x) + (\ + e)u ,
where //, is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with are as follows:
(A3) \jut > 0 and //, (mf -  0ct Y) = o}
where the second equation, the complementary slackness condition, implies that the 
CIA constraint will be strictly binding iff jut > 0 for all /.
Using Equations (A l) and (A2), fit > 0 for all t if and only if 
(A4) E, (c;X0C ) > E, ( c -V " > ) v '
Substituting for the return on nominal bonds yields the following necessary condition: 
(A5) R, x E, {c;X0r, : ,) > E, ) V/
Clearly Inequality (A5) holds if and only if Rt > 1 for all t. Q.E.D.
92 This derivation is carried out for the m odel with only nominal bonds. However, adding capital and 
indexed bonds into the model does not change the necessary condition for the CIA constraint to bind, 
because all three assets must offer equivalent expected utility at the margin. Separate derivations are 
therefore not provided for the extended models.
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Appendix B -  The second-order approximation of lifetime utility
A second-order Taylor expansion of Equation (2.1) around time-/ expected values 
gives the following result:
(B1) w,(ct r ,cl+l o ) * U( y (C '  Y) + w,+10(Etct+lo) + Ut+’° (E'Cl+^  vai. +1 o)
where un(EtCt+\,o) is the second derivative of utility in old age evaluated at £a+i,o, and 
varr(c/+i,o) is the conditional variance of consumption in old age.
Given that lifetime utility follows a constant relative risk aversion specification, 
Equation (B l) can be written in the following form:
(B2) Loss, « ——
' 2 {Etc,+Wr s V a r r ( G +l , o )
where Loss, is defined as the deviation of lifetime utility from the level of utility
QTreceived if consumption levels are at their time-/ expected values.
Note firstly that log-linearising the budget constraint in old age around the 
deterministic steady-state gives the following expression:
/ Q T  \  _ ~ n i n , d  n  i n , d  r n , d  ^ . d  ~ d  m
(B3) Cq c ,+\,o t+\ t t ^  l+l
where ‘hats’ denote percentage deviations from steady-state and time subscripts have 
been eliminated from steady-state values.
The log-linearised real returns on money balances and bonds in the above expression 
are given by
(B4) r " = -  Or,
1 +  7T*
93 Note that in the case o f  consumption when young, Efil<Y = c , j  is the tim e-/ expected value.
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<B5> ^"i =&,+ r", = R ,~  1 -  ;r*)1 + ^ *
where n *  is the steady-state rate of inflation over 30-years.
Equation (B3) can therefore be written in terms of inflation as follows:
(B6) c0cltl0 = r 'b ' 'R ,  + r"b"-db f  +  r ” m dm\d -  * * )
1 + /T*
where the fact that Co = rn bn,d+ r^rri* has been used.
Hence the level o f consumption in old age is given by
(B7) cMl0 = c 0 + r"b"‘‘R ,+ r"b ’' ‘‘b:-d + r mmdmd _ * * )
1 + ;r*
Therefore, the expected level of consumption in old age is
(B8) E,c,tW = c0 + r"b"dR, + r ' b ^ b ^  + r " m dmd - - £ & - ( £ > „ ,  - « • )
1 + /T*
It follows that the conditional variance of consumption in old age is given by
(B9) var, (cM O) = °0 2 var, (;r,+l)
(1 + 7T*)
Hence the utility loss of generation t can be written as follows:
(BIO) Losst « - (1 /2 )0 , var,(;r,+1)
where O, = S(c0)2 ( 1+tt*)'2 {Efit+\,o)'^+S) > 0 and EtCt+\yo is given by Equation (B8).?
The term O, is in general time-varying, but is strictly positive provided £ a +i>0 > 0.
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Appendix C:
Steady state and market-clearing conditions in the nominal bonds model 
Deterministic steady state
The deterministic steady state is given by the following system of equations: 
(C l) c , +b"-d + m J = < u ( l - r ; ) , j  e  (IT, PLT)
(C2) ca = r"b"d + r mm J
(C3) R = (1 + 7 [ * y
(C4) r m = 1/(1 + /r*)
(C5) g  = TJa  + ( \- r " )b " -s + m ‘x * / ( \  +n*)
(C6) m J = m*
(Cl) b"'d = b"J
. . .  ©(1- t 1)-(1  + r m)md .. , ,  s
(C8) b = — ----  —   —  (implied by c,
(C9) c~ys = c~0s { (1 + 0 ) r " -  6
1 +  7 T * ;
„ 1 +  0  +  7T*
(C 10) r  ~  ( i +  ^ * x i  +  0 )
(implied by the previous two equations)
Market-clearing conditions
A monetary equilibrium in the OLG economy is a set of allocations 
K j >c t , o »K ' d »b "'s »m 1 »m ! r " , R t , r tm , T J with the following properties for all t:
(1) Allocations c ( Y, c t Q,b"'d , m d solve the maximisation problem of the young at time t\
(2) The goods, money and bond markets clear:
(Cl 1) c,y + crQ + g ,= co
(Cl 2) m d =m't
(Cl 3) b nt 'd = b nt 's
(3) The government budget constraint and long run government spending target are 
satisfied:
(C l4) g, = t jco + m] -  r™m]_x + bnt 's -  rtnb?;x
(Cl 5) E (g ,)  = g *
(4) The CIA constraint holds with strict equality:
(Cl 6) m d = 0ctY
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Appendix D: Model listing for the model with nominal bonds
C\~Y C\lto(D 1) u, (c, Y, c ,+10) = '' + E, t+l' Lifetime utility of generation t
1 — o  1 — 5
(D2) c, Y + bnt 'd + m d = co( 1 -  t j ) Budget constraint when young, j  e  (IT,PLT)
(D3) ct+w = r"+xb"'d + r ”xm d Budget constraint when old
(D4) m dt = 6b, r CIA constraint
(D5) r,7, = 1 /(I + tv,+l) Real return on money balances
(D6) r,", = R ,r", Real return on nominal bonds
(D7) c~y = E, ifiXo  (0 + ~  )) Euler equation for nominal bonds
(D8) g, = t jo) + m st -  rtmm*_x + b"'s -  r"b":\ Government budget constraint
(D9) E (g ,)  = g  * Government spending target
30
(DIO) ln(m; I m st_x) = n  * + ln(c, y / c,_XY ) - n ,  IT money supply rule
/=!
(D ll)  ln(m,' / m,'_, ) = n *  +£30, - e n + ln(cI t, / c,_,,,) - /r, PLT money supply rule
(D12) U !OC“'>= J .E
i  I
U t , Y  ( C t , Y  )  U t , 0  ( C t , Y  ) Social welfare
t=\ t=i
(D13) c~y = E, (c;fl o ) Bond supply rule
(D14) md = m] Money market clearing
0^15) b ”,d = b ”,s Market-clearing in bonds
(D16) ct Y + cl 0 + g, = a  Goods market clearing
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Appendix E -  Estimation results for the RPI pensioner index and the CPI
This appendix reports estimation results over the sample period for two alternative 
UK price indices, the RPI for one-pensioner households and the Consumer Prices 
Index (CPI). Both series were obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Time Series Database at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtimezone.asp.
The following regression was estimated at a quarterly frequency q :
(El) 7Tq = c + £q
where nq is quarterly inflation, defined as the log change in the aggregate price index 
between quarter q and q -1.
Table E l -  RPI pensioner regression results, 1997Q3-2010Q2
Parameter/Test Result
c 0.007
(s.e.) (0.001)
Quarterly inflation standard deviation, 
i.e. s d ^ )
0.0074
Yearly inflation standard deviation 0.015
Dickey-Fuller unit-root test on ln(/?P7) -0.342
(prob. value) (0.987)
Jarque-Bera test on£ 6.38
(prob. value) (0.041)
Table E2 -  CPI regression results, 1997Q3-2010Q2
Parameter/Test Result
c 0.005
(s.e.) (0.001)
Quarterly inflation standard deviation, 0.0056
i.e. sd (eq )
Yearly inflation standard deviation 0.011
Dickey-Fuller unit-root test on In (CPI) 
(prob. value)
-0.751
(0.9996)
Jarque-Bera test o n ^ 17.33
(0.00)
(prob. value)
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Appendix F: The second-order approximation of lifetime utility with capital
As noted in Appendix B, a second-order Taylor expansion of Equation (1) around 
time-/ expected values gives the following result:
(FI) u, (c, Y, c,+1 0 ) as u, Y (c, y ) + ut+\o (E tc{+x o ) + vai. (C'^ o)
where un(EtCt+\,6) is the second derivative o f utility in old age evaluated at £a+i,o, and 
var,(c^i,o) is the conditional variance o f consumption in old age.
Given that utility is CRRA, Equation (FI) can be written in the following form:
(F2) Loss. * ——
' 2 1+6 var,(c,.i,o)
where Loss, is defined as the deviation o f lifetime utility from the level of utility 
received if consumption levels are at their time-/ expected values.
Note firstly that log-linearising the budget constraint in old age around the 
deterministic steady-state gives the following expression:
(F3) c0c,tl0 = A k aA,t[ + aAk°k,  + r"bndb " d + r nb n'dr ^  + r mmdih\' + r mrndr ^
where ‘hats’ denote percentage deviations from the deterministic steady-state and 
time subscripts have been removed from steady-state values.
The log-linearised real returns on money balances and bonds are respectively
(p4)
(F5) r,h =R,+  r" = R, -  -  *-*)
where 7t  * is the steady-state rate of inflation.
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Equation (F3) can therefore be written in terms of inflation as follows:
(F6) c0c ^ 0 =AkaA[+] +aAkak, +rnbndb?'d +rnbndRt +rmml (rnbnd +rmmd)
1 + 7[*
m. - (*,.i -* * )
Thus the level of consumption in old age is given by
c,+i.o = c 0 + A k a AM + a A k ak' + r ’’b " db " d + r"b"'dR, + r mm dm d
(F7) (r"b ”M + r mm d ) ,
 r— :------- K + i - * * )1 +  7t *
Hence, the expected level of consumption in old age is given by
E,c,.\.o =c0 + A kapA, + ccAkakt + r nbndbnt 'd + r nbnd R, + r mmdmd 
(p8) (r"b"J  + r " m d )
1 + K
where the fact that Al+l = pAt + el+l has been used in taking expectations.
It follows that the conditional variance o f consumption in old age is given by
2
(F9) var/ ( C(.i,o) =
r"b"'d + r mm d
1 + /T * var,(7r,.i) + (*°)2 var, ( 4 +i)
Therefore, by Equation (FI), the utility loss o f generation t can be written as a loss 
function in the conditional variances o f inflation and productivity:
(F10) Loss, * - ( l / 2)vF,[var/ ( ^ +1) + <;var/ ( 4 +1)]
where = d{rpbnd + rmmd)2{ 1 +7r *)'2(Etct+ i ,o)'( 1 > 0, with EfCt+ \>0 given by Equation
(F8).95 The constant coefficient g = (rnbn,d + md')2 (1+7T*)2 l?a > 0 indicates the
relative importance of productivity risk for the utility loss o f generation t.
95 The term is in general tim e-varying, but w ill be strictly positive so long as £^ ,+ 1,0 > 0.
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Appendix G:
Steady-state and market-clearing conditions in the model with capital
Deterministic steady state
The deterministic steady state is given by the following set of equations:
(Gl) c y + b " d + m d + k = j  s (IT ,PLT)
(G2) c„ = A k a + r ”b ”-d + r mm d
(G3) /? = (! + n  *)r"
(G4) r m = 1/(1 + **)
(G5) g  = TJ co + (1 -  r" )b" s + m sK * /(I + **)
(G6)
(07)
(G8)
(09)
(G10) 
(Gl 1)
m d = m s 
b " d = b"-‘
m \  d /i . a /_ ff-1b"J = +  (\ + A k a )k ed s = c - s ^
1 + r"
- S  - 6  
Cy ~ ^O (1 + 0 ) r n -
0
1 + K
r =
1 + 0 + 7T
(\ + 7T)(\ + 0)
•* =ccAkaX = r ”
(implied by the previous two equations) 
(implied by the Euler equation for capital)
(G12) A = A.
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Market-clearing conditions
A monetary equilibrium in the OLG economy is a set of allocations 
»ci,o*h?'d’b?’s’kt ’m1 »mt ,R,,rtm, tj with the following properties for all t:
(1) Allocations c l Y , c l 0 , b" J , md , k t solve the maximisation problem of the young at 
time t\
(2) The goods, money and bond markets clear:
(G13) m* = m )
(G14) ctY + ctG + g t + k t = a )+ A tk “_{
(G15) b nt d = b nt s
(3) The government budget constraint and long run government spending target are 
satisfied:
(G 17) g ,  = t ’ co +  m: -  r r m U  +  ^  -  W '
(G 18) E { g , )  = g *
(4) The CIA constraint holds with strict equality:
(G19) m f = 6c, y
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Appendix H: Model listing for the model w ith nom inal bonds and capital
C)~Y C)lto(HI) u, (c, Y ,c ,+1 o) = + E, ■-+1’° Lifetime utility of generation t
l — o 1 — 8
(H2) ct Y + b"'J + rrif + k t = cc{ 1 -  r j ) Budget constraint when young, j  e  (IT , PL T)
(H3) c,+10 = A,+lk°  + r^xb”'d + Budget constraint when old
(H4) In 4  = (1 -  p )  In Amean + p  In 4_, + e, Productivity
(H5) m d =0ctY CIA constraint
(H6) r ", = 1 /(I + /r,+1) Real return on money balances
(H7) r,", = R,r™x Real return on nominal bonds
(H8) = aA'^k?  1 Real return on capital
(H9) cr f  = E, (c'?l o ((1 + 0 Y ”+X ~  )) Euler equation for nominal bonds
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/ = 1
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Social welfare 
Bond supply rule
(HI 7) m , =  m . Money market clearing
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Chapter 3
Inflation versus price-level targeting in an OLG model with 
endogenous nominal indexation
3.1 Introduction
The analysis in Chapter 2 modelled public sector pensions and long-dated government 
bonds as pure nominal contracts. In practice, however, many countries issue inflation- 
indexed government bonds and offer public sector pensions that are indexed to 
inflation. The aim of this chapter is to extend the model analysed in Chapter 2 to 
include indexed government bonds, with the ultimate goal of testing the robustness of 
the conclusions reached therein.
Importantly, this extended model captures two imperfections of indexation that arise 
in practice -  namely, ‘indexation bias’ and lagged indexation -  and has the shares of 
indexed and nominal bonds in consumers’ portfolios chosen optimally in response to 
monetary policy. Both o f these features are crucial since there are good reasons for 
thinking that optimal indexation will vary with a change in monetary policy regime 
from inflation targeting (IT) to price-level targeting (PLT), and also that imperfections 
in indexation will impact upon this. Indeed, recent research in the area of wage 
contracts has reached the conclusion that optimal indexation is significantly lower 
under PLT (Amano et al. 2007; Minford et al. 2003) and that failure to capture this 
effect can lead to the misleading welfare conclusions (see Minford and Peel, 2003). 
Similarly, Meh et al. (2008b) find that optimal indexation of financial contracts that 
are imperfectly indexed depends crucially on the extent of inflation uncertainty over 
the contracting horizon. In short, evaluating PLT against IT in the absence of 
endogenous indexation and/or under the implausible assumption of perfect indexation 
may give rise to misleading policy implications via the Lucas critique.
In this third chapter, background information is first presented on the importance of 
indexed government bonds and extent o f indexation o f public sector pensions. As in 
Chapter 2, the focus in this introductory section is on the G7 economies and the UK in 
particular. Past macroeconomic literature in the area of optimal indexation of 
government bonds is also briefly discussed. The extended overlapping generations 
(OLG) model including indexed bonds and endogenous nominal indexation is then 
introduced, and is subsequently simulated to evaluate the social welfare impact of
switching from IT to PLT. The results from this m odel specification are briefly 
discussed in relation to the findings o f  the previous chapter, and in the penultimate 
section o f this chapter an extensive sensitivity analysis is conducted. The final section 
of the chapter discusses conclusions and policy im plications, though a detailed 
numerical com parison o f  results across model specifications is left until Chapter 5, a 
short summary chapter that discusses overall findings and policy implications from 
the thesis.
3.2 Indexation and long-dated governm ent bonds
Inflation-indexed governm ent bonds have been issued in a total o f 30 countries 
(Kitamura, 2009), including A ustralia, N ew  Zealand, Sweden, and all o f the G7 
countries. There is, how ever, considerable variation in available maturities across 
countries. For exam ple, indexed governm ent bonds are available at maturities o f 6-50 
years in the UK, com pared to m aturities o f  5, 10, 20 and 30 years in the US, and only 
30 years in Canada. M ore generally, there is considerable heterogeneity across 
countries in terms o f  indexed bonds in issuance, including the dates at which such 
bonds were introduced. These points are highlighted clearly by Figure 3.1 and the 
cross-country com parison in Table 3.1.
Germany
Japan
Italy
I
n France
US
|  Canada
! _ _ ■ ! _______________ |______________ ___________ __________________________ I----------------------------------------1------------------------------------ - 1---
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 3.1 -  Introduction of inflation-indexed bonds in G7 countries
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Table 3.1 — Comparison of indexed bonds across the G7 countries
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Price
Index
CPI HICP* HICP* HICP* Core
CPI
RPI CPI-U
Indexation
lag(months) 3 3 3 3 3 3 or 8 3
Available
maturities
(years)
30 4, 10, 
15,30
10 5, 6, 
10, 30, 
50
10 6-50 5,10, 
20, 30
Interest
payment
frequency
Twice a 
year
Once a 
year
Once a 
year
Twice 
a year
Twice 
a year
Twice 
a year
Twice 
a year
Share of 
indexed 
bonds 
(in 2008)
16% 15% < 1% 6% 2% 30% 10%
Source: Garcia (2008), Kitamura (2009), Agence France Tr6sor, Department of Finance 
Canada (2008), Department of Treasury (Italy). Notes: CPI-U -  Urban Consumer Prices 
Index; HICP* -  Harmonised Index of Consumers Prices, excluding tobacco.
The dates at which indexed bonds were introduced vary considerably across countries 
and span three full decades. Although indexed bonds account for a small fraction of 
government debt in most G7 economies, the share of indexed bonds has been growing 
steadily over the past decade or so, and often at a fast rate (Bekaert and Wang, 2010). 
For example, in Canada the stock o f outstanding indexed bonds increased from $4.1 
billion in 1994 to $17.3 billion in 2003, increasing the share of indexed bonds from 9 
to 26 per cent for government debt with a maturity o f 10 years or longer (Christensen 
et a l  2004).96 As of 2008, indexed bonds accounted for approximately 30 per cent of 
British government stock (DMO, 2010a) and 10 per cent o f the US Treasury’s 
marketable debt (Campbell et al. 2009). In part, this difference reflects the passage of 
time since indexed bonds were first introduced: the UK began issuing indexed bonds 
in 1981, whilst the US only began issuing indexed bonds in 1997. In Japan, where 
indexed bonds were introduced in 2004, indexed bonds account for only 2 per cent of 
outstanding government bonds (Kitamura, 2009).
Figure 3.2 shows the general increase in the share o f indexed bonds in the UK gilt 
portfolio over the past decade. The total share o f indexed bonds in the UK portfolio of
% Given that Canada only issues indexed debt with a maturity o f  30 years, the share in total 
government debt is som ew hat lower.
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is similar to the share of longer-dated nominal bonds — defined as those with a 
maturity of 15+ years -  though it should be noted that indexed bonds are more 
important in relative terms at longer-term bond maturities (DMO, 2010b).
35
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0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: DMO (2010a)
Figure 3.2 -  Share of index-linked gilts in the UK bond portfolio
In practice, indexation of government bonds is imperfect for a number of reasons (see 
e.g. Fischer, 1996). Firstly, indexation is partially backward-looking due to 
publication lags for aggregate price indices. For instance, indexed bonds in Canada 
are indexed to the CPI from three months earlier, whilst the majority of outstanding 
indexed bonds in the UK have a longer indexation lag of eight months to the RPI. 
Second, aggregate price indices are intended to be representative of an ‘average 
household’ and therefore do not pick up price changes faced by particular groups in 
society like pensioners (Leicester, O ’Dea and Oldfield, 2008).97 As an example of this 
second point, the inflation rate for UK pensioners in 2008 (constructed using the RPI) 
was calculated at 7.4 per cent, or 2 per cent above the inflation rate faced by a typical 
household according to the RPI (Whitehouse, 2009). Thirdly, in the case of euro area 
countries, government bonds are indexed to the area-wide HICP (excluding tobacco) 
rather than a national price index. Finally, as currently formulated, price indices also 
cannot accurately capture quality improvements, leading to quality-change bias
91 Recall that ‘old generations’ in the OLG m odel are interpreted as pensioners.
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(Boskin Report, 1996). Given these imperfections, indexed government bonds are 
effectively nominal contracts that offer only partial protection against inflation.
33  Indexation and public sector pensions
Since public sector pensions are primarily ‘defined benefit’ pensions in OECD 
countries, they can also be interpreted as long-term nominal contracts. Of the 33 
countries in the OECD, 17 currently index public sector pensions to inflation after 
retirement, that is, after they are in payment (Whitehouse, 2009). Prior to retirement, 
pensions are linked to earnings, which may or may not rise at the same rate as the 
general price level. As in the case o f indexed bonds, indexation of pensions is 
imperfect due to publication lags and the fact that representative price indices will not 
capture some important price changes, leading to indexation bias. It is also notable 
that in countries in which public sector pensions are indexed, discretionary deviations 
from indexation have been frequent in practice at times o f low inflation or deflation 
(Whitehouse, op. c/7.), and that 5 o f the 17 OECD countries that index pensions do so 
to a mixture of price and earnings indices, rather than a single price index. To 
summarise, public sector pensions -  like indexed bonds -  are nominal contracts that 
offer only imperfect insurance against inflation risk. As with inflation-indexed bonds, 
the extent to which indexation is imperfect will depend primarily on the ‘bias’ in the 
price index used for indexation and the length o f the indexation lag.
Table 3.2 provides a comparison o f public sector pension schemes across the G7 
countries. There is some heterogeneity in terms of the importance of public pension 
spending across countries; and, although pensions are indexed to prices in all 
countries except Germany, the indices used differ across countries. Public sector 
pensions are overwhelmingly defined benefit (DB) in the G7 countries, but in both 
France and Germany pension payments depend additionally on points that are 
accumulated based on contributions in individual years.
I.
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Canada France Germany Italy Japa
n
UK US
Indexation Yes Yes No* Yes** Yes Yes Yes
Price
index
CPI and 
COLA***
HICP - HICP CPI RPI COLA
Public
pension
spending
(% GDP, 
2006)
4.1% 12.4% 11.4% 14.0% 8.7% 5.7% 6.0%
Type of 
scheme
DB DB DB NDC DB DB DB
Notes: *Public sector pensions are indexed to wages in Germany. ** Indexation is only 
partial for pensions with benefits more than three times the minimum pension. DB = defined 
benefit; NDC = notional accounts. *** COLA = Cost of living adjustment.
Source: OECD (2009a).
There are some striking similarities in indexation o f government bonds and public 
sector pensions -  for instance, the same price indices are often used, and Germany, 
where public sector pensions are not indexed, did not begin issuing indexed 
government bonds until 2006 and has an extremely small market in these assets (see 
Garcia, 2006). In the UK, there are more specific similarities since both public sector 
pensions and index-linked gilts are indexed to the RPI with an eight-month lag.98
3.4 Optimal indexation of government bonds: a brief review
The motivation for studying the link between optimal indexation and monetary policy 
can be traced back to the seminal papers by Fischer (1975), Gray (1976), and Levhari 
and Liviatan (1977). Gray (1976) focused on optimal indexation of wage contracts. 
Amongst other things, she showed that optimal indexation of wages depends on the 
relative variances of real and nominal disturbances, increasing with the nominal-to- 
real volatility ratio. Indexation o f wages should therefore be higher under monetary 
policy regimes that raise nominal volatility — a prediction that appears to be borne out 
by the data (Holland, 1986). Optimal indexation o f wages has been investigated more 
recently by Minford et al. (2003) and Amano et al. (2007), who investigate optimal 
indexation in fully-specified DSGE models. Both papers examine the implications of 
PLT for optimal indexation, motivated by the theoretical result that PLT reduces 
nominal volatility substantially compared to IT at medium and long-term horizons.
’•M ore specifically, the majority o f  outstanding index-linked  gilts are indexed to the RPI. Since 2005, 
gilts with an indexation lag o f  3 m onths have also been issued.
i
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Consistent with the finding in Gray (1976), both papers report that optimal indexation 
is substantially lower under PLT than IT because nominal volatility is much lower 
over the wage-contracting horizon.
Fischer (1975) and Levhari and Liviatan (1977) both focus on the optimal demand for 
indexed bonds using a portfolio approach. Levhari and Liviatan note that if indexation 
is perfect and if the only source o f uncertainty in the economy is inflation (i.e. 
nominal risk), risk-averse consumers will demand only indexed bonds, such that full 
indexation is optimal. The economic intuition here is straightforward: if indexed 
bonds are a perfect store of value and offer the same expected return as nominal 
bonds, consumption risk will be minimised by holding only indexed bonds. In such an 
economy, nominal bonds would only be held only if inflation uncertainty were 
removed entirely. A second important finding from a portfolio approach to indexed 
bonds is that full indexation is not optimal if indexation is imperfect, because holding 
nominal bonds will diversify consumption risk if the correlation between inflation and 
the ‘indexation error’ is sufficiently small. In this case, the demand for indexed bonds 
will rise with the level o f inflation risk, producing a direct link between monetary 
policy and optimal bond indexation."
Fischer (1975) studied demand for indexed bonds in the presence of real risk. In 
particular, he focuses on the optimal demands for indexed and nominal bonds in a 
model in which households receive income from human capital and choose a portfolio 
consisting of equity, nominal bonds and indexed bonds. He notes that if inflation is 
correlated with the real return on human capital (or, more generally, with other 
sources of labour or non-labour income), it is optimal to hold both nominal and 
indexed bonds, since nominal bonds will enable households to hedge risk whereas 
perfectly indexed bonds cannot.
An important criticism that can be levelled at the portfolio approach to indexed bonds 
is that it ignores the supply-side o f the market and thus fails to provide an equilibrium 
solution to the optimal indexation problem. This consideration is an important one in 
the context of government bonds because, in an equilibrium model, government
*  This result can be derived formally by setting up a sim ple portfolio problem with indexed and 
nominal bonds under the conditions described.
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behaviour should be constrained by its budget constraint.100 Indeed, when the 
government must finance bond issuance subject to its budget constraint, nominal 
bonds are useful if the government is required to balance its budget in each period 
(Levhari and Liviatan, 1976), or if inflation is correlated with the tax burden (Bohn, 
1988). This literature, however, focuses only upon necessary conditions for partial 
indexation of government bonds to be optimal. In the model simulated in this chapter, 
the optimal share of indexed government debt is computed directly. Moreover, the 
model relaxes two implausible assumptions maintained in previous literature, namely, 
that bonds are perfectly indexed, and that bond risk-premia are equal to zero.101
3.5 The extended model with indexed bonds
This section introduces the extended OLG model in which consumers can also hold 
long-term indexed government bonds and where the shares of indexed and nominal 
bonds in consumer portfolios are chosen optimally in response to monetary policy. 
Based on the above discussion, indexed government bonds are modelled as 
imperfectly-indexed due to indexation bias and lagged indexation, and therefore do 
not offer a certain real return ex post. The model builds directly upon the model with 
capital and nominal bonds that was introduced in the second half of Chapter 2. More 
specifically, the basic structure of the model is unchanged, but the government budget 
constraint and young and old generations’ budget constraints are amended to include 
indexed government bonds. The monetary policy rules under IT and PLT are identical 
to the previous chapter and are therefore not repeated here.
In real terms, the budget constraint faced by young consumers is now given by 
(3.1) clY +b?’d +b;-d +md +k, =<a(l- t J)
where denotes demand for indexed government bonds in real terms.
Indexed bonds pay an ex ante riskless real return rt which is endogenously 
determined.102 However, due to indexation bias and lagged indexation, the ex post real 
return on an indexed bond will generally differ from the riskless return. In particular,
100 Campbell and Shiller (1996) provide a useful discussion o f  the impact o f  introducing indexed bonds 
on government financing costs (in the context o f  the US economy).
101 Bond risk-premia are zero in linear or log-linearised models. Alternatively, it sometimes assumed 
that marginal utility is linear so that consumers are risk-neutral (e.g. Bohn, op. cit.).
102 The return rt ensures that the market for indexed bonds clears.
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the ex post real return on an indexed bond held from period t to period t +1 is given 
by
(3.2) rM = r, X
'(1 + 0  
(l + * <+1)
+ vf+1
where jzmd is the biased rate of inflation to which indexed bonds are linked, n is the 
true rate of inflation and vt is a Gaussian ‘white noise’ innovation whose standard 
deviation ov is based on the indexation lag length.
The ex post real return on indexed bonds in Equation (3.2) is not riskless due 
indexation bias and lagged indexation. The first term in square brackets reflects 
indexation bias and will deviate from one if ‘true’ and ‘biased’ inflation are not equal, 
indicating that the price index used for indexation differs from the true one that 
defines consumers’ standard of living. In the UK, for example, index-linked gilts are 
indexed to the Retail Prices Index (RPI), whereas the Retail Prices Index excluding 
mortgage interest payments (RPEX) may better reflect the inflation rate faced by the 
majority of pensioners (i.e. ‘old generations’), who do not make mortgage repayments 
(Leceister, O’Dea and Oldfield, 2008). The magnitude of indexation bias in the model 
depends on the correlation between true and biased inflation and also upon the 
variance ratio.
The second term in square brackets in Equation (3.2) captures the impact of lagged 
indexation on the ex post real return on indexed bonds. The indexation lag is 
motivated by the presence of data publication and collection lags which are 
responsible for indexation occurring with a lag in practice. The indexation lag is 
modelled by a ‘white noise’ innovation vt, because this methodology provides a 
simple way to capture volatility arising from lagged indexation when the indexation 
lag length is small relative to the holding period.103 This innovation is assumed to be 
exogenous and invariant to monetary policy, reflecting the assumption that the 
indexation lag length and the return risk associated with this lag are not affected by a 
shift in monetary policy regime.104
103 It does not make sense to index partially to past inflation, as each period in the model lasts 30 years.
104 The reasoning here is that because indexation lags are somewhat shorter than one year in developed  
economies, the inflation ‘m issed’ due to the indexation lag would not differ under IT and PLT given  
that inflationary shocks occur at a yearly horizon.
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Consumption by old generations is now given by
(3.3) c,+.,0 = 4 +,*,“ +r!J>r +r,:ibr + r ,> ?
= AMk f  + ( < ,  + (1 -  tfK , )bf + r ’ mf
where a is the share of indexed bonds in consumers’ bond portfolios and bd = bu  + 
b is total demand for government bonds.
In order to gain some formal intuition for the social welfare impact of introducing 
imperfectly-indexed government bonds into the model, the model was log-linearised 
and substituted into a second-order Taylor expansion of the lifetime utility of 
generation t.
Appendix A of this chapter shows that this process gives rise to the following 
expression:
(3.4) Loss, « - ( l /2 ) z ,
var, (;r,+1) + y/ var, ( t t "  ) -  2A cov, {xM, )
+ r)al +nvar,G4,+1)
where Losst is the deviation of lifetime utility from its time-/ expected value; % >0 is a 
coefficient that depends on the model’s steady-state and expected consumption in old 
age; if/, A, rj > 0 are constant coefficients that depend upon the relative importance of 
indexed bonds in consumer portfolios, and > 0 is a coefficient that represents the 
relative importance of capital.
Equation (3.4) shows that the welfare loss for generation t depends on the variances of 
actual and indexed inflation; the covariance between actual and indexed inflation; real 
return volatility arising due to the indexation lag; and the productivity variance. 
Intuitively, holding indexed bonds will expose consumers to some long-term inflation 
risk because indexation is less than perfect.105 The covariance between actual and 
indexed inflation enters the expression for the welfare loss with the opposite sign to 
the variance terms because indexed bonds are a partial hedge against inflation so long 
as actual and indexed inflation are positively correlated. If this is the case, then 
introducing indexed bonds should reduce the importance of long-term inflation risk
105 If indexation is perfect, then itind =  7r and av=  0, in which case y/ =  A  = 0 and indexed bonds holdings 
do not contribute to the welfare loss o f  generation t.
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for old generations’ consumption: consumers will be able to protect themselves 
against inflation risk by holding indexed bonds without any corresponding increase in 
risk elsewhere in their savings portfolios.
Given that monetary policy is unchanged in the extended model, the expressions for 
actual inflation under IT and PLT are identical to those given in Chapter 2. However, 
the biased rate of inflation itmd to which indexed bonds are linked is an exogenous 
process whose functional form must be specified. In the model, it is assumed to be 
given by a stochastic process that has the same functional form as true inflation -  in 
particular, nmd has the same long run mean as true inflation and depends on only 
current innovations under IT but responds to current and past innovations under PLT. 
As a result, the variance of biased inflation is also 15 times lower under PLT than IT.
The biased inflation rate used for indexation is given by
indir ™ V' ind ] under IT n ma,n = 3 0 x ; r + >  s  ”
(3.5) tT  ’ >
n i n d , P L T  =  3 0  x  n  +  e  W  _  £ i n d ^  j  p ]_ J
where s f f  ~ n (o, crf^ ) is the biased inflation innovation in year i of period t.
The inflationary innovations in this equation are assumed to be serially-uncorrelated. 
However, they are contemporaneously cross-correlated with innovations to true 
inflation, with the strength of the correlation reflecting the extent of indexation bias. 
Both this cross-correlation and the innovation variance for biased inflation are 
estimated below using UK data, consistent with the calibration of other aspects of the 
model undertaken in Chapter 2.
3.5.1 Consumers’ first-order conditions
Consider the following expected Lagrangian:
U ,  ( < V  ’ C t + U O  )  +  K y  ~  T J  )  ~  m < !  ~  ^  ~  b t ' d  ~ k t ~  C t , Y  )
n , d
(3.6) Lt ^  Et
+ i* t(m t - o°t,Y) + 4+1,0(4+iK  + rL \b t d + K+\bt ,a + rt
n , d
+ i m t
where ^ y Q-^i.o) is the Lagrange multiplier on young (old) consumers’ budget 
constraint, and nt is the Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint.
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First-order conditions are as follows:
(3.7) 2* 
1 II + 5
s
(3.8) r  -2 — r~6 t+\,o • ' W+l.O — S+i,o
(3.9)
(3.10) = E,{XM^ X)
(3.11) mt . Xi r = Er {X[+i0rr+i)+ p t
(3.12) k, :A ,r = E,(xMOceAltlk “-'
Substituting out the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraints when young and old 
gives the following consumption Euler equations for indexed bonds, nominal bonds 
and capital:
(3-13) c ; i = E , ( c ; « or,:i) + 0M,
(314) c;sv = E , ( c ^ or ^ )  + 0n,
(315) c ; t  = e i (c;:{oC ) + 0 Mi
where r,*, = aAt^ k ^ x is the real return on capital.
The Lagrange multiplier on the CIA constraint is given by
(3.16) n, = £ , ( < 0('it, -» •-,))=  E ,{ c ^ 0 ( C t -< ■ ,))=  E ,{ c ^ 0 (r^  - / - " ) )
Intuitively, the first equality states that, absent uncertainty, the CIA constraint will be 
strictly binding (i.e. > 0 for all t) if  money is rate of return dominated by indexed
bonds, whilst the second and third equalities indicate that the same relationship holds 
for nominal bonds versus money, or capital versus money, because all three assets 
must give equivalent expected utility (at the margin) in order to be held.
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Substituting out for the Lagrange multiplier in equations (3.13) to (3.15) we have the 
following Euler equations in terms of consumption and asset returns:
(3.18)
(3.17)
(3.19)
< sv = E k i o k ' + f f K . -* :> ))  
# = £ , ( < o ( o + * f c : . - « £ . ) )
c~; =Ei(c,:io(o+0)r,il -6bz))
3.5.2 Government and monetary policy
With the government issuing both indexed and nominal debt, the government budget 
constraint in real terms is given by
The government continues to set the tax rate on young consumers’ endowment 
incomes to achieve a long run target level of government spending of E(gt) -  g* .
+ bn s -  is set to ensure that the marginal utility of consumption in youth is equated 
with the expected marginal utility of consumption in old age, thus ensuring 
consumption-smoothing between youth and old age so far as is possible.
The division of the total bond supply between indexed and nominal bonds, as defined 
by an indexation share a , is chosen optimally by the government to maximise social 
welfare. More specifically, the share of indexed bonds is chosen in response to 
monetary policy, taking into account consumers’ first-order conditions and the 
necessity of achieving the long run government spending target. The optimal 
indexation decision faced by the government is therefore an example of an optimal 
commitment Ramsey policy (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). Individual bond 
supplies are constrained to be non-negative for all t, such that the optimal indexation 
share will lie in the range [0,1]. The money supply rules to which the government 
commits under IT and PLT are unchanged and are therefore identical to those derived 
in Chapter 2. For completeness, the model’s deterministic steady state and market-
(3.20)
where b‘s is the real supply of indexed bonds issued by the government.
Analogous to the model with only nominal bonds, the total bond supply -  now bs = bl,s
153
clearing conditions are given in Appendix B, along with a full model listing in 
Appendix C.
3.6 Calibrating the inflation rate used for indexation
The calibrations for the money supply rules and productivity are identical to those 
given in the previous chapter. However, the inflation rate used for indexation is an 
additional exogenous process that needs to be calibrated before the model can be 
solved. Given that both UK public sector pensions and indexed-linked gilts are linked 
to the Retail Prices Index (RPI), the RPI was chosen to calibrate the inflation rate nmd 
to which indexed bonds are linked. There are two parameters that need to be 
estimated: the yearly inflation innovation variance and the correlation between 
innovations to Tr^and innovations to true inflation n.
In order to do so, the same regression methodology is followed as in the previous 
chapter, again using quarterly data from 1997Q3 to 2010Q2 obtained from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS).106 The estimated yearly innovation variance was used to 
calibrate rind,T and nindPLT using the specifications in Equation (3.5), whilst the 
estimated correlation between the RPI and RPIX regression residuals (over the sample 
period) was used to calibrate the contemporaneous correlation between innovations to 
true and biased inflation.
The following regression equation was thus estimated at a quarterly horizon q by 
ordinary least squares (OLS):
(3.21) 7rq = c + e q
where nq is the log first-difference o f the quarterly RPI.
The results from this regression are shown in Table 3.3. The mean quarterly rate of 
RPI inflation is identical to the estimate for RPIX inflation at 0.007, or 0.7 per cent 
per quarter. Moreover, this estimate is not statistically different, at the 5 per cent 
significance level, from the quarterly rate o f inflation o f 0.0625 implied by the 2.5 per 
cent annual inflation target in the money supply rule. These estimation results are
106 Again the data were downloaded from the O N S T im e Series Database at 
http://ww w .statistics.gov.uk/statbase/tsdtim ezone.asp.
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therefore consistent with the assumption that true and biased inflation are identical on 
average.
Table 3.3 -  RPI regression results, 1997Q3-2010Q2
Parameter/test Result
c 0.007
(s.e.) (0.001)
Quarterly inflation standard deviation, 
i.e. sd (eq)
0.0073
RPI-RPIX inflation correlation, i.e. 
co rr(x™ , ) = corr{eRqP' , s ™  )
0.89
Dickey-Fuller unit-root test on \n(RPI) -1.380
(prob. value) (0.85)
Jarque-Bera test on s q 30.58
(prob. value) (0.00)
The quarterly standard deviation o f RPI inflation over the sample period was 0.0073 
(orO .73 per cent), which is slightly higher than the quarterly standard deviation for 
the RPIX. The variance of yearly innovations to biased inflation was estimated using 
the residuals from the above regression. In particular, based on the estimated quarterly 
innovation variance, the yearly variance was calculated under the assumption that 
there is a unit root in the price level (as implied Dickey-Fuller unit root test result 
reported in the Fifth row of results in Table 3 .3107). This yearly variance was taken as 
the calibrated innovation variance for biased inflation in model simulations.
Figure 3.3 compares RPI and RPIX inflation over the sample period. In general, the 
two series are strongly positively correlated, though there are some non-trivial 
deviations in the middle and at the end o f the sample period, such that the correlation 
coefficient over the sample period was equal to 0.89. This correlation was taken as the 
contemporaneous correlation between innovations to true inflation and biased 
inflation, and was therefore used as a basis for calibrating the covariances between 
innovations to actual and biased inflation (under both IT and PLT). 08 Overall, the 
results in this section suggest a relatively small amount o f indexation bias, since 
innovations to RPIX and RPI inflation are closely correlated and have similar
An intercept and trend were included in the test regression.
101 Note that for correlated random variables X  and Y, C O v ( X , Y) = corr(X , Y) x  sd (X ) x  sd (Y ) .
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variances. For completeness, Table 3.4 lists calibrated values in the stochastic process 
for biased inflation and the money supply rules.
Figure 3.3 - RPI and RPIX inflation over the sample period 
Table 3.4 -  Calibrated values in money supp y rules and biased inflation
Model
param eter
Role in the model Calibrated value
30 x /r Inflation target over 30 years
vartc,,) Yearly money supply 
innovation variance
1.45x10
0.025
0.02 j-
0.015 + 
0.01 
0.005 
0
-0.005
-o.oi r
-0.015 |  
-0.02 |  
-0.025
var« r / ) Yearly biased inflation innovation variance
2.13x10
Yearly covariance 
between innovations to 
true and biased inflation
1.56x10 —4
3.7 Calibrating the indexation lag
The white noise innovation v, enters the real return on indexed bonds in order to 
capture the impact of an indexation lag on the ex post real return on indexed bonds. 
Therefore, in calibrating its variance, a number of points should be bome in mind. 
First, given the specification of the real return on indexed bonds, this innovation 
should have the same units as the term in inflation that it appears in brackets 
alongside. Hence v, is interpreted as the impact of the indexation lag, in inflation 
percentage points, on the inflation-indexed component of an indexed bond. Second, 
the variance of v, should reflect the volatility of the inflation rate to which indexed 
bonds are linked, measured over a horizon defined by the length of the indexation lag.
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Given that the indexation lag on UK public sector pensions and the majority of 
outstanding index-linked gilts is 8 months, this variance was estimated using the rate 
of RPI inflation over a three-quarter horizon.109
The following regression was thus estimated:
(3.22) ts.nq.q_2 = c + £ q:q_2
where knq:q-i is the differential between RPI inflation in quarter q and RPI inflation 
in quarter q-3, and eq:q.3 is a regression residual and the empirical counterpart to vt.
Table 3.5 shows the regression results. The constant term is insignificant, offering 
support to the assumption that vt is mean zero, though the Jarque-Bera test marginally 
rejects the assumption that the residual is normally-distributed at the 1 per cent 
significance level. The regression residual standard deviation was 0.0121, or 1.2 per 
cent over three quarters. The variance for vt was therefore calibrated at 0.01212 = 
0.000146.
Table 3.5 -  RPI indexation lag regression results, 1997Q3-2010Q2
Parameter/test Result
c 0.0002
(s.e.) (0.0017)
Standard deviation of the residual, 
i.e. sd(£q:q_3)
0.0121
Jarque-Bera test on £q:q_2 10.80
(prob. value) (0.005)
3.8 Full model calibration
The calibration of model parameters is identical to that in the model with capital in 
the previous chapter. For ease of reference, these calibrated values are repeated in 
Table 3.6.
109 Using 3 quarters (9 months) meant that the same quarterly RPI data could be used in estimation.
Table 3.6 -  Model calibration
Model
parameter
Role in the model Calibrated value
0 Proportion of consumption when 
young held as money
0.10
8 Coefficient of relative risk aversion 3
O) Endowment income of young 
consumers
1.641
g* Long run government spending 
target
0.40
a Elasticity of output in old age 
to capital
0.375
P Persistence in productivity over a 
30-year horizon
0.618
Table 3.7 reports the steady-state values of key variables under the baseline 
calibration of the model. The deterministic steady-state is identical to that in the 
model with capital and nominal bonds. Intuitively, the relative supplies of indexed 
and nominal bonds are irrelevant for the steady-state because real returns on bonds 
equalised in the absence of uncertainty. As previously, steady-state aggregate 
consumption accounts for 73 per cent of GDP, capital holdings (investment) for 7 per 
cent, and government spending for the remaining 20 per cent. Total bond holdings 
are 17 per cent of GDP, and money holdings are equal to 3.7 per cent of GDP. Steady- 
state inflation is again equal to the 30-year inflation target of 0.75, that is, a 75 per 
cent increase in the price level over a 30-year horizon.
Table 3.7 -  Key variables at steady state
Model variable Steady-state value
C t , Y
0.730
c t,o 0.730
(=*,') 0.343
m f(= Qc,r = m,) 0.073
k , 0.140
0.75
Note: Steady-state GDP is equal to 2
3.9 Optimal indexation
The government chooses the shares of indexed to nominal bonds to maximise social 
welfare, subject to: its budget constraint and long run target level of government
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spending; consumers’ first-order conditions for optimal saving (i.e. the Euler 
equations for indexed bonds, nominal bonds and capital holdings); monetary policy; 
and the model’s other equilibrium conditions. Consequently, the policy being studied 
is a Ramsey policy: the government can commit and takes into account the optimal 
responses of consumers when making its optimal indexation choice.
Since the aim is to solve for the unconditionally-optimal share of indexed bonds, it is 
sufficient to solve the model to second-order. Indeed, Samuelson (1970) formalised a 
general principle that it is necessary to approximate a portfolio problem up to order 
N  + 2 in order to solve for the Mh-order component of the portfolio problem. In the 
model at hand, we are looking for the zero-order component of the government bond 
portfolio, because we are looking for the constant share that is optimal in the long run 
-  that is, the very first term in a Taylor series approximation of the optimal portfolio 
share. Intuitively, a second-order approximation is necessary, since a first-order 
approximation will not capture the risk characteristics of bonds due to certainty 
equivalence.110
Given that the model is solved using a second-order approximation, the optimal 
indexation problem faced by the government can be formulated using a second-order 
Taylor expansion of social welfare around (unconditional) mean consumption levels. 
In fact, Samuelson (1970) derived his results by approximating the utility function, 
though Devereux and Sutherland (2011) note that approximating first-order 
conditions produces identical results for the zero-order component of a portfolio 
problem.
The optimal indexation problem can thus be stated as follows:
(3.23) max u society »
a
f
V y
where U £ »  = ~s{E cuYY +S) and = -S{E cIi0Y ' ^  ,
110 See Devereux and Sutherland (2011) for a more recent application in the context o f  open economy
DSGE models.
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subject to:
the government spending target E(gt) = g*; the government budget constraint; the 
money supply rule in place; and the model’s other equations and equilibrium 
conditions (as listed in appendices B and C o f this chapter).
In order to gain some intuition for the factors driving optimal indexation, we can 
consider a first-order Taylor expansion o f the first term on the right hand side o f 
Equation (3.23) around the deterministic steady-state of the model.111
Using this approximation results in the following social welfare criterion:112
(3.24) max U s o c t e n  _  1<$^ C/i E c , . Y + E c t.O +
2 S x c 0  ^
1 - S ^(|t/cX ’jvar(c,,r) + |[/-1var(c,,0))
where Ec, Y + Ect a is the long run average level o f aggregate consumption.
The goods market-clearing condition can then be used to show that the average level 
of aggregate consumption E c, y + Ect 0 is approximately invariant to a change in 
monetary policy from IT to PLT. Indeed, taking the unconditional expectations 
operator through the market-clearing condition gives Ect,y + Ect,o = cu -  g* + 
E(AjJk,)a -  kt), which is approximately invariant to the indexation share a, since the 
real return on capital is uncorrelated with real bond returns. The reasoning for the 
indexation choice not affecting the average level o f  aggregate consumption is that the 
government must meet its long run government spending target Egt = g* regardless o f  
the indexation share that is chosen. Hence, for example, if  nominal bonds have a 
higher expected return than indexed bonds, a marginal reduction in indexation would, 
ceteris paribus, increase average consumption by old generations. However, reducing 
indexation would also reduce average government spending, because the average cost 
of issuing government debt would rise. Therefore, in order to meet the long run
1.1 This approximation is intended only to provide intuition for the results that follow . In m odel 
ttnulations, the expression for social welfare is evaluated fully  to second-order (along with the rest o f  
the model). Equation (3 .24) should provide a good approxim ation i f  risk aversion is moderate or low, 
because the utility function w ill not have strong curvature.
1.2 This expression makes use o f  the fact that at steady-state cy and c0 are equal.
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government spending target, the income tax rate on young generations would need to 
rise, reducing average consumption by the young. The invariance result above states 
that the reduction in consumption by young generations will approximately offset the 
increase that accrues to old generations, such that aggregate consumption remains 
unchanged as the indexation share is varied.
Given that the first term on the right hand side o f Equation (3.24) is approximately 
invariant to the indexation share, the government is effectively minimising a loss 
function in consumption volatility, such that optimal indexation is driven by a 
consumption insurance motive. Indeed, using notation employed by Woodford 
(2003), we can express the optimal indexation problem as follows:
(3.25) m j n l / * " * « i ( |  t / - ; ' ' !  var(c,v) + | ( / - f |  var(c,,0 )) + U p.
where t.i.p. stands for ‘terms independent o f policy’.
The key term on the right hand side o f Equation (3.25) is the one in var(c,fC>). The 
reasoning is as follows. First, the consumption variance across young generations will 
be much smaller than the consumption variance across old generations, since 
consumption volatility for the young arises only indirectly through small portfolio 
substitution effects due to fluctuations in assets’ expected returns, whilst consumption 
by the old is impacted directly by ex post shocks to asset returns. Second, 
consumption volatility across old generations depends directly on the indexation 
share, whilst the indexation share itself has only a minimal impact on consumption 
volatility across young generations.113
In Appendix D it is shown that under reasonably general conditions (which are 
satisfied by the baseline calibration), the key term in Equation (3.25) will be 
minimised by choosing the indexation share so that the consumption variance across 
old generations is (approximately) minimised, or
Under IT, consumption volatility  across young generations is independent o f  the indexation share 
because expected inflation is constant. Under PLT, how ever, expected  inflation is time-varying, so 
there are small variations in the expected returns on indexed  and nom inal bonds. Consumption  
volatility across young generations is thus not independent o f  the indexation share: the extent o f  
indexation will influence consum ers’ incentives to substitute betw een  assets fo llow ing variations in 
expected inflation.
(3.26)
dvai(c,0) 
da
Equation (3.26) can thus be used to derive an approximate analytical expression for 
the optimal indexation share. This task is undertaken below.
First, the consumption variance across old generations can be approximated as
where y t 0 = Atk*_x is output produced by old generations and rttot = arlt + (1 -  a)rf is 
the overall return on the bond portfolio.
Differentiating Equation (3.27) with respect to the indexation share and setting the 
result equal to zero gives an approximate expression for the optimal indexation share. 
Appendix E shows that this expression is as follows:
Intuitively, the optimal indexation share is (i) increasing in the return variance on 
nominal bonds, (ii) decreasing in return variance on indexed bonds, and (iii) 
increasing (decreasing) in the extent to which the real returns on nominal (indexed) 
bonds and money balances covary. Notice also that full indexation will not, in 
general, be optimal (unless real returns on indexed and nominal bonds are themselves 
strongly positively correlated), since holding nominal bonds will help to diversity 
consumption risk in old age.115 All four of these predictions are confirmed by the 
simulation results that follow.
114 Note that since capital is a claim to real output, its return is uncorrelated with indexed and nominal 
bond returns, and the real return on money balances.
115 For instance, the variance-minimising shares in a portfolio o f  two assets with uncorrelated returns 
are positive so long as both assets have finite variances. When returns are positively correlated, the 
optimal shares will lie between zero and one i f  the return correlation is sufficiently small.
follows:114
(3.27) var(c,Q) ~ var (yto ) + var(r" £,'_,) + var(r"m;l,) + 2cov(r“ 6,’ ,, r ”m *,) 
(3.28) a**
var (r/A*, ) + var(r,"6;_,) -  2 c o v f r X ,, r’b^ )
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3.10 Simulation methodology
The model was again solved to second-order using Dynare++. Due to the presence of 
the optimal indexation choice faced by the government, the model solution was 
carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the optimal indexation shares under IT and 
PLT are identified by solving the model for indexation shares in the range [0,1], in 
steps of 0.01, and recording social welfare for each share. In the second stage, the 
model was simulated with the optimal indexation shares identified in the first stage to 
obtain results under IT and PLT at the optimal Ramsey equilibrium. To ensure 
consistency with Chapter 2, simulation results were obtained from 1,000 simulations 
of 5,000 periods, with the simulation seed chosen randomly in each simulation.
3.11 Simulation results
The simulation results presented in this section compare IT and PLT across three key 
areas: optimal indexation; impulse responses; and consumption volatility and social 
welfare.
3.11.1 Optimal indexation
In order to solve for the optimal indexation shares under IT and PLT, the model was 
simulated for indexation shares from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.01, as described above. An 
indexation share of Vi, for example, corresponds to a bond portfolio that is split 
equally between indexed bonds nominal bonds, whilst an indexation share of 1 (i.e. 
100 per cent) indicates that consumers hold only indexed bonds.
In fla tio n  ta rg e tin g
Panel (a) of Figure 3.4 shows how social welfare varies with the indexation share 
under IT, and Panel (b) shows the corresponding variation in consumption volatility 
across old generations. An indexation share of 76 per cent maximises social welfare. 
As expected based on the analytical expressions reported above, optimal indexation is 
driven by consumption risk across old generations, which is minimised at an 
indexation share of 75 per cent. Intuitively, a relatively high indexation share is 
optimal under IT because long-term inflation volatility is substantial, so that nominal 
bonds are a relatively poor store of value compared to indexed bonds, whose 
imperfections are small by comparison. Indeed, the simulated real return volatility on
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nominal bonds is almost two-and-a-half times as high as that on indexed bonds (see 
Table 3.9). Despite this substantial return volatility differential, it is optimal for 
consumers to hold some nominal bonds in their portfolios for diversification reasons, 
as there is a weak correlation between real returns on indexed and nominal bonds.116 
The result that optimal indexation is relatively high under IT is consistent with the 
optimal wage indexation results reported by Minford et al. (2003) and Amano et al 
(2007), and also those reported by Meh et a l (2008b) in the context of optimal 
indexation of financial contracts.
(b) Consumption volatility across old generations 
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Figure 3.4 -  Social welfare and the share of indexed bonds (IT) 
P rice - le ve l ta rg e tin g
Figure 3.5 shows the impact of the indexation share on social welfare and 
consumption volatility under PLT. Optimal indexation is somewhat lower than under 
IT at 26 per cent (see Panel (a)), indicating that it is optimal for consumers to hold 
almost three quarters of their bond portfolios as nominal bonds. The intuition for this 
result can be seen from Panel (b), which shows that consumption volatility across old
116 In fact, the correlation between bond returns is slightly negative. The reason is that unanticipated 
inflation reduces the real return on nominal bonds but increases the real return on indexed bonds, 
because biased inflation w ill tend to ‘overshoot’ true inflation due to its higher variance.
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generations is minimised at an indexation share of 25 per cent. Hence nominal bonds 
become a much better store of value than in the IT case, enabling old generations to 
reduce their exposure to consumption risk by substituting towards nominal bonds and 
away from indexed bonds.
(b) Consumption volatility across old generations 
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Figure 3.5 -  Social welfare and the share of indexed bonds (PLT)
The IT and PLT optimal indexation results are summarised in Table 3.8, which 
reports the indexation shares that maximise social welfare, as well as the indexation 
shares at which consumption volatility across old generations is minimised. Note that 
the optimal indexation shares do not coincide exactly with the ones that minimise 
consumption volatility, since the optimality condition that indexation should minimise 
consumption volatility across old generations was derived only as an approximation. 
These simulation results do suggest, however, that the approximation is a reasonably 
good one.117
117 As discussed above, the approximation should be a good one if  risk aversion is moderate or low, 
which is the case under the baseline calibration o f  S =  3.
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Table 3.1I -  Optimal indexation under IT and PLT
Monetary
policy
Optimal indexation 
share
Share at which 
var(ct 0 ) is minimised
IT 76% 77%
PLT 26% 27%
There are two factors driving the substantial reduction in optimal indexation under 
PLT. Firstly, the reduction in (long-term) inflation risk under PLT benefits holders of 
nominal bonds disproportionately, because real return volatility on nominal bonds is 
driven purely by inflation risk, whereas indexed bonds are also impacted by the 
indexation lag -  a source of real return volatility that remains unchanged under PLT. 
As a result, real return volatility falls more sharply on nominal bonds than on indexed 
bonds, giving risk-averse consumers an incentive to substitute towards nominal bonds 
under PLT.
Formally, the incentive for this substitution is highlighted by the approximate formula 
for the optimal indexation share in Equation (3.28), which indicates that a reduction in 
the nominal to indexed return variance ratio will reduce optimal indexation. The 
marked reduction in this ratio under PLT can be seen clearly from the results in Table 
3.9: the standard deviation on indexed bonds is approximately halved from 230 basis 
points under IT to 120 under PLT, but the standard deviation on nominal bonds falls 
to below one-fifth of its IT value, from 360 to 70 basis points.
Table 3.9 -  Real return standard deviations
Monetary 
supply rule
Indexed
Bonds
Nominal
bonds
IT 230 360
PLT 120 70
Notes: Figures are in basis points and are rounded
Secondly, the lower indexation share under PLT is also driven by indexation bias. 
This bias reduces the optimal indexation share even in the absence of any indexation 
lag. The reasoning is as follows. With consumers holding both indexed and nominal 
bonds in their portfolios for diversification reasons, covariance risk between bond 
returns and the real return on money influences consumption volatility in old age, and 
hence optimal indexation. Nominal bonds perform relatively better under PLT in 
terms of this cross-covariance risk, because the real return on nominal bonds is
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strongly positively correlated with the real return on money balances under IT, but 
only weakly so under PLT. Thus there is an additional diversification motive for 
holding nominal bonds under PLT: nominal bonds will tend to pay a relatively low 
return when the real return on money is high, thus stabilising consumption in old age.
Table 3.10 shows formally that the nominal bonds to money real return correlation 
falls substantially from a perfect positive correlation of 1 under IT to only 0.08 under 
PLT, whilst other return correlations remain largely unchanged.118 That a lower 
correlation between the real return on nominal bonds and the real return on money 
will reduce optimal indexation can be seen formally from the approximate expression 
in Equation (3.28). The lower correlation under PLT can be explained by the fact that 
expected inflation becomes time-varying. This has the effect of ‘diluting’ the positive 
correlation between nominal bond returns and the real return on money balances, 
because whilst nominal bonds provide insurance against anticipated fluctuations in 
inflation, money balances do not.119
Table 3.10 -  Real return correlations on indexed and nominal bonds
Correlation r \ r n r \ r m r \ r k r n,r k r \ r m
IT -0.11 -0.11 0 0 1.00
PLT -0.03 -0.04 0 0 0.08
Note: Correlations are rounded to two decimal places
In order to identify the relative importance of the factors driving the reduction in 
optimal indexation under PLT, the indexation differential was decomposed as follows 
into ‘indexation bias’ and ‘indexation lag’ components:
(3.29) a " - a PLT= A a ^ -A a ™ . +
'  v  '
Indexation lag diff. Indexation bias diff.
where d  is the optimal indexation share under monetary policy j ,  ano iag is the optimal 
indexation share in the absence of lagged indexation, and A a = a -  ano iag is 
indexation differential due purely to the presence of lagged indexation.
118 There is a perfect positive correlation under IT because expected inflation is constant; this means 
that a nominal bond is equivalent to m oney plus a constant nominal ‘mark-up’ for expected inflation.
119 Under PLT, a nominal bond is equivalent to money plus a time-varying nominal ‘mark-up’ that 
captures fluctuations in expected inflation. Since innovations to inflation are serially uncorrelated, the 
latter need not be strongly correlated with actual inflation -  hence explaining the relatively weak 
positive correlation.
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Table 3.11 shows the results from the decomposition of the IT-PLT indexation 
differential given in Equation (3.29).
Table 3.11 -  Indexation differential decomposition
Indexation share/differential (%) IT PLT
Optimal indexation share, a 1 76 26
IT-PLT differential, a IT - a PLT 50
Optimal with no indexation lag, a Jno]ag 82 76
IT-PLT indexation bias differential 6
IT-PLT indexation lag differential 44
Only 6 per cent of the indexation differential between IT and PLT is due to indexation 
bias, with the remaining 44 per cent due to the indexation lag. The impact of the 
indexation lag is substantial because long-term inflation risk is reduced by an order of 
magnitude under PLT. As a result, real return volatility on nominal bonds falls 
sharply compared to indexed bonds, because return risk on nominal bonds results 
solely from inflation uncertainty, whilst indexed bonds are also subject to return risk 
resulting from the indexation lag -  risk that is entirely unchanged under PLT.
On the other hand, the role played by indexation bias in the IT-PLT indexation 
differential is relatively small. Intuitively, since money holdings are small under the 
baseline calibration, the reduced correlation between nominal bond returns and the 
return on money balances has relatively little impact on consumption risk faced by old 
generations or, therefore, on the optimal indexation share. Moreover, the extent of 
indexation bias captured in the model is relatively small since true and biased 
inflation are strongly positively correlated and have similar variances under the 
baseline calibration. The robustness o f optimal indexation to the extent of indexation 
bias is tested below in the sensitivity analysis section.
3.11.2 Impulse responses
Impulse responses are evaluated at the optimal indexation shares identified above on 
the basis that these correspond to the equilibria implemented by the government under 
IT and PLT through its optimal commitment Ramsey policy. O f course, the impulse 
responses of exogenous variables in the model will be invariant to the indexation 
share.
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The impulse responses for inflation are the same as previously, but due to the 
introduction o f indexed bonds there is a second inflation rate in the model -  the 
biased one that is used for indexation purposes. The extent to which this second rate 
differs from the true rate determ ines the m agnitude o f the indexation bias and is an 
important factor determ ining the optimal indexation shares and social welfare. Figure 
3.6 plots one standard deviation im pulse responses o f  true inflation to a money supply 
innovation and o f  biased inflation to its innovation.
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Figure 3.6 -  Impulse responses of true and biased inflation compared
Under the baseline calibration, innovations to true and biased inflation are strongly 
correlated, with a correlation coefficient o f  0.89. However, as the impulse responses 
shown are orthogonalized, there is no response o f  biased inflation to a money supply 
innovation, or vice versa. N evertheless, com paring the two impulse responses will 
give a good indication o f  the response to indexed inflation to money supply 
innovations, due to the high positive correlation. The response o f biased inflation to 
its innovation is larger than the response o f  true inflation to a money supply 
innovation, because it has a higher innovation variance. Overall, however, the two 
inflation responses are rather sim ilar (under both IT and PLT), as is to be expected 
given that the innovation variances are not that different. Figure 3.6 therefore provides 
formal confirm ation that the extent o f  indexation bias is relatively low under the 
baseline calibration: true and biased inflation track each other well in response to 
inflationary shocks.
Figure 3.7 shows the im pulse responses o f  real returns on indexed bonds to 
inflationary innovations under IT and PLT. The real return on indexed bonds is 
pushed downwards by an innovation to true inflation (i.e. a money supply innovation) 
but upwards by an innovation to the biased inflation rate to which indexed bonds are 
linked. Since true and biased inflation are strongly positively correlated and have 
similar variances, the real return on indexed bonds will be largely stabilised against a 
money supply innovation. This point is highlighted by the fact that the two impulse 
responses have sim ilar m agnitudes but opposite signs. It is notable that there is a 
small lagged response o f  the real return on indexed bonds under PLT, due to the 
initial inflationary im pulses being offset in the second period. M oreover, this lagged 
response is much larger for an innovation to indexed inflation due to the presence of 
indexation bias.
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Figure 3.7 -  Impulse responses of the real return  on indexed bonds to 
innovations to actual and biased inflation
The corresponding im pulse responses for consum ption in old age are shown in panels 
(a) and (b) o f  Figure 3.8. The consum ption responses to actual and indexed inflation 
are largely symmetrical under IT, because indexed bonds account for more than three- 
quarters o f consum ers’ bond portfolios. That is to say, nominal bond holdings and 
money holdings are small in com parison to indexed bond holdings, such that the fall 
in consumption in response to unanticipated inflation (which also affects the real 
returns on nominal bonds and m oney) is only slightly  larger, in absolute terms, than
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the positive impact from an unanticipated innovation to indexed inflation. Under PLT, 
by contrast, consum ption falls less sharply in response to unanticipated inflation due 
to the lower level of long-term  inflation risk, and this fall in consumption far 
outweighs the increase that results from  an innovation to indexed inflation, because 
the latter only affects the one-quarter o f  consum ers’ bond portfolios held as indexed 
bonds.
As is to be expected, there is no response o f  the real return on nominal bonds to 
innovations to indexed inflation, and no alteration in the real return impulse responses 
to money supply innovations com pared to C hapter 2. Sim ilarly, the impulse responses 
to productivity are identical to those in C hapter 2 and are therefore not repeated here.
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Figure 3.8 -  Impulse responses of consum ption in old age to innovations to 
actual inflation and biased inflation
Figure 3.9 investigates the im pact o f  m oney supply  innovations (i.e. innovations to 
actual inflation) on asset holdings and consum ption in youth. As in the model w ithout 
indexed bonds, there is no response o f  asset holdings under IT, whilst capital and 
bond holdings are reduced under PLT, because consum ers substitute towards m oney 
balances. The reasoning is the sam e as previously: a positive shock to inflation lowers 
expected future inflation under PLT, increasing the expected real return on m oney 
balances but leaving expected real returns on bonds and capital unchanged.
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As explained in C hapter 2, substitution betw een assets following shocks to inflation 
produces a small am ount o f  extra consum ption volatility  across young generations 
under PL1 Since indexed and nom inal bonds give equivalent expected utility at the 
margin, the reduction in total bond holdings under PLT is identical to that in the 
model without indexed bonds. C onsequently , the corresponding reductions in indexed 
and nominal bond holdings are determ ined by their shares in total bond holdings, 26 
and 74 per cent respectively. In the case o f  innovations to biased inflation, the 
expected real return on indexed bonds is unchanged under both IT and PLT, and there 
is no response o f  asset holdings or consum ption in youth, because innovations to 
biased inflation have no im pact on the expected real return on m oney balances.
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Figure 3.9 -  Impulse responses to a money supply innovation
The other additional shock in the m odel is the indexation lag innovation in the real 
return o n  indexed bonds. There is no im pact from  this innovation on the expected (ex 
ante) return on indexed bonds, because the innovation is w hite noise with an expected 
value of zero. Consequently, consum ption by the young does not respond to the 
indexation lag innovation. There is, o f  course, an ex post response from this 
innovation on the real return on indexed bonds, and a knock-on impact on 
consum ption in old age, as show n clearly  in Figure 3.10. M oreover, since the 
indexation lag length is the sam e under IT and PLT, the im pact on the real return on
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indexed bonds is the sam e in both cases. H ow ever, the im pact o f an innovation on 
consumption by old generations is larger under IT, because holdings o f  indexed bonds 
are around three tim es as high due to the h igher indexation share o f  76 per cent.
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Figure 3.10 -  Impulse responses to the indexation lag innovation
3.11.3 Consumption volatility and social welfare
As previously, the consum ption equivalen t w elfare gain k  is reported along with 
consumption means and variances across young and old generations; see Table 3.12.
Table 3.12 -  Social welfare and consumption
Simulated value IT PLT
ECi,Y 0.7299 0.7300
1,0 0.7307 0.7307
var(c, y) x 1000 0.0385 0.0387
var(c, 0 ) x 1000 0.3401 0.2946
k. (in %  term s) 0.0K3%
With indexed bonds in the m odel, the w elfare gain from PLT falls to 0.01 per cent o f  
aggregate consumption, or 0.007 per cent o f  GDP. This gain com pares to an increase 
of 0.103 per cent in the m odel w ith nom inal bonds only, and 0.026 per cent in the
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model with nominal bonds and capital. In monetary terms, the aggregate gain is equal 
to £90.7 million -  a gain per employed member of the UK population of £3.13, or 
£10.80 per pensioner. These gains are borderline trivial, but it should be noted that 
they apply to all current and future generations. Intuitively, indexed bonds are an 
additional asset with which consumers can protect their savings against inflation risk 
-  and a good one for this purpose given that the imperfections of indexation are 
relatively small under the baseline calibration of the model. Consequently, the 
benefits to be had from reducing inflation risk under PLT are somewhat smaller if 
indexed bonds are freely available.
Because indexation is endogenous, consumers are better able to ‘smooth’ 
consumption such that mean consumption levels are approximately identical under IT 
and PLT, in contrast the models o f Chapter 2. Mean consumption by old generations 
is in fact slightly higher under IT (because bond risk-premia are higher), but there is 
no numerical difference to four decimal places.120 Intuitively, due to the need for the 
government to meet its long run government spending target, the increase in bond risk 
premia under IT implies a higher tax on young consumers, which in turn reduces 
average consumption by young agents, offsetting the slight increase for old 
generations. As a result, aggregate consumption is essentially unchanged, as in the 
models simulated in Chapter 2. Consumption volatility across old generations is 13 
per cent lower under PLT -  a reduction which is somewhat lower than in the model 
with capital and nominal bonds (39 per cent) or nominal bonds only (95 per cent), but 
which is nevertheless non-trivial. As in the results reported previously, there is a small 
increase in consumption volatility across young generations under PLT (a 1 per cent 
increase), due to variations in expected inflation causing young generations to 
undertake portfolio substitution between assets.
To summarise, old generations benefit from a non-trivial reduction in consumption 
volatility under PLT, but there is only a small welfare gain because consumption risk 
has a second-order impact on social welfare. In order to investigate the quantitative 
robustness of these results, the next section conducts an extensive sensitivity analysis.
120 In particular, mean consum ption across old generations is 0 .73074  under IT and 0.73071 under PLT.
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3.12 Sensitivity analysis
This section analyses the importance of the indexation share for the IT-PLT welfare 
comparison and investigates sensitivity to key calibrated parameters and variances.
3.12.1 Indexation and social welfare
A key finding from the PLT literature is that optimal wage indexation is substantially 
lower than under IT. For instance, Amano et al. (2007) found that if wage indexation 
is exogenous and does not respond under PLT, the welfare gain vis-a-vis IT is 
substantially understated. An even stronger result is found by Minford and Peel 
(2003): holding indexation fixed under PLT gives the false conclusion that social 
welfare is higher under IT. These results suggest that the Lucas critique should be an 
important consideration for economic researchers who build models for the purpose 
of comparing social welfare across monetary policy regimes that might affect 
contracting behaviour in important ways. An interesting question that can be 
answered using the model in this chapter is whether the substantial reduction in 
optimal indexation under PLT -  from 76 per cent to 26 per cent -  is important for the 
estimated welfare gain. In order to do so, the approach in Minford and Peel (2003) is 
followed: social welfare under PLT is computed under the assumption that indexation 
is held fixed at the optimal level under IT.
A second important consideration is that current level of bond indexation in 
developed economies is rather low (see e.g. Bekaert and Wang, 2010). Indeed, 
amongst developed countries, indexed government bonds are most prevalent in the 
UK where they account for around one-quarter of the total government bond portfolio 
(DMO, 2010a), compared to the optimal share of 76 per cent estimated in the baseline 
case. It is therefore instructive to compare social welfare under IT and PLT when the 
extent of bond indexation is fixed at a low level comparable to that developed 
economies. For this purpose, the indexation share was set at 21 per cent, the share of 
indexed bonds in the UK government bond portfolio as of March 2010 (DMO, 
2010b).
175
The results from these two sensitivity exercises are reported in Table 3.13. For ease of 
reference, the consumption equivalent welfare gain from the baseline calibration is 
reported in bold in the middle column.
Table 3.13 -  Indexation and the welfare gain from PLT, JL
Indexation set 
at IT optimal
Optimal
indexation
Indexation set 
at UK level
0.008% 0.010% 0.020%
The welfare gain from PLT is underestimated by one-fifth if indexation is held fixed 
at the optimal level under IT. Although the change in the welfare gain is relatively 
small in absolute terms, this reduction masks the fact that the reduction in old 
generations’ consumption volatility under PLT is somewhat lower than in the optimal 
indexation case at 11.7 per cent. On the other hand, if indexation is fixed at the 
current UK level, the welfare gain from PLT is doubled relative to the baseline case at 
0.020 per cent. Intuitively, the current low level of indexation in developed countries 
works in favour of PLT and against IT because optimal indexation is substantially 
lower under PLT and close to 21 per cent. Moreover, since indexation is higher in the 
UK than any other developed economy, this estimate can be viewed a lower bound on 
the welfare gain from PLT if indexation remains at low levels as in developed 
economies currently.
3.12.2 Model parameters
As with the models in Chapter 2, the welfare results are robust to changes in the 
persistence of productivity and its innovation variance, and also to the consumption 
share of money in the CIA constraint. The sensitivity analysis in this section therefore 
focuses on four key areas: the extent of risk aversion; nominal volatility; the extent of 
indexation bias; and the indexation lag length. Each of these areas is investigated in 
turn below. Given that indexation is endogenously determined, the optimal indexation 
shares vary in these simulations. Therefore, both the optimal indexation shares and the 
corresponding welfare gains are reported and discussed in the analysis below.
Risk aversion
As in the models of Chapter 2, sensitivity is investigated for alternative risk aversion 
coefficients of 3/2 and 5. The results from this analysis are shown in Table 3.14.
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Table 3.14 -  Sensitivity of optimal indexation and X  to risk aversion
Simulated value Coefficient of relative risk aversion, 8
8  = 3 /2 8  = 3 8  = 5
IT optimal 
indexation share
77% 76% 78%
PLT optimal 
indexation share
24% 26% 27%
X 0.006% 0.010% 0.014%
The extent of risk aversion has little impact on optimal indexation, but a substantial 
impact on the estimated welfare gain from PLT. When risk aversion is Tow’, the 
welfare gain from PLT falls to 0.006 per cent of aggregate consumption, whilst it rises 
to 0.014 per cent with ‘high’ risk aversion -  both deviations of four-tenths from the 
baseline welfare gain. In absolute terms, the range of uncertainty is narrower than 
previously, reflecting the lower magnitude of the welfare gain under the baseline 
calibration. The intuition behind the impact of risk aversion on the welfare gain is as 
given in Chapter 2: an increase in risk aversion increases the relative importance of 
consumption risk for social welfare, making a reduction in consumption volatility
191under PLT of greater social value than in the baseline case.
3.12.3 Nominal volatility
In concordance with the sensitivity analyses in Chapter 2, money supply innovation 
standard deviations o f 0.015 and 0.009 were investigated in addition to the baseline 
calibration of 0.012. As we have seen, the volatility of the money supply innovation 
endogenously determines the volatility o f (true) inflation according to the money 
supply rule implemented by the government. However, in the current model, a change 
in the money supply volatility implies, ceteris paribus, a change in the volatility of 
biased inflation (because innovations to the latter are correlated with innovations to 
the former), whilst the calibration of the indexation lag innovation variance is related 
to the volatility of biased inflation.
Therefore, in order to isolate the impact of a pure change in nominal volatility (i.e. 
holding the relative importance of imperfections in indexation constant), the 
simulations below change the innovation variance to biased inflation and var(v>) in
121 Formally, consum ption volatility has a second-order impact on social welfare. An increase in the 
curvature o f  the utility function, as measured by 3, increases the role o f  such higher-order effects.
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tandem with the money supply innovation variance, such that the variance ratios 
remain unchanged relative to the baseline calibration. The innovation variances under 
‘high’ and ‘low’ volatility calibrations are presented in Table 3.15, along with their 
baseline calibrations.
Table 3.15 -  Nominal volatility sensitivity calibrations
Money supply innovation variance
Low
var(f.,) = 0 .87x10^
Baseline
var(£r; ,)  = 1.45x10^
High
var(elV ) = 2.20 x 10^
Biased inflation innovation variance
Low
var(£-“ ) = 1.30x10^
Baseline
var(s"f) = 2 .13x10^
High
v a r ( ^ )  = 3.20xl0~4
Indexation lag innovation variance
Low 
a l  = 8.7 x 10' 5
Baseline
<rv2 = 0.00015
High 
cr2 = 0.000220
The results are reported in Table 3.16. Optimal indexation is again fairly robust. An 
increase in nominal volatility increases optimal indexation only slightly, but raises 
welfare gain from PLT by one-fifth. Intuitively, nominal risk rises whilst real risk 
(from holding capital) remains unchanged, such that nominal volatility becomes a 
relatively more important factor in consumption risk for old generations, increasing 
the stabilisation benefits to be had from PLT. By the same reasoning, the welfare gain 
from PLT falls somewhat as the extent of nominal volatility is reduced. The impact of 
nominal volatility on the welfare gain from PLT is smaller in magnitude than in the 
models of Chapter 2, but is non-trivial in proportional terms and similar to that from 
varying risk aversion.
Table 3.16 -  Sensitivity of optimal indexation and A to nominal volatility
Simulated value
>fominal volatility
Low Baseline High
IT optimal 
indexation share
75% 76% 79%
PLT optimal 
indexation share
23% 26% 28%
A 0.007% 0.010% 0.012%
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3.12.4 Indexation bias
An important determinant of optimal indexation is ‘indexation bias’ captured by the 
real return on indexed bonds. The size of the indexation bias depends on the relative 
volatilities of true and biased inflation and the positive correlation between the two 
inflation rates. In particular, the larger volatility differential and the lower the 
correlation between the two, the greater the extent of indexation bias -  because actual 
and indexed inflation will diverge more often. Indexation bias of some form will be 
present unless the variances of the two indices are exactly equal and there is perfect 
positive correlation of 1 between innovations to true and biased inflation.
In order to investigate the impact of changes in indexation bias on optimal indexation 
and social welfare, the model was simulated for alternative correlations between 
money supply innovations and innovations to indexed inflation, with the innovation 
variances held fixed. In the baseline calibration, the correlation was set at 0.89. Here, 
robustness is investigated to alternative correlations of 0.80 and 0.98. Moreover, the 
model was also simulated in absence of indexation bias by setting biased inflation 
equal to true inflation, thus providing a benchmark against which the other results 
could be compared. This assumption (or the high correlation of 0.98) would be 
applicable for countries in which indexed government bonds and public sector 
pensions are linked to an inflation rate that provides an excellent approximation to the 
true one. The results from these sensitivity tests are shown in Table 3.17.
Table 3.17 -  Sensitivity of optimal indexation and A to indexation bias
Simulated
value
Correlation, c o r r ( x , 7 r ind) Zero bias
(i.e. n  -  7rind)0.80 0.89 0.98
IT optimal 
share
71% 76% 85% 100%
PLT
optimal
share
22% 26% 30% 30%
A 0.013% 0.010% 0.005% 0.005%
When the correlation between innovations to true and biased inflation is reduced to 
0.80, indexation bias is increased relative to the baseline case, with the intuitive result 
that optimal indexation falls somewhat under both IT and PLT. Moreover, the welfare 
gain from PLT increases by one-third, because indexed bonds are less able to protect
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savers against the high level of long-term inflation risk under IT, such that the 
consumption stabilisation benefits to be had from PLT are increased.122 By the same 
reasoning, optimal indexation rises if the indexation correlation is reduced, and the 
welfare gain from PLT is reduced with it. Interestingly, although the high and low 
correlation cases are symmetrical, the welfare gain from PLT is halved in the ‘high 
correlation’ case. The reason is that optimal indexation increases only slightly under 
PLT, but markedly under IT. This difference reflects the fact that indexation becomes 
somewhat less costly under IT but only marginally so under PLT given that, under the 
latter, indexation bias is a minor source of volatility due to the low level of long-term 
inflation risk.
If there is no indexation bias at all, optimal indexation increases sharply under IT: full 
indexation of 100 per cent is optimal, implying that the government should issue only 
indexed bonds. Under PLT, however, optimal indexation increases only slightly -  
from 26 per cent in the baseline case up to 30 per cent. The large increase in optimal 
indexation under IT reflects the fact that inflation risk is the dominant factor in return 
volatility, whilst this is not true under PLT because volatility arising from the 
indexation lag plays a crucial role due to the low level of inflation risk. In effect, long­
term inflation risk is sufficiently high under IT that it is optimal to hold only indexed 
bonds and be insured as much as possible.
The welfare gain from PLT is halved when there is no indexation bias, as in the case 
when the correlation is ‘near-perfect’ at 0.98. This result suggests that countries 
whose indexed bonds have relatively little indexation bias would have somewhat less 
to gain in the long-term from switching from IT to PLT. The intuition is simply that 
the lower the extent o f indexation bias, the better indexed bonds are as a substitute for 
PLT. Overall, the welfare gain from PLT is reasonably sensitive to the extent of 
indexation bias, as are the optimal indexation shares.
3.12.5 Indexation lag length
In order to investigate sensitivity to the indexation lag length, alternative variance 
calibrations are considered for the white noise innovation v* that enters the return on
122 In particular, PLT reduces consum ption volatility across old  generations by 19.9 per cent, compared 
to 13.1 per cent in the baseline case.
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indexed bonds. The innovation variance in the baseline calibration was set at 0.00015 
based upon estimation results for the change in RPI inflation over three quarters, 
which is approximately equal to the indexation lag on index-linked gilts and public 
sector pensions in the UK. However, as can be seen above from Table 3.1, other G7 
countries issue indexed bonds with a shorter indexation lag o f three months.123 The 
sensitivity analysis below therefore calibrates the model for an indexation lag of three 
months, such that the innovation variance is one-third of its baseline value. For 
symmetry, the impact o f an indexation lag o f 15 months is also considered. The 
calibrations and results are reported in Table 3.18.
Table 3.18 -  Sensitivity of the welfare gain X to the indexation lag
Simulated value
Indexation lag length
High 
(5 quarters) 
a ]  = 0.00027
Baseline 
(3 quarters) 
a ]  = 0.00015
Low 
(1 quarter)
crv2 = 5.3 x 10-5
IT optimal 
indexation share
72% 76% 83%
PLT optimal 
indexation share
17% 26% 44%
/I 0.010% 0.010% 0.008%
The indexation lag length has a substantial impact on the IT-PLT optimal indexation 
differential. When the indexation lag is calibrated based on a one-quarter horizon, 
optimal indexation rises and the optimal indexation differential is reduced from 50 to 
39 per cent. Intuitively, optimal indexation rises because the indexation lag becomes a 
less important source o f volatility in the real return on indexed bonds, making indexed 
less risky as compared to nominal bonds. Indexation rises more sharply under PLT 
than IT because, as discussed above, volatility arising from the indexation lag is a 
relatively more important factor in overall return volatility under PLT, due to the 
considerably lower level o f inflation risk. By the same token, an increase in the 
indexation lag length to 5 quarters reduces optimal indexation under IT and PLT, and 
increases the optimal indexation differential to 55 per cent. Overall, the welfare gain 
from PLT is rather robust to the length o f the indexation lag, though optimal 
indexation is strongly sensitive.
123 The UK also issues indexed bonds with a lag o f  three m onths, but the majority o f  bonds outstanding 
have an eight-month indexation lag (D M O , 2010a).
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3.13 Conclusions and policy implications
In this chapter, indexed bonds were introduced into the OLG model and the extent of 
bond indexation was determined endogenously in response to monetary policy as part 
of an optimal commitment Ramsey policy implemented by the government. The 
analysis concentrated primarily on how introducing indexed bonds into the model 
influenced the long-term welfare impact from PLT (and its robustness), as well as on 
optimal indexation under IT and PLT. Since indexation is optimised in response to 
monetary policy and captures imperfections of the kind observed in practice, the 
social welfare and volatility results obtained should not be vulnerable to the Lucas 
critique, and should thus provide a sound foundation from which to draw policy 
conclusions.
Introducing indexed government bonds increases social welfare under both IT and 
PLT, but the increase under IT is larger because indexed bonds play an important role 
in protecting consumers against the high level of long-term inflation risk. As a result, 
the welfare gain from switching to PLT was reduced to only 0.010 per cent of 
aggregate consumption, or an increase in GDP of approximately 0.007 per cent. For 
the UK, this amounts to an aggregate monetary gain of £90.7 million. The implied 
gain per employed member o f the UK population over a lifetime is £3.13, or £10.80 
per pensioner.124 Whilst this estimated welfare gain is rather small, it is economically 
non-trivial given that it would apply, in principle, to all current and future generations, 
and that the level of consumption on which it is calculated should grow over time. 
Moreover, it is notable that the reduction in consumption volatility for old generations 
(i.e. pensioners) is non-trivial at almost 15 per cent.
Intuitively, the welfare gain from PLT is reduced somewhat because indexed bonds 
enable consumers to largely protect their savings against long-term inflation risk, thus 
reducing the benefits obtainable from lowering inflation risk under PLT. In other 
words, indexed bonds act as a substitute for PLT by insuring consumption in old age 
against the high level o f inflation risk under IT. In terms of optimal indexation, the 
results are consistent with the literature that has investigated optimal indexation of 
wage contracts: optimal indexation is reduced substantially under PLT, and ignoring
124 As in Chapter 2, these figures are based on 2009 data in O N S (2010a), with the pensioner 
population figure taken from DW P (2009).
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this reduction understates the potential welfare gain from PLT. Under the baseline 
calibration of the model, optimal indexation was 76 per cent under IT, compared to 
only 26 per cent under PLT.
The estimated welfare gain from PLT is sensitive to the indexation share and to key 
calibrated values in the model. In particular, the welfare gain from PLT is 
underestimated slightly if  indexation is held fixed at the same level as is optimal 
under IT, and is doubled if indexation is set at a low level as in developed economies 
currently. As with the two models analysed in the second chapter, there is 
considerable sensitivity of the welfare gain to the extent of risk aversion and nominal 
volatility.
Additionally, indexation bias is a crucial factor, because it determines the extent to 
which indexed bonds can protect consumers’ savings against long-term inflation risk. 
If indexation bias is increased, the welfare gain of PLT rises because consumers 
cannot insure themselves as effectively against the high level of inflation risk under 
IT. On the other hand, if indexation bias is close to zero, a high indexation share is 
optimal under IT and the potential welfare gain from PLT is rather small, implying 
that countries whose indexed bonds and public sector pensions are subject to little 
indexation bias would have relatively little to gain from switching to PLT. However, 
given the numerous potential biases in price indices and the difficulties surrounding a 
calculation of ‘true inflation’, it is not a straightforward task for countries to assess 
this at the current time. Altering the indexation lag length has a substantial impact on 
optimal indexation, but little impact on the estimated welfare gain from PLT, because 
this source of risk is present to the same extent under both IT and PLT.
To summarise the key findings of this chapter, PLT leads to only a small increase in 
social welfare, but the welfare gain is likely to vary across countries with risk 
aversion, the extent o f nominal volatility, the relative importance of indexed bonds, 
and the extent of imperfections in indexation.
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Appendix A:
The second-order approximation of lifetime utility with indexed bonds
A second-order expansion of the lifetime utility o f generation t can be written in the 
following form:
where Loss, is defined as the deviation o f lifetime utility from the level of utility 
received if consumption levels are at their time-/ expected values.
Note firstly that log-linearising the budget constraint in old age around the 
deterministic steady-state results in the following expression:
The log-linearised real returns on money balances, indexed bonds and nominal bonds 
are as follows:
where x* is the steady-state rate o f inflation.
The right hand side of Equation (A2) can be written in terms of actual inflation and 
biased inflation using equations (A3) to (A5). Carrying out these steps and using the 
definition of a percentage deviation around steady-state, the level of consumption in 
old age can be expressed as follows:
(Al) Loss
(A2)
where Ar+l = pAt + e,+1.
(A3) ( x f+l - x * )
(A4)
1 + x * 1 +  7 T *
(7Tt+1 -  X*) +  V,+1
(A5)
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c0 + A k° [A,., + a k , )+ r 'b 'db \d + r"b" db"-‘ + r mm dm d + r ‘b ‘-dr,
(A6) c,.yo = + r"b"dR. - r ’b ‘d + r"b’,d + r mm d
1 + 7T* (* ,+i -  «■*)
I i i,d
+
r'b  
1 + ;r /+i
Expected consumption in old age is therefore given by
(A7) E,c,.lj0 =
c0 + Ak°(pA, + a k , )+ r ib ‘db;d + r nb"'db"d + r mm dmd + r 'b‘dr,
r lW'd -U v nh n'd
+ r b R . -----------------------------_ ( £ ^ +i
1 + n
r 'b 'd
+ -7— (E,* % - * * )
1 + 71 *
Thus the conditional variance o f consumption is as follows:
(A8) var,(c,.,„) =
r (r ‘b, d + r nb"d + r mmd) 2 , , (r‘bld)2 , w '
 var, (*,.i) +  -----1 3 - var, (xM )(1 + x * )2 
+ (r 'b 'd)2<y2 + k 2° var,(/!,.,)
2 r 'b ‘( r 'b 'd + r"bnd + r mm d)
(1 + a*)1
( 1  + * * )
Therefore, by Equation (A l), the utility loss o f generation t can be written as follows:
(A9) Loss, « —(1/2 )%,
var, ) + v  var, ) -  2A cov, (tt,,, , )
+ t)ct2v +52 var, (/I,.,)
S (r ‘b 'd + r nb ' d + r mm d )2 n . _ . . , c  ..where* , = —^ ------- n||^  > 0 , and b,c,.i.o  is given by Equation (A7).
(1 + 7r*)2(E ,c ltlo)
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Constant coefficients are defined as follows:
(A10) V  s  ( r ' b ^ f  /(r 'b ,J‘ + r"b"'‘1 + r mm d)2
(Al 1) A s r ^ ^ + r T '  + r V )
(A12) 7 S 0  + * * ) V
(A13) + / ( r 'b 'd + r ’'b”a + r ’"md)2
Note that in the special case when indexed bonds and capital are excluded from the 
model (i.e. b = k = 0), the loss in lifetime utility is given by -(l/2)/,var,(^,+i) since 
the constants in equations (A 10) to (A 13) are all equal to zero.
i
I
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Appendix B: Steady-state and m arket-clearing  conditions 
Deterministic steady state
The deterministic steady state is given by the following set of equations: 
(Bl) cY +bu  +b"-J + m J + k = a { \ - T J),  for j  <= (IT, PL T)
(B2) c0 = A k ° + r ib i d + r ’'b"-‘‘ + r ’"m‘l
(B3) R = (1 + n*)r"
(1 + 7t*)
(B4) r ' =
(B5) r m = 1/(1 + /r*)
(B6) g  = r y<a + (l -  r ‘)b‘s +(1 - r " ) b ’J + m Jx  * /(I + ft*) 
(B7) n M = n *
(B8) m ‘ = m d
(B9) m d = 0cy 
(BIO) b‘d = b ‘‘ = a x b '
(Bl 1) b"-J =b"J =(1 - a ) x b ‘
oAl -  r y) - (1  + r m)m  - (1  + A k a )k 
(B12) b“ = b'4 + b = V  = ---------------------
(from bond supply rule, c /  = c0 )
-s -s(  x, , 9(B13) c'° = co* \(\  + 0 ) r ' -
1 +  7T*
(B14) c ?  = Cg"\ (1 + 9)r" - 9
1 + n
i „ 1 + 0 + 7T* x . . .
(B15) r -  r -  r -  — ——— — (implied by the previous two equations)
(1 + /r*X l + u )
(B16) r* = a A ka 1 = r n = r ‘ (from the Euler equations for capital and bonds)
(B17) A = Amean
Market-clearing conditions
A monetary equilibrium in the OLG economy is a set of allocations
{cty*cuoM'd >Rt >rr  >t JX=\ with the following
properties for all t:
(1) Allocations {ci r ,c , , lo ,bi'J ,b"'d , k , , m f Y  solve the maximisation problem of a 
young consumer bom at time t\
(2) The goods, money and bond markets clear:
(B18) o>+ A,k°_, = c , y + c ,0 + g ,+ k ,
(B19)
(B20)
^ 2 1 )
m f = m ’ 
b \d = b i ‘
b n.d =  b n.s
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(3) The government budget constraint and long run government spending target are 
satisfied:
(B22) g , = T J a> + m ; ~  r,mm;L, + bl; s -  -  r.'bZ
(B23) E(g l ) = g *
(4) The CIA constraint holds with strict equality:
(B24) = 9c, j
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Appendix C: Model listing
c 1^  c l~s 
(C l) u, = - ^ -  + E,
1 -8  ‘ 1-8 Lifetime utility of generation t
(C2) ct Y + b nt 'd + b\'d + m d + k t = oo( 1 -  r j ) Budget constraint faced by young
(C3) c[+xo -  At+Xk “ + r ‘^ b ‘t'd + r"+xb"'d + r™xm d Budget constraint faced when old
(C4) In A, = (1 -  p )  In Amean + p  In At_x + et Productivity
(C5) m d =Oct) CIA constraint
(C6) r,:x = l/(l + /r,+1) Real return on money balances
(C7) r", = R ,C X
(C8) r/+1 = r, x (1 + Q
0  + * ,+i)
+ v/+i
Real return on nominal bonds 
Real return on indexed bonds
(C9) ct y = Et (c,fx o ((1 + 0)r"+x -  Or™,)) Euler equation for nominal bonds
(C10) c~y = Et (c~fx o ((1 + 0)rt‘+x -  Or™x)) Euler equation for indexed bonds
(C11) c~d = Et (ctf xo ((1 + 0)aAt+xk “ 1 -  Or™x)) Euler equation for capital
( C l 2) g t = t j G) + m] -  r™mst_x +  b\'s -  rt‘b ‘t'_sx +  bnt 's -  rtnb":x 
Government budget constraint
(C13) E(g,) = g *  Long run government spending target
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(C14) In(m st / m ]_x) = n  * £ i,, + to(c,,y / cr-i,y ) ~ ^  IT money supply rule
j=i
(C l5) ln(m; /w ; ) = ;r * +^ 30 , — £3 0 + ln(c, Y / c/_1 y ) — n t PLT money supply rule
Social welfareU t , Y  ( C / ,y  )  ( C t , Y  )
. ' = 1  / = 1
30
(C17) ;r'm/,/7' = n  * Inflation rate to which index bonds are linked (IT)
»=i
(C18) k ^ ' plt = k  * +£^ t -  £ j Inflation rate to which bonds are linked (PLT)
(C l9) c~y = E , (cr7i,o) Total bond supply rule (implies b j )
(C20) b* = b‘ s + b" s Total bond supply definition
(C21) md = mst Money market equilibrium
(C22) b" d = b" s = (1 -  a)b. Market-clearing in nominal bonds
(C23) b\,d = b‘/  = ab* Market-clearing in indexed bonds
(C24) co + Atk ° x = ct Y + ct 0 + g t +k, Market-clearing in goods
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Appendix D -  An approximate first-order condition for optimal indexation
In the main text it is argued that, as an approximation, the indexation share a will be 
chosen to solve the following minimisation problem:
(Dl) mm — 
- 2
r r society 
coco v a r ( c , , o )  +  Up.
where t.i.p. stands for terms independent o f policy’ and the absolute value of the 
second derivative o f the social welfare function with respect to ctio (evaluated at its 
unconditional mean) is given by = s (E c (0 ) {X+S).
The first-order condition for this problem is given by
(D2) ^ ( E c, 0 ) 20' <>')
d  var(c, „ )  
da x (^ cr,o)1+<> -  (\ + S){Ecuoy  var(c,0 )x
dEc,t,o
da
=  0
Hence the optimal indexation share will satisfy the following equality:
(D3) dvar(c Q)  ^ x\(i7 V ^  \ ^E c,0 z  x  IE c ,,o ) = 0  + s )\Ect 0 f  var(c, 0 ) xca da
Rearranging Equation (D3) for d var(cl Q) /  da yields
(D4)
d v ar(c ,Q)
da = 0 + * )
var(c/>0) dEct,o
Ec t,o da
Hence iff \dx{ct>0)IEctio ~ 0, the first-order condition for the optimal indexation share
i can be approximated by125
%
fI  _____________________________ _
* 125 Under the baseline calibration var{c lt0)IEcti0 is approxim ately 4 .6E -4  under IT and lower under PLT. 
" Note that 8E cl0  Ida w ill a lso  be c lo se  to zero g iven  that indexed  and nom inal bonds are priced to give 
\  equivalent expected utility (at the margin). For this reason, m ean consum ption by old  generations is 
 ^ essentially identical under IT and PLT, despite the substantial optim al indexation differential (see  
I Table 3.12).
i.
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(D5) 8vartC>o ) g 0
da
Thus, the optimal choice of the indexation share will (approximately) 
consumption volatility across old generations.
minimise
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Appendix E -  Deriving an analytical expression for the optimal indexation share
In this appendix, an approximate expression for the optimal indexation share is 
derived by minimising the consumption variance across old generations. As noted in 
the main text, the key terms in the consumption variance Eire given by
(El) var(c,0 ) « var(y ,0 ) + v a r ^ . , ) + var(r, V - . ) + 2cov(rttot b;_x, rtmmd_x) 
where r'°' = ar‘t + (1 -  a )r" is the overall return on old generations’ bond portfolios. 
Equation (E l) can be written in terms of the indexation share as follows:
var(c,0 ) a  var(y, 0 ) + a 2 var(/-/&;_,) + (1 -  a ) 2 v a r ( r , ) + var(r,mm ^ )
(E2) + 2 a ( l  -  a)cov(r,'fc;_, , r ‘b’_x) + 2ocov(/-,'i;_,
+ 2(1 -  a ) cov(r,"i;_,, )
Minimising Equation (E2) with respect to the indexation share a gives following first- 
order condition:
d var (c, a ) 
(E3) -----7 ^  = 2
da
a v a r ( r /^ , ) -  (1 -  a) var(r?b*t_x) + (1 -  2a)co\(r't bst_x, r?b*_x) 
+ cov(r;Z?;_,, r ” m d_x) -  co v(r"bst_x, r™mdt_x)
=  0
Solving Equation (E3) for the optimal indexation share a* gives the expression 
reported in the main text, i.e.
* _ var(r;y_ ,) + cov(r?bst_x, r " m d_x) -  coy(r‘b;_x, r"m d_x) -  covfr/fr^, r"bst_x) 
var (r/6;_,) + v a r ^ " ^ , ) -  2 co v(rlt bst_x, r?bst_x)
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Chapter 4
Estimating the impact of price-level targeting on the long-term 
inflation risk premium
4.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, the monetary policy literature has argued that a change in 
monetary policy regime from inflation targeting (IT) to price-level targeting (PLT) 
would lead to a substantial reduction in the inflation risk premium on long-term 
nominal bonds (e.g. Crawford et al. 2009; Stuber 2001). Such a reduction would have 
potential benefits for the economy, including an increase in aggregate investment and 
output through a lower cost o f capital (Meh et al. 2008a), and a lower cost of issuing 
nominal government debt, which would enable government spending to be raised for 
a given level of taxes, or for taxes to be lowered for a given level of expenditure. 
Somewhat surprisingly, no attempts have yet been made in the monetary policy 
literature to estimate the impact o f PLT on the inflation risk premium within a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework.
This task is taken up in the current chapter. In order to so, the overlapping generations 
(OLG) models of chapters 2 and 3 are used to compute the inflation risk premium on 
long-term nominal government debt under IT and PLT. The models are again solved 
using a second-order approximation method, since the aim is to capture the level of 
inflation risk-premia and not their variability (which would require a third-order 
approximation). Consistent with the analysis in previous chapters, inflation risk 
premia are computed in all three versions o f the model and are subjected to various 
sensitivity tests to allow for calibration uncertainty and heterogeneities across 
countries and over time.
To preview the results, a key finding is that, consistent with predictions from the 
literature, the inflation risk premium on long-term nominal bonds is substantially 
lower under PLT due to the absence o f base-level drift. This general result is robust in 
model parameter sensitivity analysis and across models, though the absolute reduction 
in the inflation risk premium varies somewhat depending on the model at hand and its 
calibration. The intuition for PLT substantially lowering the inflation risk premium is 
straightforward: long-term inflation volatility is reduced by an order of magnitude
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under PLT, such that risk-averse savers holding long-term nominal bonds are exposed 
to less consumption risk over a long horizon and therefore require less of a ‘risk 
premium’ as compensation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, past literature on the inflation risk premium is 
briefly discussed, including both theory and estimation results. The chapter then turns 
to the methodology that is used to estimate inflation risk premia in the OLG models of 
chapters 2 and 3. Simulation results from the OLG models are then reported and 
discussed in a third section, before being subjected to various robustness tests. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing overall conclusions and policy 
implications. The results are also discussed further in Chapter 5, a short final chapter 
that puts in context the overall findings of the thesis and its policy implications.
4.2 The inflation risk premium: a brief survey
The inflation risk premium is defined in the literature as the premium, in percentage 
points or basis points per annum, offered by a nominal bond over an asset whose real 
return is fully protected against inflation risk. Economists are interested in the 
inflation risk premium primarily because of its potential importance for the level of 
long-term interest rates, and hence for investment, aggregate demand, and the 
sustainable rate of economic growth. A reduction in the inflation risk premium, for 
example, would be expected to boost investment and aggregate demand by lowering 
long-term interest rates -  a point made by Jean-Claude Trichet in testimony before the 
European Parliament,126 and by Bemanke (2006) who notes that “special factors that 
lower the spread between short-term and long-term rates will stimulate aggregate 
demand.” As noted in the introduction, a reduction in the inflation risk premium will 
also lower the average cost of issuing nominal government debt127 -  a potentially 
important consideration given that the affordability of pensions is now a major public 
policy issue in many developed economies (see e.g. OECD 2009a).
In order to provide a comprehensive formal definition of the inflation risk premium 
that is consistent with existing literature, the analytics in this section are developed
126 See Trichet (2005).
127 The OLG m odels used in this chapter capture this ‘average cost’ effect, but the impact o f  PLT on 
investment and aggregate output is quantitatively trivial in the calibrated models.
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within a representative agent framework. It is then demonstrated in the next section 
that an analogous expression for the inflation risk premium can be obtained from the 
OLG models of chapters 2 and 3. To this end, consider a risk-averse representative 
agent whose quarterly discount factor is P and whose marginal utility of consumption 
in period t is denoted MUt. The one-period real stochastic discount factor at time t is 
then given by = p{MU t+\/ MU,).128 Using the real stochastic discount factor, we 
can price real and nominal bonds using the fundamental equilibrium asset pricing 
equation (see Cochrane, 2001). This equation states that any asset i can be priced 
according to P* = E[mX], where X  is the payoff o f asset i, P1 is its price, and m is the 
real stochastic discount factor for the date when the asset pays off. When dealing with 
assets such as bonds it is often convenient to write this equation in the form 1 = 
E[mrl], where r' = X /  P* is the gross real return on asset /.
According to this equation, a one-period riskless real bond will have a real return that 
satisfies
(4.1) \ = r 'xE,[m„u ]
where the subscript /, 1 indicates that the payoff in real terms next period is known 
with certainty at time /.
Similarly, the real return on a riskless «-period real bond will satisfy
(4.2) 1 = K , „ J
where the subscript /,« indicates that the payoff in real terms n periods ahead is known 
with certainty at time /, and mt+n,t = /T(MU,+,,/MU,) is the w-period-ahead real 
stochastic discount factor.
The first subscript refers to the num erator and the second subscript to the denominator.
Hence, for example, m,+nJ =
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Now consider an w-period nominal bond with zero default risk -  that is, a bond whose 
real return is certain but for inflation risk. In this case, the nominal return Rt,n is 
known for certain at time t and must satisfy
where 7r,+„ is the rate of inflation between period t and period t+n.
Intuitively, the payoff on an w-period nominal bond has two components, The first is 
the known nominal return Rt n, and the second is the ‘inflation discount’ Pt/Pt+n, which 
represents the extent to which inflation over the life of the bond erodes its purchasing 
power upon maturity. If there is inflation risk, the inflation discount will not be known 
with certainty at time t and will, in general, be correlated with the real «-period ahead 
stochastic discount factor. This correlation gives rise to an ‘inflation risk premium’.
In order to obtain an expression for the inflation risk premium, note that Equation
(4.3) can be written as follows:
(4 -4 ) 1 =  E ,m , + ^ ,.„ c Ov,( " W - ( l  +
where = /?,.*/( 1+ nt+n) is the real rate of return on the w-period nominal bond.
The w-period inflation risk premium at time t, denoted irp(n, is then given by the 
difference between the expected real return on the «-period nominal bond and the n- 
period riskless real return. Using Equation (4.4) and Equation (4.2) we arrive at the 
following expression for the w-period inflation risk premium:
(4.5) irp, „ = Etrlt„ „ -  r '  = -r/„ cov, (m,+„, , R, „ (1 + tt, „  )’')
where / =  1 /E(m) from Equation (4.2).
Intuitively, if consumption and inflation are negatively correlated (i.e. higher inflation 
erodes consumption purchasing power), then the inflation risk premium will be 
positive such that nominal bonds compensate risk-averse consumers with an expected 
return above the ^-period riskless real return. Moreover, it is notable that the inflation
m t + n , t 1 +  7T,
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risk premium drives a wedge between nominal and real rates, such that the Fisher 
equation cannot be recovered in its traditional form.129
There are a number o f papers in the literature that have estimated the inflation risk 
premium in general equilibrium models using identical or similar expressions to 
Equation (4.5). Indeed, the fact that the inflation risk premium cannot be observed 
directly from data is often cited as an argument in favour of estimating its value using 
a DSGE framework. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), for example, estimated the US 
inflation risk premium over the postwar period using a continuous-time flex-price 
general equilibrium model in which monetary policy and taxes are endogenous. Their 
results suggest that the ten-year inflation risk premium varies considerably over the 
business cycle but has averaged 70 basis points over the postwar period.
On the other hand, Ravenna and Seppala (2007) use a New Keynesian model that is 
parameterised to match the nominal term structure in the US over the postwar period, 
and conclude that inflation risk premia have been small on average at 10 basis points 
or less up to a 5-year horizon. One potential explanation for this stark contrast in 
results is that, under standard calibrations, the aggregate price level displays 
substantial nominal 4 stickiness ’ in New Keynesian models, such that the implied level 
of inflation risk from model simulations is fairly low. Indeed, as noted by Le et al. 
(2008) in the context of the Smets-Wouters model of the US, inflation and other 
nominal variables are too stable relative to the data, leading to rejection of the model
130as a whole based on the method o f indirect inference.
Estimates of the inflation risk premium in the literature have also been derived using a 
no-arbitrage macro-finance approach. For example, Campbell and Viceira (2001) 
develop a two-factor model o f the term structure of interest rates that is augmented to 
fit both equity and bond returns, with the inflation risk premium measured by the term 
premium of ten-year nominal bonds over ten-year indexed bonds. Using quarterly US 
data covering the postwar period, Campbell and Viceira estimate the model by
129 If the inflation risk prem ium  is zero (i.e . cov(m /+„ , , (1 + 7ct+n) 1) =  0 ) ,  the Fisher equation can be 
obtained by substituting the right hand side o f  Equation (4 .4) into the left hand side o f  Equation (4.2) 
and approximating 1 + tt/+«))] ' w ith 1 + E tKt+„ in order to so lve for the nominal rate.
130 Le et al. do show, however, that a w eighted  N ew  K eynesian -N ew  C lassical version o f  the model 
cannot be rejected on key m acroeconom ic variables over the Great M oderation period.
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maximum likelihood using the Kalman filter and conclude that the ten-year inflation 
risk premium has averaged 110 basis points. Likewise, Ang et al. (2008) estimate an 
essentially affine term structure model with regime-switching over the postwar period 
and reach a similar conclusion, namely, that inflation risk-premia in the US are 
positive and around 115 basis points on average. Lastly, D ’Amico et al. (2008) 
estimated a no-arbitrage term structure model using information from US Treasury 
Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) in order to control for the dynamics of real 
yields. They found a lower average inflation risk premium of around 50 basis points, 
consistent with their sample covering the Great Moderation period when inflation 
variability fell dramatically.131 In terms o f European countries, estimates of inflation 
risk premia tend to be lower,132 though a recent study for the UK covering the post-IT 
period reports a substantial five-year inflation risk premium of around 100 basis 
points (see Joyce et al. 2010).
One reason for the continued use o f ad hoc term structure models in the literature is 
the inability of general equilibrium models to match risk-premia on nominal bonds 
under empirically plausible calibrations -  the so-called ‘bond premium puzzle’ (see 
e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson 2008). However, the general equilibrium and macro­
finance approaches to bond risk premia have tended to reach broadly similar 
conclusions regarding the inflation risk premium. In particular, whilst there is no clear 
consensus on the magnitude o f the inflation risk premium, the available evidence 
points to a positive and economically non-trivial premium at medium- and long-term 
bond maturities.
In terms of IT versus PLT, there is less literature on the inflation risk premium. Stuber 
(2001) and Crawford et al. (2009) both argue that PLT would lead to a non-trivial 
reduction in longer-term inflation risk-premia, but stop short of modelling the impact
133explicitly. A similar result has been obtained formally by Meh et al. (2008a), who 
consider a small open economy model in which firms can finance investment using 
short-term or long-term nominal debt contracts. Firms have the choice to default on
131 See also Hordahl (2008 ) for a sim ilar finding.
132 This result is probably due, in part, to the sam ples used  in the studies covering the Great Moderation 
period. For exam ple, Garcia and W em er (2 0 1 0 ) estim ate that from  1999 to 2006, the 5 -year inflation  
risk premium in the Euro Area averaged 25 basis points.
133 Cited by Crawford e t al. (2009).
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both types of debt, so there is a risk premium in the cost of capital. Although IT and 
PLT are not modelled explicitly, the former is assumed to be represented by a ‘high’ 
level of long-term price-level uncertainty, and the latter by a ‘low’ level of 
uncertainty. Reducing long-term price-level uncertainty has two effects. First, it 
lowers the risk premium on debt (since there is a lower probability of default), and 
with it the cost o f capital. Second, a reduction in long-term price-level uncertainty 
leads to an increase in the fraction o f agents using long-term nominal debt, which in 
turn boosts investment and output. These results suggest that switching from IT to 
PLT could have a beneficial impact on investment and output by lowering the 
inflation risk premium. However, these results should be taken with caution because 
they apply to debt contracts with default risk (hence excluding most government 
bonds from a long run perspective) and in a model where the price level is exogenous.
In the present chapter, the long-term inflation risk premium on nominal government 
bonds is computed directly in the OLG models that were calibrated and estimated in 
the previous chapters -  models in which the price level is endogenously determined 
and where IT and PLT are modelled explicitly.
43 The inflation risk premium in the overlapping generations models
In order to obtain an expression for the inflation risk premium in the three OLG 
models of chapters 2 and 3, it is necessary to first define the risk-free real return that 
would be received on a perfectly indexed bond.
Recall that the Euler equation for nominal bonds in all three models is given by
where Z1 = R/( 1 + n) is the real return on a nominal bond and rm = 1/(1 + n) is the real 
return on money balances.
The additional term on the right hand side enters the Euler equation for any asset, 
risky or riskless, due to the presence o f  the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint in the 
model, as discussed in Chapter 2. Note also that a single period in the model is
(4.6)
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interpreted as 30 years, which amounts to a horizon of n =120 quarters in terms of the 
analytical representative agent framework discussed in the previous section.
A riskless real bond with known return /  would thus have to satisfy the following 
Euler equation:
(4.7) c ' t  = E ,(c;‘ o ((\ + 0 )r /  -  a-,:, ))= (1 + 0 )r /E , {c;X0 ) -b e ,  (c - V " , )
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) can be written in the form of the fundamental asset pricing 
equation as follows:
(4-8) 1 = £ , ( " C ^ , )
(4-9) 1 = £ , ( « £ % )
where r ”x = (1 + 0 )r^  -  0r”{; rt{x = (1 + 0 )r f  -  6r™x; and m ™  = c“*0 /c~Y .
To derive the inflation risk premium in the OLG model, we need to expand equations
(4.8) and (4.9). Doing so gives the following expressions:
(4.10) 1 = (l + 0)Elm°fJ E,r,:i + (1 + 6>) cov, (m°“ , < , )  -  BE, ( m ^ C )
(4.11) 1 = (1 + 0 ) r /E ,m ° *  -  BE, )
Therefore, the inflation risk premium in the OLG model is given by
(4.12) 'rp,,oua = E,rM ~ r!  = - r / covr(w,M?>r/"i)
Using the definition of Z,  this equation can be written in the same general form as 
Equation (4.5), or
(4.13) irptvin = ~r!  cov/ ^  0- + n t+\ )_1)
The inflation risk premium in the OLG models is therefore analogous to one from a 
representative agent framework, except that the stochastic discount factor now
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depends on the ratio o f marginal utility in old age to marginal utility in youth (and is 
not ‘discounted’ by /?), and one period t is 30 years, which is equivalent to setting n = 
120 quarters in terms o f Equation (4.5). Intuitively, the fundamental nature of the 
inflation risk premium is unchanged because the only key difference between an OLG 
framework and a representative agent one when pricing assets is the horizon over 
which risk matters; in the former it is fixed by the horizon from ‘youth’ to ‘old age’ 
because generations live for two periods of fixed length, whilst in the latter it is 
variable and depends on the term to maturity n o f the bond held.
In Appendix A of this chapter, the inflation risk premium term in Equation (4.13) is 
approximated using a Taylor series expansion in order to highlight its key 
determinants. Other things being equal, the inflation risk premium increases with the 
magnitude of nominal bond and money holdings, the extent of risk aversion, and the 
level of inflation risk. Moreover, in the model with indexed bonds, an increase in the 
share of indexed bonds (or, equivalently, a decrease in the share of nominal bonds) 
will lower the inflation risk premium. In the sensitivity analysis section of this 
chapter, the quantitative impacts o f these factors on inflation risk premia are 
investigated.
In order to calculate inflation risk premia in the OLG models, two extra equations are 
added to each of the three models -  one to calculate the inflation risk premium; and a 
second which defines the risk-free rate as in Equation (4.7). The inflation risk 
premium is then calculated as the unconditional mean from 5,000 simulations of 
1,000 periods that are solved to second-order using Dynare++. The calibration of the 
model and its other equations are unchanged and are not repeated here. The inflation 
risk premia results for each o f the models are reported in the next section, and the 
robustness of these baseline results is then investigated in the sensitivity analysis 
section that follows.
4.4 Simulation results
Table 4.1 reports the 30-year inflation risk premium under IT and PLT from the three 
OLG models: Model 1, which includes only nominal bonds (and money); Model 2 in 
which consumers can also invest in productive capital; and Model 3 in which indexed
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bonds are additionally introduced, and where the extent o f nominal indexation is 
determined endogenously in response to monetary policy.
Table 4.1 -  Inflation risk  prem ia
M odel IT PLT
(1) 41.0 1.4
(2) 20.9 0.7
(3) 5.8 0.5
Note: Figures are in basis points
The estimated inflation risk premium is positive in all three models. As predicted by 
the PLT literature, the inflation risk premium is somewhat lower under PLT than IT. 
Intuitively, long-term inflation risk is reduced by an order of magnitude under PLT, 
because it precludes base-level drift in the price level, hence preventing the 
accumulation of uncertainty over the bond holding horizon. The inflation risk 
premium is largest in Model (1) in which consumers hold only nominal assets. The 
reason is that consumers’ optimal holdings o f nominal bonds are high compared to the 
other two models, because they do not have the option o f investing in capital. As a 
result, consumers are somewhat more exposed to inflation risk than in the other two 
models, and require a much larger risk premium for holding nominal bonds.
The inflation risk premium under IT o f 41 basis points is non-trivial, but it should be 
borne in mind that this figure applies to the return over a 30-year horizon. Expressed 
in yearly terms (i.e. dividing by 30), this implies an inflation risk premium of around
1.5 basis points per annum. This estimate is similar to estimates of the 10-year risk 
premium on nominal bonds from ‘state o f the art’ New Keynesian DSGE models (see 
Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005),134 but 
notably the model does not rely upon consumption habits, which are known to
135 136amplify asset risk premia substantially (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999).
134 The risk (or term) prem ium  on nom inal bonds is equal to the inflation risk premium in M odel (1), 
since inflation variations are the on ly  source o f  risk.
135 The reason is that habit formation increases the curvature o f  consum er utility, making second-order 
effects o f  greater importance. For exam ple, under the m ost com m only  used specification o f  habits , the 
coefficient o f  relative risk aversion (evaluated at steady-state) is g iven  by <5/(1-fc) rather than <5, where 
0 < A < 1  is the habit persistence parameter on past aggregate consum ption in the utility function.
136 Similarly, Lungu and M inford (2 0 0 6 ) find that an O LG m odel can better match the ‘equity 
premium' without the need for habits in consum ption.
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By contrast, the inflation risk premium under PLT is close to zero at only 1.4 basis 
points over a 30-year horizon — around 30 times lower than under IT and equivalent to 
only 0.05 basis points in per annum terms. As mentioned above, PLT reduces the 
inflation risk premium substantially because it eliminates base-level drift, such that 
inflation uncertainty does not accumulate over the 30-year holding horizon for bonds. 
However, it was noted in Chapter 2 that the unconditional variance of inflation is 15 
times lower under PLT, rather than the ratio o f 30 suggested by the risk premium 
results. The reason for this difference is that what matters for the inflation risk 
premium is conditional volatility o f inflation -  see equations (A7) and (A8) in 
Appendix A — because bonds held from period / to /+1 must be priced at time t when 
they are purchased. This distinction is crucial under PLT because past shocks to 
inflation are offset in order to return the price level to its target path, yet this induced 
volatility will not affect the inflation risk premium directly, because these past shocks 
are known by young generations at the time that they purchase nominal bonds. A 
simple way to see this result analytically is to note that whilst conditional variance of 
inflation under IT is the same as the unconditional variance of 3 0 ^ , the conditional 
variance of inflation under PLT is only ef2 -  one-half of the unconditional variance of 
let2 and 30 times lower than under IT. This result accounts for the factor of 
approximately 30 by which the inflation risk premium is lower under PLT.
Adding capital into the model roughly halves the inflation risk premium in absolute 
terms to around 21 basis points, as can be seen from the second row of results in 
Table 4.1. This reduction occurs because consumers’ portfolios are diversified 
between both real and nominal assets, such that nominal bonds account for a smaller 
share than in Model (1), implying a reduction in consumption covariance risk -  a 
result that can be seen formally from the risk premium expression in Equation (A8) of 
Appendix A.137 Intuitively, the smaller are consumers’ holdings of a particular risky 
asset, the less risk they are exposed to, ceteris paribus , from variations in the return 
on that asset. That portfolio diversification drives the reduction the inflation risk 
premium is confirmed formally by the fact that simulating Model (2) without any
137 In particular, holdings o f  nom inal bonds fall. This reduction in nom inal bond holdings can be seen  
clearly from tables 2.3 and 2 .9  in Chapter 2.
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productivity risk (i.e. an innovation variance of zero) leaves the estimated inflation 
risk premium essentially unchanged.138
Introducing indexed bonds into the model with capital reduces the IT inflation risk 
premium substantially from around 21 to 6 basis points. This sharp reduction occurs 
for two reasons. First, and most simply, indexed bonds enable consumers to protect 
their savings against inflation risk better than nominal bonds and therefore reduce 
overall consumption risk in old age. Indeed, recall that since indexed bonds are a 
considerably better store o f value than nominal bonds under IT, the optimal 
indexation share is relatively high at 76 per cent. This has the effect of reducing the 
inflation risk premium substantially, since it means that only a relatively small portion 
of overall consumption variability arises due to the real payoff on nominal bonds 
fluctuating with inflation — a result which can be seen clearly from Equation (A7) by 
noting the impact o f the indexation share on the inflation risk premium. By contrast, 
the proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium under PLT is much smaller. 
The reasoning is that optimal indexation is relatively low in this case (26 per cent), 
such that a large proportion o f consumers’ bond portfolios remain directly exposed to 
inflation risk.
Second, under the baseline calibration, real returns on indexed and nominal bonds are 
slightly negatively correlated, because ‘biased’ inflation tends to overshoot ‘true’ 
inflation. As a result, consumption covariance risk can actually be hedged by holding 
indexed bonds. This has the effect o f directly reducing the inflation risk premium, as 
can be seen clearly from Equation (A7) in Appendix A. It is worth noting for 
comparative purposes that the ‘equity premium’ in models (2) and (3) is around 27 
basis points. Hence the IT inflation risk premium is non-trivial in relative terms at 
more than two-thirds o f the equity premium in the model with capital and nominal
139bonds, and more than one-fifth in the extended model with indexed bonds.
To summarise, the long-term inflation risk premium is economically non-trivial under 
IT due to base-level drift, but varies substantially depending on consumers’ asset
138 This result is also consistent w ith  Equation (A 8 ) in A ppendix A , because the productivity innovation 
variance does enter the expression  for the inflation risk premium.
139 The equity risk prem ium  w as m easured by the unconditional m ean differential between the expected  
return on capital and the risk-free real rate / .
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holdings and with the extent of direct exposure to inflation risk. The potential benefits 
from a reduction in inflation risk premium under PLT are therefore likely to be 
greatest in countries where pure nominal assets are o f most importance. For example, 
in countries like Germany where holdings of long-term nominal assets are an 
important source o f retirement income (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004; Garcia, 
2008), the inflation risk premium could be sizeable. On the other hand, in countries 
like the US and UK where holdings of indexed bonds are non-trivial and real assets 
play a more important role (OECD, 2009b), the inflation risk premium is likely to be 
lower.
Whilst the model is unlikely to provide an accurate estimate of the magnitude of 
inflation risk-premia — due to the ‘bond premium puzzle’ and the general inability of 
DSGE models to price risky assets plausibly -  the result that PLT leads to marked 
proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium is robust across all three models 
and should provide a more accurate estimate o f the implications of PLT.140 Indeed, 
PLT reduces the inflation risk premium by over 90 per cent in all three cases, with the 
largest reductions in the models without indexed bonds. The next section investigates 
the sensitivity of these results to key calibrated parameters and variances.
4.5 Sensitivity analysis
This section investigates sensitivity to the calibrated values of parameters which the 
analytical expressions derived in Appendix A suggest may play an important role for 
inflation risk premia. These parameters include the following: the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion S; the CIA coefficient 0 (which determines the size of money 
holdings); the money supply innovation variance (which determines the extent of 
inflation volatility); and, in the model with indexed bonds, the indexation share a. In 
all simulations, the tax rate on young consumers was adjusted to ensure that long run 
government spending target was met, and in the model with indexed bonds the
140 The argument here is that the m ain issue with pricing risky assets in a general equilibrium  
framework is that im plausibly high leve ls o f  risk aversion are necessary to match the data (e.g. Mehra 
and Prescott, 1985). H ow ever, since the inflation risk prem ium  depends on the covariance term co \{m , 
r'1), which based on a first-order approxim ation o f  tn around steady-state is equal to Scov(c, r”) (where 
c is future consum ption), taking the ratio o f  tw o risk premia effective ly  cancels out risk aversion.
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optimal indexation share was recalculated in each simulation in order to give a new 
optimal commitment Ramsey equilibrium.
Additionally, the impact o f changing the asset holding horizon is investigated at the 
end of this section in order to determine how much the inflation risk premium results 
vary with the term-to-maturity on nominal bonds. This is an important consideration 
given that nominal bonds are issued at various long-term maturities in practice, and 
also because long-term inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon under IT but 
is bounded under PLT.
4.5.1 Model (1): nominal bonds only 
Risk aversion and money holdings
Table 4.2 reports the inflation risk premium for various combinations of the 
coefficient 0 in the CLA constraint and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 6. The 
range of values considered matches that used in sensitivity analysis in Chapter 2.
Tab e 4.2 -  Inflation risk premia sensitivity to risk aversion and money holdings
Risk aversion 
coefficient 3
Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances 0 
0 = 0.01 <9 = 0.10 0 = 0.25
3 = 1.5 21.3 / 0.7 20.5 / 0.7 19.5 / 0.7
3 = 3 42.5 / 1.5 41.0 / 1.4 39.0 / 1.3
3 = 5 70.9 / 2.4 68.4 / 2.4 65.1 / 2.2
Notes: Entries on the left (right) refer to IT (PLT). Figures are in basis points.
As is to be expected, an increase in risk aversion raises the inflation risk premium, 
whilst a reduction in risk aversion lowers it. For instance, for the baseline calibration 
of 6, raising the coefficient o f relative risk aversion from 3 to 5 increases the IT risk 
premium by around two-thirds to 68.4 basis points, whilst the risk premium under 
PLT almost doubles but remains small at 2.4 basis points. For the lower risk aversion 
coefficient of 1.5, the inflation risk premium under IT is still non-trivial at 20.5 basis 
points, whilst under PLT it is rather small at 0.7 basis points. Intuitively, an increase 
in risk aversion means that consumers require greater risk compensation in 
equilibrium for holding nominal bonds o f given ‘riskiness’, whilst less compensation 
for inflation risk is necessary if  aversion to risk is lower.
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Changing the CIA coefficient 0, the share of consumption when young held as money 
balances, has relatively little impact on the inflation risk premium. With the baseline 
calibration of risk aversion, for example, the ‘high’ value of 0 o f 0.25 lowers the IT 
risk premium to 39 basis points, whilst the ‘low’ value o f 0.01 raises the risk premium 
slightly to 42.5 basis points. With regards to the PLT inflation risk premium, there is 
even less sensitivity at just 0.1 basis points either way. Intuitively, although an 
increase in 6 raises money holdings — which, ceteris paribus, will raise the inflation 
risk premium as can be seen from Equation (A8) — it also necessitates a reduction in 
nominal bond holdings, because young generations’ endowment incomes are fixed. 
There are thus two opposing forces on the inflation risk premium, with the result that 
its overall value remains relatively unchanged.
Nominal volatility
Table 4.3 reports sensitivity to the extent o f nominal volatility, as captured by the 
yearly money supply innovation variance. The same range of values is considered as 
in chapters 2 and 3. Hence sensitivity is tested to deviations of around one-quarter 
from the baseline money supply innovation standard deviation.
Table 4.3 -  Inflation risk premia sensitivity to nominal volatility
Money supply innovation variance
Low
var(£:,,)  = 0.87 x \0~* 
IT PLT 
24.5 0.8
Baseline
v a r ^ , , ) = 1.45 x 10^
IT PLT 
41.0 1.4
High
var(£,, ) = 2.19 x 10^ 
IT PLT 
61.1 2.1
Note: Figures are in basis points.
An increase (decrease) in the money supply innovation variance raises (lowers) the 
inflation risk premium, since it translates into an increase (decrease) in the level of 
long-term inflation risk. The results are fairly sensitive to changes in the money 
supply innovation variance, with the inflation risk premium increasing by around one- 
half in the high volatility case, and falling by almost one-half with the low volatility 
calibration. The result that the inflation risk premium is substantially lower under PLT 
is strongly robust, and it is notable that the ratio o f risk premia under IT and PLT —
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that is to say, the proportional change in the inflation risk premium — remains roughly 
constant across the high and low volatility calibrations.141
4.5.2 Model (2): nominal bonds and capital 
M o n e y  h o ld in g s  a n d  r is k  a v e r s io n
Table 4.4 examines the sensitivity o f the inflation risk premium to the coefficient 0 in 
the CIA constraint and the coefficient o f  relative risk aversion S in the model with 
nominal bonds and capital.
Table 4.4 -  Inflation risk premia sensitivity to risk aversion and money holdings
Coefficient of 
relative risk 
aversion <5
Proportion of consumption when young 
held as money balances 0 
9  = 0.01 <9 = 0.10 <9 = 0.25
<5 = 1.5
<5 = 3 
<5 = 5
11.0 / 0.4 10.4 / 0.4 9.6 / 0.3
22.1 / 0.8 20.9 / 0.7 19.3 / 0.7
36.8 / 1.3 34.8 / 1.2 32.1 / 1.1
Note: Entries on the left (right) refer to IT (PLT). Figures are in basis points.
As in the model with only nominal bonds, IT and PLT inflation risk premia are robust 
to changes in the CLA coefficient 0 but vary somewhat with the extent of risk 
aversion. With the baseline calibration for 9 , for example, raising the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion from 3 to 5 almost doubles the IT and PLT inflation risk premia 
to 34.8 basis points and 1.2 basis points respectively, whilst halving the baseline risk 
aversion coefficient roughly halves the magnitude o f inflation risk premia. The 
proportionate impact o f changes in risk aversion on inflation risk premia is similar to 
that in the model with only nominal bonds, since, as shown by the approximate 
expressions for the inflation risk premium in Appendix A, the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion acts as a ‘scale factor’ for all the uncertainty terms in the inflation risk 
premium.
141 The intuition for this second finding can be seen  from the expression for the inflation risk premium 
in Equation (A8): it is the ratio o f  inflation risk under PLT to that under IT that matters for the 
proportional change in the inflation risk prem ium, a ratio w hich does not change as the m oney supply 
innovation variance is varied.
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Nominal volatility
Table 4.5 investigates sensitivity o f inflation risk premia under IT and PLT to changes 
in the money supply innovation variance, which in turn determines the amount of 
inflation volatility in equilibrium.
Table 4.5 -  Inflation risk premia sensitivity to nominal volatility
Money supply innovation variance
Low
var(f,,) = 0 .8 7 x 1 0 ^  
IT PLT 
12.4 0.4
Baseline
var(£-,,) = 1.45x10^
IT PLT 
20.9 0.7
High
v a r^ , , ) = 2 .1 9 x l0 ^  
IT PLT 
31.0 1.1
Note: Figures are in basis points.
The inflation risk premium results are quite sensitive to the money supply innovation 
variance, though slightly less so than to changes in risk aversion (see Table 4.4). 
Raising the money supply innovation variance increases inflation volatility, and 
therefore increases the inflation risk premium under both IT and PLT. Lowering the 
money supply variance has the opposite effect. A policy implication suggested by 
these volatility sensitivity results -  and the similar results for the Model (1) -  is that 
the absolute size o f the reduction in the inflation risk premium attainable under PLT is 
likely to vary somewhat across countries with the extent of nominal volatility and the 
success of IT in keeping inflation variability at a low level.
4.5.3 Model (3): nominal bonds, indexed bonds and capital
Given that the inflation risk premium results show little sensitivity to the CIA 
constraint coefficient 0 in models (1) and (2), the sensitivity analysis in this section 
does not examine robustness with respect to this parameter. However, as in the 
sensitivity analysis of Chapter 3, the impact of holding indexation fixed under PLT is 
examined, as is the impact o f indexation being set at a relatively low level as in 
developed economies.
R isk  a v e rs io n
Table 4.6 reports the sensitivity of the IT and PLT inflation risk premia to the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion in Model (3).
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Table 4.6 -  Sensitivity to risk aversion
Coefficient of 
relative risk 
aversion
IT PLT
<5 = 1.5 2.8 0.3
<5 = 3 5.8 0.5
<5 = 5 8.9 0.9
Note: Figures are in basis points.
Although the inflation risk premium is somewhat more robust in absolute terms than 
in the other two models, the proportionate impact of changes in risk aversion is 
similar: halving the coefficient o f relative risk aversion to 1.5 roughly halves inflation 
risk premia compared to the baseline case, whilst an increase to 5 almost doubles their 
magnitude. It is notable also that the inflation risk premium under PLT remains at 
around one-tenth o f the IT value as the coefficient of relative risk aversion is varied 
between high and low values, consistent with the approximate expression reported in 
Equation (A7) of Appendix A. Therefore, the result that PLT leads to a sharp 
proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium is robust to changes in the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, despite the fact that inflation risk premia vary 
substantially in absolute terms.
N o m in a l v o la tili ty
The results in Table 4.7 report the impact o f changes in nominal volatility on inflation 
risk premia in the model with indexed bonds. In order to hold the relative importance 
of imperfections in indexation constant as nominal volatility was varied, the 
innovation variances for biased inflation and the indexation lag were changed in 
tandem, as in the sensitivity analysis conducted in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.12.3).
A
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Table 4.7 — Inflation risk premia sensitivity to nominal volatility
M oney supply innovation variance
Low
var(fJf) = 0 .8 7 x 1 0 ^  
IT PLT 
3.5 0.3
Baseline
var(£r<v) = 1.45x10-4
IT  PLT 
5.8 0.5
High
var(£\,) = 2.19X10-4 
IT PLT 
7.7 0.8
Note: Figures are in basis points.
The results are again quite sensitive to the extent of nominal volatility, though less so 
than to changes in risk aversion, and somewhat less so in absolute terms than in the 
first two models. This result arises due to the lower absolute magnitude of the 
inflation risk premium when consumers can hold indexed bonds and the extent of 
indexation is chosen optimally in response to monetary policy. For instance, in the 
high volatility case, the inflation risk premium under IT rises from 5.8 basis points to
7.7 basis points, whilst in the low volatility case it falls to 3.5 basis points. The 
inflation risk premium under PLT is somewhat more stable in absolute terms (though 
still rather variable in proportional terms), varying between 0.3 and 0.8 basis points in 
the low and high volatility cases, compared to the baseline estimate of 0.5 basis 
points.
Indexation and inflation risk prem ia
In this section, the model is solved under two alternative assumptions, namely, (i) that 
indexation is fixed under PLT at the IT optimum; and (ii) that the extent of indexation 
of government bonds is set at a low level as in developed economies (see e.g. 
Campbell et al. 2009). For (i) the model is simply solved for the inflation risk 
premium under PLT when the indexation share is equal to the baseline optimal IT 
share, whilst for (ii) inflation risk premia are computed under both IT and PLT when 
the degree of indexation is set at 21 per cent, the share of indexed bonds in UK 
government bond portfolio as o f March 2010 (DMO, 2010b). The results from these 
sensitivity tests are reported in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8 — Indexation and inflation risk premia
Indexation fixed 
at IT optimal
Optimal 
indexation 
(baseline case)
Indexation fixed 
at UK level
IT: 5.76 
PLT: 0.20
IT: 5.76 
PLT: 0.54
IT: 16.69 
PLT: 0.58
Notes: Figures are in basis points
When indexation is fixed under PLT at the optimal IT share of 76 per cent, the 
inflation risk premium is more than halved to 0.2 basis points, because consumers are 
largely protected against inflation variations if  they hold around three-quarters of their 
bond portfolios in indexed bonds. On the other hand, setting indexation at the UK 
share of 21 per cent has little impact on the inflation risk premium under PLT (since 
optimal indexation is anyhow 26 per cent), but raises the risk premium under IT 
substantially from 5.8 to 16.7 basis points. The reasoning here is that consumers are 
considerably more exposed to the high level of long-term inflation risk under IT if 
they hold almost hour-fifths o f their portfolios in nominal rather than indexed bonds.
Indeed, as is shown formally in Appendix A, a reduction in the share of indexed 
bonds in consumers’ portfolios (and hence an increase in the share of nominal bonds) 
will raise the inflation risk premium given that indexation bias is relatively small in 
the baseline model. Intuitively, the IT inflation risk premium of 16.7 basis points is 
roughly eight-tenths o f its Model (2) value of 20.9 basis points, consistent with 
consumers holding around 80 per cent o f their bond portfolio in nominal bonds. A key 
finding is thus that if indexation remains at its current low level in developed 
economies, the IT inflation risk premium is likely to be substantially higher than 
estimated by the optimal indexation case, implying an even larger proportional 
reduction under PLT.
4.5.4 Bond holding horizon
Finally, given the focus on long-term nominal bonds, it is instructive to consider how 
the holding horizon for bonds influences the inflation risk premia results. Indeed, in 
terms of comparing IT and PLT, the bond holding horizon is likely to be important 
because, theoretically, inflation risk increases with the forecast horizon under IT but is 
bounded under PLT. The baseline model assumed that each period lasts 30 years, but,
given that the models are of life-cycle saving, holding periods as long as 35 years or 
as short as 25 years are also plausible. This section investigates the impact of varying 
the bond holding horizon from 25 to 35 years in all three model specifications.
The resulting relationship between the holding period and inflation risk premia is 
effectively the term structure o f the inflation risk premium’, and is analysed in both 
the IT and PLT cases. As well as highlighting the degree of robustness of the baseline 
estimates, these results are useful from a practical policy perspective because they 
show the extent to which inflation risk premia are likely to vary with the term to 
maturity on government bonds. Knowing such information should be advantageous 
for governments that issue long-term nominal debt, and also for central banks who 
must consider how changes in short-term interest rates will impact upon longer-term 
rates.
In order to examine the impact o f changing the holding horizon captured in the model, 
the money supply rules, biased inflation and productivity were recalibrated for 
horizons of 25 to 35 years. Appendix B derives general expressions for an OLG 
model with a horizon o f N  years to demonstrate this process. In Table 4.9, the 
resulting inflation risk premia results are reported at each horizon in basis points, with 
graphical representations of the results given in Figure 4.1 for Model (1); Figure 4.2 
for Model (2); and Figure 4.3 for Model (3).
Table 4.9 -  Inflation risk premia and the bond holding horizon
Bond holding 
horizon (years)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
25 39.80 / 1.65 20.28 / 0.84 5.35 / 0.65
26 40.16 / 1.59 20.45 / 0.81 5.56 / 0.61
27 40.38 / 1.55 20.55 / 0.79 5.75 / 0.59
28 40.67 / 1.49 20.68 / 0.76 5.77 / 0.57
29 40.87 / 1.45 20.76 / 0.74 5.75 / 0.56
30 41.04 / 1.41 20.86 / 0.72 5.76 / 0.54
31 41.19 / 1.37 20.93 / 0.70 5.75 / 0.53
32 41.32 / 1.33 20.98 / 0.68 5.54 / 0.51
33 41.42 / 1.30 21.02 / 0.66 5.54 / 0.50
34 41.49 / 1.26 21.06 / 0.64 5.51 / 0.48
35 41.57 / 1.23 21.13 / 0.62 5.73 / 0.46
Note: Entries on the left (right) refer to IT (PLT). Figures are in basis points.
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In Model (1), the IT inflation risk premium increases non-trivially with the term to 
maturity because inflation volatility is proportional to the forecast horizon as a result 
of base-level drift (see Equation (B11)). Intuitively, the longer a nominal bond is held, 
the greater the accumulation of inflation risk over the life of the bond, because shocks 
to inflation are not offset but are instead treated as ‘bygones’. Formally, as the term to 
maturity increases from 25 to 35 years, the IT inflation risk premium rises by around
1.8 basis points, and at a decreasing rate with each additional year. By contrast, the 
inflation risk premium under PLT actually falls as the term to maturity increases, 
though the downward slope is fairly moderate, with an increase in the holding horizon 
from 25 to 35 years causing a drop o f only 0.42 basis points.
This contrast in results arises because there is no base-level drift under PLT (because 
past shocks to inflation are offset), such that inflation volatility does not increase with 
the forecast horizon, as can be seen clearly from Equation (B12). Taken alone, this 
result suggests a constant inflation risk premium. However, the inflation risk premium 
actually falls slightly, because the increase in the horizon captured by the model 
increases the long-term inflation target, which in turn reduces the expected real return 
on money balances. By Equation (4.11), this increase leads to a fall in the risk-free 
rate, which in turn lowers the inflation risk premium. It is important to note that whilst 
this downward pressure on the inflation risk premium is present under both IT and 
PLT, it is only sufficient to produce a downward-sloping term structure of the 
premium under the latter, since under IT the positive impact from increased inflation 
risk dominates.
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Figure 4.1 -  Inflation risk prem ia in Model (1)
As can be seen from  figures 4.2 and 4.3, sim ilar results arise in the models with 
capital and indexed bonds -  and for the sam e reasons -  though the m agnitude o f 
inflation risk prem ia varies considerably  across models. In M odel (2) where 
consumers can hold m oney, nom inal bonds and capital, the inflation risk prem ium  is 
approxim ately halved, as is the range across w hich the inflation risk prem ium  varies 
as the asset holding horizon  in the m odel is increased. U nder IT, the inflation risk 
premium increases from  20.3 basis points at a 2 5 -year horizon to 21.1 basis points at a 
35-year horizon, w hilst under PLT the inflation risk prem ium  falls slightly from 0.84 
to 0.62 basis points across the term  structure.
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Figure 4.2 -  Inflation risk prem ia in Model (2)
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In M odel (3) w here indexed bonds are also introduced, the inflation risk premium 
under IT is roughly one-six th  o f  its M odel (1) estim ate across the term structure, 
whilst under PLT it falls at a sim ilar rate to that in M odel (2) -  an intuitive result 
given that optim al indexation is robust at around 26 per cent as the holding horizon is 
increased. Interestingly, the inflation risk  prem ium  under IT actually falls slightly 
after the 30-year horizon, though it still increases overall across the term structure.142 
There are two distinct factors driv ing this result.
Firstly, because consum ers hold the m ajority  o f  their bond portfolio in indexed bonds, 
they have better protection than in the o ther tw o m odels against the increasing level o f  
inflation risk as the bond holding horizon  is raised, and therefore require less o f  risk 
premium in com pensation. This first po int accounts for the slow er rate o f  increase o f 
the inflation risk prem ium  as the term  to m aturity  is increased from the starting point 
o f 25 years. Secondly, after the baseline holding horizon o f 30 years, optimal 
indexation increases slightly  above the baseline o f  76 per cent, because inflation risk 
is sufficiently high that it becom es optim al for consum ers to hold more indexed 
bonds, given that they provide relatively  better protection against inflation variations.
142 There are ‘kinks’ in Figure 4.3 because the optimal indexation share is solved to the nearest whole 
number.
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This increase in optim al indexation (w hen com bined with the negative impact on the 
risk-free rate from an increase in the long-term  inflation target) is sufficient to ensure 
that the inflation risk prem ium  starts to fall after the 30-year horizon.
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Figure 4.3 -  Inflation risk prem ia in Model (3)
In summary, a robust conclusion across m odels is that the term structure o f  the 
inflation risk prem ium  is upw ard-sloping under IT and slightly downward-sloping 
under PLT, though in neither case is the effect particularly strong. There is also 
robustness in the sense that, in proportional term s, IT and PLT inflation risk premia 
fall roughly in tandem  across the three m odels. In order to demonstrate this point 
formally, Figure 4.4 plots the percentage reduction in the inflation risk premium under 
PLT as the asset holding horizon is varied in all three models.
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Figure 4.4 -  Percentage reduction in the risk premium under PLT
The percentage change in the inflation risk prem ium  is fairly robust in all three 
models as the bond holding horizon is varied. Indeed, in all three models and for all 
maturities tested, PLT reduces the inflation risk premium by 88 per cent or more, with 
the exact percentage reduction increasing with the bond holding horizon. In models 
(1) and (2), the percentage reduction in the inflation risk premium is greater than 95 
per cent at all maturities, and Figure 4.4 shows that the percentage reductions in 
inflation risk premia are essentially identical for both o f  these models.
In Model (3), the proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium is slightly lower 
at between 88 and 92 per cent across the term structure. Intuitively, as shown by 
Equation (A7), the inflation risk prem ium  in this case depends on the indexation 
share, which differs substantially betw een the IT and PLT cases given that consumers 
hold more indexed bonds and fewer nom inal bonds to insure their savings against the 
high level o f inflation risk under IT. Thus it is the endogenous response o f  nominal 
indexation to m onetary policy that accounts for lower proportional reduction in the 
inflation risk prem ium  in the m odel w ith indexed bonds. Nevertheless, the results are 
robust across all three m odels and indicate a substantial proportional reduction in the 
inflation risk premium under PLT at long-term  bond maturities.
Therefore, whilst the analysis in this chapter is unlikely to provide an accurate 
estimate o f the level o f  risk prem ia under IT and PLT (an issue with DSGE models in 
general), it does give the clear-cut and m ore reliable conclusion that PLT will lead to 
a substantial proportional reduction  in the inflation risk premium, thus offering
2 2 0
formal support to reasoned but speculative arguments put forward in the PLT 
literature. This robust result complements the other sensitivity tests, which similarly 
indicated a marked reduction in the inflation risk premium under PLT for a wide 
variety of alternative model calibrations.
4.6 Conclusions and policy implications
In this chapter, the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds has been estimated using 
the three versions o f the OLG model investigated in chapters 2 and 3. Following up 
arguments made in the monetary policy literature, the goal was to quantify the impact 
of PLT on the long-term inflation risk premium within a DSGE framework. A key 
result is that, consistent with predictions from the literature, PLT leads to a substantial 
reduction in the inflation risk premium compared to IT. Intuitively, this result arises 
because PLT reduces long-term inflation volatility by an order of magnitude 
compared to IT.
Inflation risk premia vary considerably in absolute value across the three models, 
because consumers’ exposure to inflation risk depends crucially on the assets that they 
hold in their portfolios. Consequently, the level of inflation risk premia is likely to 
vary somewhat across countries, and also over time if indexed bonds continue to 
become more prominent. Under IT, baseline estimates of the inflation risk premium 
ranged from 41 basis points in Model (1) to only 6 basis points in Model (3), but 
under PLT there was somewhat less variation from 1.5 to 0.5 basis points. In terms of 
matching the absolute level o f risk-premia in the data, the models are comparable to 
‘state of the art’ New Keynesian models but notably do not rely upon the presence of 
habit formation in consumption.
Given that DSGE models give rise to asset risk premia an order of magnitude lower 
than in the data for empirically plausible calibrations (e.g. Rudebusch and Swanson 
2008; Cochrane 2001), it is important not to place too much confidence in the 
magnitudes of the estimated inflation risk premia from the models. However, in order 
to address this shortcoming, the analysis in this chapter also focused also on the 
proportional change in the inflation risk premium — the argument being that even if 
risk premia are too low in levels there is no good reason to think that the relative size 
across IT and PLT should also be inaccurate. Indeed, the asset pricing ‘puzzles’
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identified in the literature arise primarily because risk aversion calibrations necessary 
to match premia in the data are empirically implausible and worsen the performance 
of DSGE models in terms o f matching other stylised macroeconomic facts (see 
Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008), yet looking at the relative size of risk premia 
‘cancels out’ the effect o f risk aversion and therefore plausibly offers more reliable 
results.
A robust conclusion is that PLT leads to marked proportional reduction in the 
inflation risk premium compared to IT -  typically over 90 per cent -  a result which is 
robust to changes in key parameters, and also to variations in the asset holding 
horizon in the model. As we might expect, PLT leads to a greater proportional 
reduction in the inflation risk premium in models (1) and (2) where indexed bonds are 
absent. The reason is simply that consumers are unable to protect themselves against 
the relatively high level of long-term inflation risk under IT, and therefore require a 
larger risk premium as compensation for holding nominal bonds. The potential 
benefits from PLT arising from a reduction in the inflation risk premium are therefore 
likely to be largest in countries like Germany where nominal assets play a major role 
and indexed bonds a relatively minor one (see Garcia, 2008). Correspondingly, the 
potential benefits are likely to be somewhat smaller in countries likely the UK and US 
where indexed government bonds account for a non-trivial share in government bond 
portfolios and real assets play an important role (OECD, 2009a; Campbell et al. 
2009).
Finally, it should be noted that although the analysis in this chapter has focused on the 
inflation risk premium on nominal bonds issued by the government, it does not follow 
that the results hold no useful policy implications for public sector pensions. For 
instance, the result that the inflation risk premium is substantially lower under PLT 
implies that, other things being equal, risk-averse consumers would be willing to save 
more in nominal pensions under PLT than IT. This is a potentially important 
consideration given that savings rates are low in many developed economies and the 
affordability of public sector pensions is a major public policy issue.
i
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Appendix A: Factors affecting the inflation risk premium — an approximation
From Equation (4.12) of the main text, the inflation risk premium is given by
where M Ut Y -  ctj  the marginal utility o f consumption in youth.
The covariance term in Equation (A2) is analytically intractable due to the strong non- 
linearity of marginal utility in old age. However, taking a first-order Taylor expansion
Using this expression, the factors driving the inflation risk premium can be identified 
analytically. An expression is first derived for Model (3), the most general case. 
Analogous expressions for the other two models are then derived straightforwardly as 
special cases.
143 N ote that using a first-order accurate expression for marginal utility is sufficient to get a second- 
order accurate expression for the covariance term. See e.g . D evereux and Sutherland (2011).
(A l) r  cov, \m,
where = c;flx>/c ; ‘  and r /  is defined by Equation (4.7).
Equation (A l) can therefore be expressed in the following form:
(A2) cov, c,
around the time-/ expected value o f consumption gives the following:143
(A3)
Using Equation (A3) in (A2) gives
(A4) irP,,oLG ~  s i r!  ! M U ,*  )  c o v , (c )
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General model with indexed bonds
Recall that consumption by old generations in this model is given
(A5) W  = A .x K  + « ,  + (i ■- * K ,  )b;d + r m md^  r t+ \ r r ,t
where bf = b 'J + b" J is the total demand for bonds.
Equation (A4) is therefore equal to
(A6) irP,,oLc ~ S ( r j  /M U  r ) x a co v , ( r i i . C , )bf + (1 -  a) var, )b‘
l^+co
d \
where the fact that cov, , AM ) = 0 has been used.144
Using the definitions for r" and t'm we can write this expression as follows:
(A7) irPi.oui = 8 ( r f  / M U l Y ) x
aR, cov, (!•;,,, 1 /(I + n M ))*;' ^
v+ (r , m f + R f (1 -  a)bf jvar, (1 /(I + ))
Equation (A7) shows that the inflation risk premium depends positively on: (i) the 
extent of risk aversion (as measured by <5); (ii) the volatility of inflation; and (iii) the 
covariance between indexed bond returns and the inverse (gross) rate of inflation.145
Moreover, since real returns on indexed and nominal bonds are weakly negatively 
correlated under the baseline calibration and Rt >1, it follows that a rise in nominal 
bond holdings relative to indexed bond holdings (a fall in the indexation share a) will
144 This result fo llow s because m oney supply innovations and productivity innovations are 
uncorrelated, w hich in turn m eans capital is a perfect hedge against inflation (see the discussion in 
Chapter 2).
145 If indexed bonds returns are negatively  correlated with the real return on nominal bonds, then the 
first covariance term in brackets w ill be negative and w ill therefore reduce the inflation risk premium. 
The sign o f  the correlation depends upon the properties o f  the biased measure o f  inflation used for 
indexation. It is negative under the baseline calibration because ‘b iased’ inflation tends to overshoot 
‘true’ inflation due to its higher variance.
raise the inflation risk premium.146 Moreover, an increase in money holdings will 
increase the inflation risk premium, ceteris paribus.
Models without indexed bonds
To derive an expression for the inflation risk premium in the models without indexed 
bonds -  models (1) and (2) -  we can simply set a = 0 in Equation (A7). Since in this 
case bd = bnd , we arrive at the following expression for the inflation risk premium:
(A8) irp, ow  = 8 (r [  / MU, +«,m ,‘')v a r,(l/(l + ^ l ))
Hence both money and nominal bond holdings increase the inflation risk premium, 
ceteris paribus.
146 A negative correlation is not necessary for this result: it w ill hold in general provided that indexation 
is not strongly im perfect. Indeed, so long as co \(r>, (1 +  i t ) 1) <  var((l + n) ), a reduction in the 
indexation share w ill increase the inflation risk prem ium  because R ( > \.
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Appendix B: Model calibration when the bond holding horizon is TV years
B l. Money supply rules 
Inflation targeting (IT)
Recall from Chapter 2 that the yearly nominal money supply rule under IT is given by
(Bl) In M'.'it = In M ^[T + n  + s t, + In ci Y -  In cM Y
where k is the yearly inflation target and e, is the yearly money supply innovation, a 
serially-uncorrelated random variable drawn from an TV(0, a2) distribution.
In order to derive an TV-year money supply rule from this specification, we can 
substitute repeatedly for the lagged money supply. Doing so implies that the TV-year 
horizon money supply rule is as follows:
N - \
(B2) In A// = In M S_N + TV x n  + ^  e ._y + In ci Y -  In ct_N J
j =0
where TVtt is the TV-year inflation target.
Hence, if each period t in the model lasts TV years, the IT money supply rule in any
period t can be represented as follows:
N
(B3) \a (M ’ IT / = N x t i  + ^ e tJ + In(c ,Y / c,_l r )
i=1
where the money supply innovations have been indexed from years 1 to TV and the 
time subscript indicates that all TV innovations belong to period /.
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Price-level targeting (PLT)
The yearly money supply rule under PLT can be written in the following form:
(B4) In M']'PLT = hi M sr PLT + n  + e. -  £ ._ x + In ci Y -  In cM Y
where n is the yearly inflation target consistent with the target price path, and e, is a
serially-uncorrelated money supply innovation drawn from an N(0, a2) distribution.
Substituting repeatedly for the lagged money supply term on the right hand side gives 
the following relationship between the money supply in year / and N  years earlier:
(B5) In M .'plt = In M sr p^ T +N'*7c + £i -  £t_N + In ciY -  In ct_NJ
Therefore, if each period t in the model lasts N  years, the PLT money supply rule in
any given period t is as follows:
(B6) ln( M f LT / M st 'PLT ) = N x n :  + s Nt -  e Njt_x + In (ctY / ct_lY )
where the money supply innovations have been indexed to reflect the year in which 
they occur, and the t subscript indicates the period to which the innovations belong.
Table Bl reports the calibrated long-term inflation target in the N-year models based 
upon the baseline yearly inflation target o f 2.5 per cent (i.e. k = 0.025). As discussed 
in the main text, integer values o f N  from 25 to 35 years are considered.
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Table B l — The inflation target and the bond holding horizon
Horizon N  (years) 1 Long-term inflation target
25 0.625
26 0.650
27 0.675
28 0.700
29 0.725
30 0.750
31 0.775
32 0.800
33 0.825
34 0.850
35 0.875
B2. Inflation
Recall that the CIA constraint in the model implies that 
(B7) M f  = 6PtctY
where M? = P i s  money demand in nominal terms.
Taking logs o f Equation (B7) implies that the (30-year) growth rate of money demand 
is given by
(B8) In M f  -  In M f x = n t + In ct Y -  In ct_l Y
where n, * In Pt -  In Pt_x.
Imposing money market equilibrium in equations (B3) and (B6) therefore gives the 
following expressions for inflation under IT and PLT:
Inflation targeting
N
(B9) n',T = Wx *  + Z X 'z'=l
Price-level targeting
(BIO) x ™  = N * t t  + £ Nj -
where e,., is the money supply innovation in year i o f period t.
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It follows that the inflation variances under IT and PLT are given by
(B11) var(;r,/r ) = Ncr2
(B 12) YaK7r PLT) = 2 o .2
B3. Biased inflation
In the model with endogenous nominal indexation, indexed bonds are linked to a 
biased measure of inflation that is assumed to follow the same functional form as true 
inflation. As such, the IT and PLT stochastic processes for biased inflation will 
change in accordance with true inflation as follows:
(B13)
n™dJT = N x x  + ' j r £ ‘n?
;=1
.in d ,PLT . ind „  indn] = N x x  + e lN- - s Nj_,
under IT
under PLT
where ~ A (^o, crf^ ) is the biased inflation innovation in year i of period
As under the baseline calibration, yearly innovations to true and biased inflation are 
assumed to be positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.89.
B4. Productivity
Recall that productivity in the model is built up from an AR(1) process for log 
productivity at a quarterly horizon q,
(B14) \n A t = ( l - p , ) l n ^ , , TOO„ + P , l n ^ _ 1+ e , 0 < Pq < 1
where eq is an IID-Normal productivity innovation with mean zero and variance <j2q .
Hence, substituting repeatedly for lagged productivity, productivity over an N -year 
horizon is given by
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A
4N-\
(BIS) In A, = (1 -  p - ) 1„ Aq _  + p ^ iaAq_AN + ^
j=  0
If each period t in the model lasts N  years, then Equation (B15) can be written in the 
following form:
(B16) In At = (1 -  p )  In Amean + p in  At_x + e,
4-JV—1
where \nA mecm = (I - p q» )\n  Aq mean/(I - p ) , p  = p™  and e, -  .
j=o
It follows that the variance o f the innovation to productivity is given by 
(B17) var(e ) = - P » } »
X~ P \
This expression is used to calibrate the innovation variance for productivity in the 
models with Af-year horizons. The autoregressive parameter p is also recalibrated 
accordingly. Based on the original baseline calibrated values of pq = 0.996 and oq = 
0.005, Table B2 reports the calibrated autoregressive coefficients and innovation 
variances in the N-year models as N  is varied from 25 to 35 years.
Table B2 -  The calibration of productivity and the bond holding horizon
Horizon N  (years) P Oe
25 0.670 0.0416
26 0.659 0.0420
27 0.649 0.0426
28 0.638 0.0431
29 0.628 0.0435
30 0.618 0.0440
31 0.608 0.0444
32 0.599 0.0448
33 0.589 0.0452
34 0.580 0.0456
35 0.571 0.0460
M
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Chapter 5
Quantifying the long-term benefits of price-level targeting:
A summary comparison across models
5.1 Introduction
This short chapter summarises the long-term benefits from price-level targeting (PLT) 
estimated in the second, third and fourth chapters, and discusses policy implications 
arising from these results. Robustness of results is also discussed, including the 
importance of the different model specifications given the presence of heterogeneities 
across countries and over time. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing some 
topics for future research and by putting in context the contributions of the thesis to 
the monetary policy literature.
5.2 Social welfare and consumption risk
Chapters 2 and 3 considered three different versions of a monetary overlapping 
generations (OLG) model in which young consumers save for old age using long-term 
government bonds. The first was an endowment economy in which only nominal 
government bonds were issued and consumers had no access to real assets; the second 
relaxed the nominal assets assumption by allowing consumers to also hold productive 
but risky capital; and the third model extended the second to include (imperfectly-) 
indexed government bonds, with the equilibrium degree of bond indexation chosen in 
response to monetary policy as part o f an optimal commitment Ramsey policy. All 
three models were solved using a second-order perturbation method in order to 
capture asset risk-premia and obtain reliable social welfare rankings of IT and PLT.
In chapters 2 and 3, the analysis focused primarily on the long-term welfare gain from 
switching from IT to PLT and on the impact on consumption risk faced by old 
generations -  the dimension along which PLT had its main impact. The models were 
roughly calibrated to UK data based on the assumption that long-term bonds in the 
model correspond to public sector pensions and long-dated government bonds, and 
capital to private sector pensions. The results are, however, intended be relevant for 
developed economies in general, including Canada whose central bank is currently 
conducting a review of price-level targeting in anticipation of the renewal of its policy 
agreement with the Government in 2011 (see Bank o f Canada, 2006).
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Table 5.1 summarises the results obtained in the second and third chapters and 
focuses on three key areas: the consumption equivalent welfare gain X; the robustness 
of the welfare gain in sensitivity analysis (based upon the highest and lowest 
estimates); and the estimated baseline reduction in consumption risk for old 
generations. Model (1) denotes the first and simplest OLG model with only nominal 
government bonds, Model (2) is the OLG model with nominal bonds and capital, and 
Model (3) is the model with indexed and nominal government bonds, capital, and 
endogenous nominal indexation.
Table 5.1 -  The social w elfare and volatility impacts of PLT
M easure Model
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
X (in % terms) 0 . 1 0 3 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 1 0
Risk aversion 
sensitivity 
(Low, Hign)
(0.052, 0.173) (0.012, 0.044) (0.006, 0.014)
Nominal volatility 
sensitivity 
(Low, Hign)
(0.062, 0.154) (0.015, 0.039) (0.007, 0.012)
Reduction in
var{ctQ) 9 6 . 4 % 3 9 . 4 % 1 3 . 1 %
Notes: Model (1) = nominal bonds; Model (2) = nominal bonds + capital;
Model (3) = nominal bonds + capital + indexed bonds. ‘Low’ denotes the lowest 
value of the welfare gain obtained in sensitivity analysis; ‘High’ is the largest.
The estimated welfare gain from PLT was positive in all three models but varies 
substantially across the different specifications. The reasoning behind a positive 
welfare gain from PLT is simple and runs as follows. Long-term inflation risk is 
substantial under IT because o f base-level drift: even if the central bank misses its 
inflation target by only a small percentage in each year, these misses can accumulate 
and become quite large after 30 years. The substantial level of long-term inflation risk 
translates into a high level of consumption volatility for old generations because 
consumers hold government bonds and money — nominal assets that offer less than 
perfect insurance against inflation fluctuations. Under PLT, however, the price level is 
returned to its target path following inflationary shocks, such that the price level is 
trend-stationary. As a result, past deviations from the inflation target do not
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accumulate over the long-term and inflation risk is reduced by an order of magnitude. 
PLT therefore stabilises old generations’ consumption more effectively than IT, 
which in turn increases social welfare given that consumers are risk-averse.
Importantly for these results, the government, the monopoly issuer of bonds and 
money, is required to meet a long run government spending target. This constraint 
means that social welfare is effectively maximised by minimising consumption risk 
across young and old generations. In particular, since there is little to choose between 
IT and PLT in terms o f consumption volatility across young generations, the social 
welfare gain from PLT depends crucially on the extent to which it is able to lower 
consumption volatility across old generations through reducing long-term inflation 
risk. In effect, the three different versions of the model investigate the impact of PLT 
on social welfare and consumption risk as the composition of consumers’ savings 
portfolios is altered. It is important to note that the welfare gains reported in Table 5.1 
are permanent in the sense that they apply to all current and future generations.
The estimated welfare gain varies substantially across models because changing the 
composition of consumers’ asset portfolios alters exposure to risk and enables 
consumers to diversify or hedge risk to a greater or lesser extent. The model with 
nominal bonds produced the largest welfare gain at 0.103 per cent of aggregate 
consumption, or approximately 0.08 per cent of GDP. In monetary terms, the 
aggregate gain is £899.1 million, which is equal to £31.03 per working member of the 
population aged 16 years and over, or £107.04 per pensioner based on current UK 
data. The welfare gain is largest in this case since consumers hold only nominal bonds 
and money, so that inflation volatility is the only source of consumption risk. Thus 
consumption risk in old age is reduced dramatically under PLT (a reduction of 95 per 
cent), in tandem with the marked reduction in inflation risk over the saving horizon 
from youth to old age. The welfare gain was rather sensitive in Model (1), ranging 
from 0.052 to 0.173 per cent as the coefficient of relative risk aversion was varied 
from 1.5 to 5, and from 0.062 to 0.154 per cent as the extent of nominal volatility was 
varied from the baseline standard deviation by around one quarter.
Once capital is added into the model, the baseline welfare gain from PLT falls by 
almost three-quarters to 0.026 per cent of aggregate consumption, or approximately
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0.020 per cent o f GDP. Based on UK data, this increase in consumption implies an 
aggregate 8ain o f £227 million, or £4.59 per employed member of the population and 
£27.02 per pensioner. There are two factors driving the substantial reduction in the 
welfare gain. Firstly, consumers’ optimal holdings of capital are non-trivial, such that 
the importance o f nominal assets in consumers’ portfolios is reduced. Secondly, 
capital is itself a risky real asset (because productivity is stochastic) and is therefore a 
source of consumption risk that is not affected by a change in monetary policy regime 
from IT to PLT. Consequently, introducing capital means that a substantial fraction of 
total consumption risk for old generations is not affected by PLT. The impact of these 
two factors is clearly illustrated by the lower reduction in consumption volatility 
across old generations o f 40 per cent, as compared to 95 per cent in the model without 
capital. Notably, the welfare gain remains sensitive to risk aversion and extent of 
nominal volatility, though less so than in the model only nominal bonds. Specifically, 
the welfare gain varies from 0.012 to 0.044 per cent as the risk aversion coefficient is 
changed from 1.5 to 5, and from 0.015 to 0.039 per cent as nominal volatility is varied 
around its baseline by one quarter.
Finally, introducing indexed bonds into the model with capital lowers the estimated 
welfare gain from PLT even further. The estimated baseline welfare gain in Model (3) 
was only 0.010 per cent o f aggregate consumption, or 0.008 per cent of GDP -  
roughly one-tenth o f the estimate in the model with only nominal bonds. Based on 
current UK data, the potential gain in welfare is equal to £90.7 million, a gain per 
employed member o f the UK population of £3.13, or £10.80 per pensioner. These 
gains appear borderline trivial, but it should be noted that they apply, in principle, to 
all current and future generations, and that the level of consumption on which these 
gains are calculated should grow over time. The welfare gain from PLT is reduced 
further because with indexed bonds consumers can largely protect their savings 
against long-term inflation risk. In other words, indexed bonds act as a ‘substitute for 
PLT’ by insuring old generations’ consumption against the high level of inflation risk 
under IT.
5.3 Optimal indexation
In terms of optimal indexation, the results are consistent with the literature that has 
investigated the relationship between monetary policy and optimal indexation of wage
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and financial contracts (Meh et al. 2008b; Amano et al. 2007; Minford and Peel, 
2003). Indeed, optimal indexation is substantially lower under PLT than IT, and 
ignoring this reduction understates the potential welfare gain from PLT. Under the 
baseline calibration, optimal indexation was 76 per cent under IT compared to only 26 
per cent under PLT. Importantly, the imposed constraint that the government achieve 
a long run target level of government spending means that optimal indexation is 
approximately independent o f expected bond returns. For instance, a higher expected 
return on nominal bonds than indexed bonds (due, for example, to a greater risk 
premium) translates into higher average consumption by the old but also a higher 
average cost of issuing nominal government debt, such that young generations must 
be taxed more heavily to make up the shortfall. Provided risk aversion is not very 
strong, the consumption gain to old generations will approximately offset the loss to 
young generations, leaving average aggregate consumption and social welfare 
unchanged to first-order. With social welfare unaffected by expected bond returns, 
indexation should be chosen to minimise consumption volatility, since this has a 
negative second-order impact on social welfare. Hence the government’s optimal 
indexation Ramsey problem effectively amounts to choosing the mix of bonds that 
will minimise the long run level o f consumption risk faced by bondholders.
Optimal indexation is relatively high under IT because long-term inflation risk is 
substantial due to base level drift, making nominal bonds a poor store of value 
compared to indexed bonds, given that the latter provide excellent (though imperfect) 
protection against inflation risk. Under PLT, however, long-term inflation risk is 
reduced by an order o f magnitude and comparable to that at a yearly horizon. As a 
result, there is less need for consumers to protect their savings against inflation risk, 
whilst at the same time the imperfections of indexed bonds become a relatively more 
important source o f risk. The net result o f these two effects is that nominal bonds 
become a better store o f value than indexed bonds under PLT, such that optimal 
indexation gives nominal bonds a majority share in the government bond portfolio. 
Most of the reduction in optimal indexation under PLT is due to the ‘indexation lag’ 
and not ‘indexation bias’, because the indexation lag of 8 months is a non-trivial 
source of return volatility given that long-term inflation risk under PLT is so low by 
comparison to the IT case.
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Moreover, the finding that optimal indexation is substantially lower under PLT is 
robust to changes in key model parameters and shock volatilities, though it should be 
noted that optimal indexation under IT is somewhat higher than current levels in 
developed economies. This result implies that the current potential welfare (and 
volatility) gains from PLT may be understated by the baseline results for Model (3). 
As well as having important implications for social welfare, the extent of indexation is 
also important for the inflation risk premium on nominal bonds. The reasoning here is 
that the extent o f risk exposure from holding an asset depends on the relative holdings 
of that asset in consumer portfolios, as well as on the level of risk associated with its 
payoff and consumer aversion to that risk. That is to say, a risky asset that is 
prominent in consumer portfolios will be a more important factor for overall 
consumption risk than an asset that is equally risky but with a small portfolio share.
5.4 Inflation risk premia
It has been argued in the literature that inflation risk premia are an important 
consideration for monetary policymakers because they affect longer-term interest 
rates and therefore the cost o f issuing government debt and the ‘price’ of long-term 
investments. In the context o f the IT versus PLT debate, a number of economists have 
argued that there would be a substantial reduction in the long-term inflation risk 
premium under PLT, and that this would lead to an increase in investment and 
economic growth (e.g. Crawford et al. 2009; Lilico, 2000). Moreover, by reducing the 
average cost o f issuing long-term nominal government debt, a reduction in the 
inflation risk premium would enable governments to increase spending for a given 
level of taxes, or to reduce taxes (and related distortions) for a given level of 
expenditure.
Using the three models introduced in Chapters 2 and 3, long-term inflation risk 
premia were computed in Chapter 4 to investigate whether and PLT leads to a marked 
reduction relative to IT as hypothesised in the literature. The main results are 
summarised in Table 5.2. A key finding which is robust across model specifications is 
that PLT leads to a reduction in the inflation risk premium of more than 90 per cent, 
with the reduction being more than 95 per cent in models (1) and (2) where 
consumers cannot hold indexed bonds. The result that PLT leads to a substantial
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proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium is also robust to variations in risk 
aversion, nominal volatility, and the bond holding horizon.
Intuitively, PLT leads to a substantial reduction in the inflation risk premium because 
long-term inflation risk is reduced by an order of magnitude relative to IT due to the 
absence of base-level drift. As such, risk-averse holders of long-term nominal bonds 
are exposed to less consumption risk and require less of a ‘risk premium’ in 
compensation than under IT. The inflation risk premium is reduced less strongly in 
proportional terms in the model with indexed bonds because the extent of indexation 
is chosen optimally in response to monetary policy. Indeed, as noted above, there is 
strong substitution towards indexed bonds under IT but somewhat less under PLT, 
because indexed bonds are an excellent store of value compared to nominal bonds if  
the level of long-term inflation risk is high. The net result of this substitution to 
indexed bonds under IT is that consumers’ exposure to risk from holding nominal 
bonds falls dramatically, which in turn reduces the inflation risk premium somewhat.
Table 5.2 -  Inflation risk premia under IT and PLT
Measure Model
(1)
IT PLT
(2)
IT PLT
(3)
IT PLT
Inflation risk premium 41.0 1.4 20.9 0.7 5.8 0.5
Risk aversion 
sensitivity 
(Low, High)
(21,68) (0.7,2.4) (10,35) (0.4,1.2) (3,9) (0.3,0.9)
Nominal volatility 
sensitivity 
(Low, High)
(25,61) (0.8,2.1) (12,31) (0.4,1.1) (4,8) (0.3,0.8)
Holding horizon 
sensitivity 
(Low, High)
(40,42) (1.2,1.7) (20,21) (0.6,0.8) (5.4-5.7) (0.5,0.7)
Baseline reduction 
under PLT 96.6% 96.7% 91.4%
Notes: Results are in basis points over a 30-year horizon and are rounded to the nearest 
basis point under IT (except for a single entry in the table). ‘Low’ denotes the lowest 
value of the risk premium obtained in sensitivity analysis; ‘High’ is the largest.
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Although the proportional reduction in the inflation risk premium is robust across 
model specifications and to changes in key parameters, the absolute size of inflation 
risk premia varies substantially, as does the absolute reduction attained under PLT. 
Most notably, there is considerable variation with respect to the extent of risk aversion 
and the level of nominal volatility, particularly in the first two models. For example, 
in Model (2) the inflation risk premium under IT varies from 10 basis points with a 
risk aversion coefficient o f 1.5 to 35 basis points with a coefficient of 5, whilst 
varying nominal volatility around the baseline by one-quarter gives a similar range of 
12 to 31 basis points.
A striking result in Table 5.1 is that estimated inflation risk premia fall sharply as we 
move from Model (1) to Model (3) -  that is, as the importance of inflation-hedging 
assets in consumers’ portfolios is increased by giving them access to indexed bonds 
and capital. This is especially true under IT where the inflation risk premium is much 
higher. For example, under IT the baseline inflation risk premium over a 30-year 
horizon is 41 basis points in Model (1), compared to only 6 in Model (3). The 
intuition for the inflation risk premium falling sharply is that, in the model with only 
nominal assets, consumers are unable to protect themselves against the relatively high 
level of long-term inflation risk under IT and therefore require a large risk premium as 
compensation for holding nominal government bonds.
Introducing capital as in Model (2) causes optimising consumers to hold both capital 
and bonds in their portfolios, such that consumption covariance risk associated with 
holding nominal bonds is reduced in tandem with their share in consumers’ portfolios. 
Similarly, adding indexed bonds as in Model (3) enables consumers to directly protect 
their wealth against inflation variations whist not being exposed to substantial real 
risk (from productivity), with the result that fewer nominal bonds are (optimally) held, 
which reduces the inflation risk premium even further. Substitution from nominal to 
indexed bonds is particularly marked under IT because consumers have more gain by 
protecting themselves against the high level of long-term inflation risk. On the other 
hand, such risk is sufficiently low under PLT that issuing only nominal government 
bonds is not strongly sub-optimal from a social welfare perspective.
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5.5 Policy implications
A key finding from Table 5.1 is that the long-term welfare and volatility gains to be 
had from PLT vary substantially across models. This finding is cmcial since the ‘best 
model for any particular country is likely to vary depending upon which assets are 
most important in the provision o f retirement income.
For instance, in the case of the UK and US, private sector pensions play an important 
role (OECD, 2009b); indexed government bonds account for a non-trivial share of 
government bonds; and public sector pensions are indexed once in payment. 
Therefore, the model with capital and indexed and nominal bonds is likely to be most 
applicable, suggesting a small potential welfare gain from switching to PLT. On the 
other hand, public sector pensions account for around 85 per cent of retirement 
income in Germany (Berkel and Borsch-Supan, 2004, Borsch-Supan, 2000) and the 
market for indexed bonds is extremely small (Garcia, 2008), whilst private pensions 
and private financial income account for only 5 per cent of retirement income in Italy 
(OECD, 2009a).147 In these two countries, the model with only nominal bonds is 
likely to be more appropriate, giving an implied welfare gain that is around ten times 
larger and clearly non-trivial. Canada is a country in which nominal assets play an 
important role (Meh and Terajima, 2008), but where indexation of public sector 
pensions and government bonds is relatively low and real assets are an important 
source of retirement income. As such, Model (2) is likely to be most appropriate, 
suggesting a welfare gain that lies between the extremes just discussed.
A second important point from Table 5.1 is that there is considerable sensitivity to 
both risk aversion and nominal volatility. The former is important because risk 
aversion will potentially vary across countries, and because economists have not yet a 
reached a consensus on its correct calibration due to inability of dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models to match ‘risk premia’ in the data (Rudebusch 
and Swanson, 2008; Cochrane, 2001; Mehra and Prescott, 1985). To the extent that 
the degree of risk aversion is uncertain, the potential welfare gain from PLT is also. 
An interesting issue that has not been addressed in this thesis is the extent to which
147 This figure is based on data for the ‘m id -2000s’ and refers to the incom e o f  over-65s, excluding any 
earnings from work or incom e from self-em ploym ent.
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adopting a different specification for consumers preferences would affect the 
estimated long-term welfare gain from PLT and inflation risk premia. As discussed 
below, this is a potentially fruitful extension for future research.
Turning to nominal volatility, there is clear heterogeneity across countries in terms of 
inflation variability, including amongst IT countries (Dotsey, 2006). It has been 
argued in the literature that the Great Moderation may be due to favourable shocks 
(the ‘Good Luck’ hypothesis) rather than improved monetary policy, so the coming 
decades may see a rise in inflation volatility above current levels, increasing the 
potential welfare gain from PLT. It should also be noted that the level of long-term 
nominal volatility under IT is itself highly uncertain, since the IT approach to 
monetary policy has been in place only a relatively short period of time. Due to the 
uncertainties surrounding nominal volatility and the extent of risk aversion, the long­
term welfare gain from PLT was not precisely estimated. However, based on Table 
5.1, the long-term welfare gain in developed economies should lie between 0.005 and 
0.173 per cent of aggregate consumption. Although these estimated gains are 
relatively small, it should be noted that consumption risk for old generations (i.e. 
pensioners) is reduced substantially in all three models -  a result which is strongly 
robust to both risk aversion and nominal volatility.
Turning to the inflation risk-premia results summarised in Table 5.2, there is also 
considerable sensitivity to model specification, risk aversion and nominal volatility. 
Therefore, the importance o f inflation risk premia is likely to vary across countries 
with the extent of nominal volatility and risk aversion, as well with the importance of 
nominal, indexed and real assets in retirement income portfolios. For example, in 
countries like Canada and Germany where nominal assets play a substantive role, the 
absolute reduction in the inflation risk premium under PLT could be considerable. On 
the other hand, the reduction in the inflation risk premium would likely be small in 
countries like the UK and US where indexed government bonds have a substantial 
share and almost one-half o f retirement income comes from private pensions and 
private financial income (OECD, 2009a).148 Interestingly, inflation risk premia are not 
sensitive to variations the asset holding horizon from 25 to 35 years, a period that can
148 As in the reference to Italy above, these figures are based on data for the ‘m id-2000s’ and refer to 
the incom e o f  over-65s, excluding any earnings from work or incom e from self-employment.
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be said to cover long-term maturities’. This result provides important information for 
governments that issue long-term nominal debt,149 and also for monetary 
policymakers who must consider how changes in short-term interest rates are likely to 
impact upon longer-term interest rates at various horizons.
One potential issue with the estimated risk premia from the three models is that they 
are rather low compared to what has been estimated in the data — an issue with DSGE 
models more generally. In order to address these concerns, the analysis also focused 
on the percentage reduction in the inflation risk premium under PLT, as reported in 
the last row of Table 5.2 (for the baseline calibrations). A key conclusion is that PLT 
leads to a reduction in the inflation risk premium of over 90 per cent — a result which 
is strongly robust to risk aversion and nominal volatility, and also across model 
specifications. This result suggests that any given country that switches from IT to 
PLT could in the long run expect a significant proportional reduction in the inflation 
risk premium on its long-term nominal government debt. Moreover, although the 
proportional gains are largest at over 95 per cent in models (1) and (2) where there are 
no indexed bonds, this conclusion depends crucially on indexation being optimised in 
response to monetary policy. Indeed, if  the share of indexed bonds is set fairly low as 
in developed economies currently, the proportional reduction in the inflation risk 
premium in Model (3) is closer to that in the other two models.
Finally, it should be noted that although the inflation risk premium results relate to 
nominal bonds issued by the government, it does not follow that the results hold no 
useful policy implications for public sector pensions. Notably, the result that the 
inflation risk premium is substantially lower under PLT is potentially important for 
pensions because it suggests that, other things being equal, risk-averse consumers will 
be willing to save more in nominal pensions under PLT than IT. This should be an 
important consideration for the many developed economies in which savings rates are 
low and where the affordability o f public sector pensions is a major public policy 
issue.
149 For instance, issuance o f  nom inal governm ent debt is often concentrated at particular maturities, as 
noted in Chapter 2.
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To summarise, the main policy implication is that the long-term welfare gain from 
PLT will be small but economically non-trivial. Moreover, the welfare benefit is 
likely to vary substantially across countries, and also over time as performance under 
IT improves or deteriorates. In countries in which private sector pensions are 
important, IT performs well, and risk aversion is low, the long-term welfare gain from 
PLT is likely to be relatively small. Conversely, countries where public sector 
pensions are dominant, nominal volatility is substantial, and indexation of government 
bonds is relatively low would have most to gain in the long-term from PLT. Though 
targeting the price level leads to a substantial reduction in the inflation risk premium 
on long-term nominal government debt, an overlapping generations framework with 
additional transmission mechanisms is needed to assess directly the implications of 
this result for social welfare. Such an analysis would be a useful extension for future 
research.
5.6 Contributions to the literature and future research
The key results discussed above have important implications for future research, as 
does the modelling methodology employed to obtain these results. This brief final 
section first discusses these implications and then turns to the overall contributions of 
the thesis to the monetary policy literature.
Firstly, since the welfare gain could not be estimated precisely and the models have 
not been tested empirically, further research is needed to evaluate the long-term 
welfare impact o f PLT. Ideally, this research should be conducted in more 
comprehensive models o f the economy of the kind used at central banks. However, 
given the numerous advantages o f the OLG framework exemplified in this thesis, it 
seems preferable to conduct such analyses within an overlapping generations 
framework -  at least as a starting point.150 For example, future research could extend 
the basic OLG set-up presented here to include additional assets or a bequest motive, 
and could be precisely calibrated to data along the lines of the papers by Dopeke and 
Schneider (2006) and Meh et al. (2010). Models of this kind should be a useful tool
150 That is, unless a ‘n ew ’ D SG E m odel soon  em erges in w hich long-term inflation risk has a direct 
impact on social welfare.
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for central banks seeking to conduct microfounded quantitative policy evaluations 
over a long-term horizon.
Secondly, the substantial reduction in optimal indexation under PLT suggests that it is 
crucial for future policy analyses comparing IT and PLT to endogenise the degree of 
nominal indexation. Indeed, models that do not endogenise the extent of indexation in 
response to monetary policy will be vulnerable to the Lucas critique and may give rise 
to seriously misleading results in forecasting or policy analyses. This conclusion 
applies both to smaller theoretical models used in academic circles and to larger 
models of the kind used for policy analysis by central banks and policy institutions 
(see e.g. Laxton, 2008). Most notably, the optimal indexation results have clear 
import for central banks like the Bank of Canada that are considering switching from 
IT to PLT in the future and are interested in evaluating the two regimes in simulated 
models of the economy.
Thirdly, as noted above, an interesting issue left unexplored in this thesis is the impact 
of the specification o f consumer preferences on the estimated welfare impact from 
PLT and on inflation risk premia. This is a potentially important issue because the 
welfare gain from PLT depends crucially on its impact on consumption risk, which 
has a second-order impact on social welfare. Adopting a preference specification 
better able to match asset risk-premia like habit formation or Epstein-Zin preferences 
would likely increase the welfare gain from PLT substantially, since an increase in 
risk aversion increases the importance of second-order terms in utility.151 However, 
whilst these other specifications o f preferences do a better job at matching asset risk- 
premia (De Paoli and Zabczyk, 2008; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) and other 
higher-order effects like precautionary behaviour (De Paoli and Zabczyk, 2011), they 
simultaneously reduce the ability o f models to fit other stylised macroeconomic facts 
like volatilities (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008).152 It is therefore important for future 
research using alternative preferences to investigate these knock-on effects as well.
151 To give a familiar exam ple, the coeffic ien t o f  relative risk aversion under external habit formation is 
given by <5/(1 -h) com pared to on ly <5 w ith constant relative risk aversion, where 0 < h <  1 is the ‘habit 
s ize’ coefficient on  past aggregate consum ption and <5 is the risk aversion coefficient.
152 Epstein-Zin preferences are potentially less vulnerable to this criticism  because they enable 
researchers to calibrate separately the coeffic ien t o f  relative risk aversion and the elasticity o f  
intertemporal substitution. H ow ever, these preferences still require implausibly high calibrations for
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Lastly, other potentially useful extensions for future research include relaxing the 
assumption that PLT is perceived as perfectly credible by economic agents and 
amending the assumption that the price level is returned to its target path within one 
year. On this last point, the monetary policy literature has noted that returning the 
price level to trend this quickly could lead to excessive output volatility (see Smets, 
2003). Importantly, incorporating a longer horizon for returning the price level to 
target would eliminate some o f the reduction in long-term inflation risk under PLT, 
thereby reducing the estimated welfare gain, as well as the reductions in consumption 
risk and inflation risk premia attained under PLT. The importance of the target 
horizon for the results in this thesis is an interesting issue that is left for future 
research.
There are a several general contributions o f the thesis that have potential importance 
for the conduct of economic research in the future. The key ones are as follows. 
Firstly, we have seen that the OLG life-cycle model can be fruitfully used to study the 
optimal conduct of monetary policy over a long-term horizon. Indeed, as noted in 
chapters 1 and 2, a key advantage of the OLG life-cycle framework over the 
workhorse New Keynesian model is that it enables researchers to model explicitly the 
impact of long-term inflation risk on social welfare using consumer utility. In 
addition, the OLG framework is also an extremely transparent framework for long­
term analyses, an important potential advantage that is often overlooked by economic 
researchers.
Secondly, we have seen that an OLG modelling framework can be used to study long­
term risk premia on financial assets, in particular when those premia depend crucially 
on the monetary policy regime in place. Although this is not a use to which OLG 
models have typically been put in the literature, it is nevertheless a potentially useful 
one -  in particular, because it avoids the need to build-up the term structure explicitly 
quarter-by-quarter (or year-by-year) in simulations, a formidable and time-consuming 
task which likely explains why there has been no previous research estimating long­
term inflation risk premia in fully-specified DSGE models. Moreover, as noted above, 
the overlapping generations framework presented in this thesis could potentially be
risk aversion (see Rudebusch and Swanson, 2009), and it is not clear how  preferences o f  this kind 
could be introduced in an OLG fram ework g iven  that they are recursive.
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extended in order to analyse directly the social welfare implications of a reduction in 
the inflation risk premium under PLT. Last but not least, although it has not been an 
aim of this thesis, the OLG modelling framework presented here could be used to 
study the redistributive effects of PLT on young and old generations, as well as the 
extent to which these effects are likely to vary across countries and over time.
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